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Abstract and Keywords 
Brazil’s toll-highway system is among the most extensive tolling systems on the planet. 
This extensive toll-highway system affects millions of Brazilians, particularly because it 
is increasingly difficult for Brazilians to move between work and home without passing 
through a number of toll gates. Moreover, most toll roads in Brazil have been conceded 
from the government to private actors, and regulations governing the actions of these 
private actors (and the rates they charge to highway users) are sparse.  This thesis will 
examine the nature of the highway toll industry in Brazil, the laws conceding toll roads to 
private actors, and the general lack of regulation of privately operated toll roads in Brazil. 
It will conclude that the current regulatory regime amounts to a violation of the 
Lawfulness Principle of the Brazilian Constitution.  
 
Keywords: Highway Tolls, Brazil, Lack of Regulation, Lawfulness Principle, Legality, 
General Law of Concessions. 
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Os amores na mente, as 
flores no chão, a certeza 
na frente a história na 
mão, caminhando e 
cantando e seguindo a 
canção, aprendendo e 
ensinando uma nova 
lição... 
Vem, vamos embora que 
esperar não é saber, quem 
sabe faz a hora 
não espera acontecer... 
 
Música  –  Pra não dizer que 
não falei das flores 
 
The loved ones in mind, the 
flowers on the floor, 
confidence ahead and the 
history in (our) hands.  
Walking and singing  
and following the song,  
learning and teaching  
a new lesson...  
Come on, let's go,  
expect is not wise,  
who is wise, makes it 
happen,  
doesn’t expect it to happen 
...    
 
Song – (It is) Not to say 
that I have not mentioned 
the flowers 
 
Geraldo Vandré (1935 –      ) 
Brazilian singer  
Song placed in the second position in the Third 
International Song Festival in 1968 of Globo 
Television, thereafter, execution forbidden until for 
many years by the military dictatorship in Brazil 
(1964 – 1985). 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
  Most of Brazil’s toll-highway system is illegal. While Brazil’s domestic and 
Constitutional laws permit the use of toll-highways for the raising of public revenue, 
Brazil’s current toll-highway system violates several existing statutory and Constitutional 
norms. Generally speaking, these violations relate to Brazil’s “Lawfulness Principle”, 
that is, the principle that all state actions are prima facie illegal unless authorized by clear 
and specific laws.
1
   
  Brazil’s current toll road regime violates the Lawfulness Principle in two specific, 
related ways, which I shall refer to as (a) failure to address operational concerns and (b) 
failure to authorize concessions. These two failures of Brazil’s toll highway system – 
failures which will be explored throughout this thesis – can be summarized as follows:  
 
1 – Failure to Address Operational Concerns: Brazil’s current legal regime is 
unconstitutionally vague in that it fails to address core issues pertaining to the operation 
of toll road systems. For example, there are no regulations governing the types of 
highways subject to tolls, no provisions governing the collection of tolls, no laws 
establishing toll rates, no laws clarifying the ownership of collected tolls, and no laws
2
 
governing the proper use of funds raised through tolls. Where a law purports to concede a 
public resource to a private actor, Brazil’s Constitution requires that the law must specify, 
                                                 
1
 The content and impact of the Lawfulness principle will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
2
 The General Law of Concessions – Federal Law 8,987 of 1995 of 13 February 1995 – is the general legal 
authority governing highway concessions. This statute governs the concession of numerous types of 
resources and government undertakings. As I will demonstrate later in this thesis, the General Law of 
Concessions fails to provide the level of detail necessary for compliance with Brazil’s Lawfulness 
principle. 
 
  
2 
among other things, the terms of the concession itself and procedures to be followed in 
the making of the concession and the future operation and maintenance of the conceded 
resource.   
 
2 – Failure to Authorize Concessions. Brazilian laws purporting to authorize the 
concession of public highways to private actors are impermissibly vague. One corollary 
of Brazil’s Lawfulness Principle is the requirement of specificity: limitations on personal 
liberty must be spelled out by clear laws which specify the nature and extent of the 
relevant state action. Brazil’s Lawfulness Principle requires more than what the current 
concession regime provides (namely, a single, sweeping concession of toll highways).
3
 
On the contrary, the Lawfulness Principle requires a specific law governing each act of 
concession, with each such law addressing specific legal issues that relate to such 
concessions. That is, the Lawfulness Principle requires that, for every state action which 
affects the life of Brazilian citizens, the assets of the public administration, public 
contracts or agreements, public expenses, sales of public assets, etc. – there must be 
specific statutory authorization.  
 As we shall see in future chapters, the regime governing toll roads in Brazil fails 
to comply with the foregoing requirements of Brazil’s Lawfulness Principle. There is no 
statute expressly authorizing the concession of toll highways in Brazil, and such laws as 
do exist fail to address important operational issues. As a result, in most cases the 
executive lacks legal authority for the concessions it has granted. 
                                                 
3
 This concession Law, entitled “The General Law of Concessions” is fully described and assessed in 
Chapter 3.  
  
3 
  Chapter 1 of this thesis addresses an important preliminary question: Why are 
there toll roads in Brazil?  What specific policy goals and benefits are sought through the 
creation of a toll road system and the concession of that toll road system to private 
actors? Chapter 1 explores three answers to that question.  They relate to (1) funding 
policy, (2) environmental policy, and (3) other miscellaneous benefits from tolls. Each 
such benefit is examined in chapter 1. 
 Chapter 2 of this thesis will provide a brief introduction to (a) the Brazilian Legal 
System, and (b) the current toll road system in Brazil. Chapter 3 contains the core legal 
argument of the thesis and will be devoted to a comparison of the tolling system in Brazil 
with the requirements of Brazil’s Lawfulness Principle.  
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Chapter I 
Why Toll Roads? An Examination of the Benefits of Toll Road Systems 
1.1 The Lack of Public Investment in Highways  
Over the last decade, Brazil has suffered from a dramatic reduction of public 
investment in public transportation. In 2003, for example, public investment in Brazil’s 
infrastructure was reduced from 2.4% to only 1% of the country’s GDP.4 This drop in 
public support for infrastructure included a massive drop in support for public highways. 
 While investment has dropped off, deterioration has accelerated, suggesting that 
investment in infrastructure ought to be rising, rather than falling, in order to slow or 
repair this deterioration. An engineering study of the Foundation for Technological 
                                                 
4
 José Roberto Afonso and Geraldo Biasoto Jr. “Investimento Público no Brasil – Diagnosticos e 
proposições” [Public Investment in Brazil: Diagnosis and Propositions] (2007) BNDES Magazine, volume 
14, number 27, June, pages 71-122. Both leading Brazilian economists demonstrate the drastic reduction of 
investment in infrastructure in Brazil.  
“This path of public sector investment has an even more negative scenario when it is considered only the 
investment made in infrastructure (the combination of investments in transport, energy, communications 
and sanitation). Fixed investment in the sector (i.e., even including large State owned corporations) in 
infrastructure, which was already low in 1995 (only 2.4% of GDP) declined by almost 60% until 2003, 
when barely surpassed 1% of the GDP. Radically different was the trend observed by the public sector 
primary surplus, which rose from 0.3% to 3.9% of GDP between 1995 and 2003, as well as by interest 
expenses, which rose further, from 6.9% to 8.5% of the GDP over the same period (see Table 6). Clearly, 
the success of the Brazilian fiscal adjustment was recorded as a depression of fixed investments, especially 
those invested in infrastructure.” (Translated from Portuguese by the author). 
In Portuguese: “Essa trajetória do investimento do setor público apresenta um quadro ainda mais negativo 
quando consideradas apenas as aplicações realizadas em infra-estrutura (o conjunto formado por ações de 
transportes, energia, comunicações e saneamento). O investimento fixo do setor (ou seja, mesmo 
computadas grandes empresas estatais) em infra-estrutura, que já era baixo em 1995 (apenas 2,4% do PIB), 
diminuiu em quase 60% até 2003, quando mal superou a casa de 1% do PIB. Radicalmente outra foi a 
trajetória observada pelo superávit primário do setor público, que subiu de 0,3% para 3,9% do PIB entre 
1995 e 2003, bem assim pelas despesas com juros, que subiram ainda mais, de 6,9% para 8,5% do PIB, no 
mesmo período (vide Tabela 6). Fica claro que o sucesso do ajuste fiscal brasileiro teve como contrapartida 
uma depressão dos investimentos fixos, ainda mais daqueles aplicados em infra-estrutura.” 
  
5 
Engineering Development (FDTE) and Brazilian Development Bank
5
 gave the following 
account of reasons for the lack of public investment:  
The persistence over the last years of limited investment capacity of the various levels of 
government – through budget funds – forced the Union, States and Municipalities to drastically 
reduce the resources devoted to the maintenance and expansion of the highway system in Brazil.  
The result was a growing deterioration of the quality of the highways, accompanied, for some, 
by a limited capacity against the growing demand for its use. The constraints that States and the 
Union have to tackle this problem are due not only to the lack of budgetary resources, but also to 
administrative difficulties in resources management and technical operation of highways. 
 
As a result, governments at all levels lack the funds to improve or even maintain 
Brazil’s highway system, giving rise to quickening deterioration of Brazil’s 
transportation network.  If this deterioration is to be halted – and if Brazil’s transportation 
network is to be improved to accommodate growing demand – the government must look 
for new means of funding the transportation network, and innovative methods of 
investing in infrastructure. 
 The improvement and maintenance of highway infrastructure is important for 
economic development. According to Duflo and Qian
6
, investment in (and maintenance 
of) highway infrastructure assists economic development by integration, mobility and by 
the increase of movement of goods and services: 
There are a number of reasons why good transportation infrastructure is advantageous for 
economic development. First, it reduces trade costs and promotes market integration. This 
should reduce price volatility and reallocate resources in line with comparative advantage. It also 
increases market size which allows firms to capture gains from increasing returns and promotes 
more intense competition. Second, it promotes factor mobility. It is easier to migrate to the city if 
one can come back easily whenever needed. It is easier to lend to someone whose project you 
                                                 
5
 See document online. Only in portuguese:  
<http://3etapaconcessoes.antt.gov.br/upd_blob/0001/1204.pdf> (Accessed on 24 April 2013). 
6
 Abhijit Banerjee Esther Duflo and Nancy Qian. On the Road: Access to Transportation Infrastructure and 
Economic Growth in China (2009) Working Paper. MIT. The authors assert that healthy infrastructure is 
advantageous for economic development. See also Rebecca Shah and Richard Batley. Private-Sector 
Investment in Infrastructure: Rationale and Causality for Pro-poor Impacts (2009) Development Policy 
Review, Vol 27. No. 4, pp. 397-417.  
  
6 
can visit. It is easier to put your savings in a bank if the bank is more accessible. Third, it is 
easier to take advantage of opportunities for investment in the human capital: you can send your 
child to a better school or take him to a better doctor. Fourth, and more intangibly, the free 
movement of people and goods may bring with it new aspirations, new ideas, and information 
about new technologies. 
All of these reasons can generate increases in output, which, in the short run, also leads to faster 
growth. In China, the corridors themselves are typically more than a hundred years old. If China 
were an economy nearing steady state, one might have imagined that the growth impact would 
be small. But the years we study (1986-2003) are years of explosive growth in China. Therefore, 
all of China is probably best thought of as being in transition. Given this, it is not hard to 
imagine that there would be both level and growth effects. 
 
The need for investment in (and maintenance) of Brazil’s highway-transport 
network, coupled with the public administration’s failure to prioritize such investments7, 
have recently led to a spree of concessions of highways as one of the government’s chief 
policy priorities. In large part, the private investment has taken place through the vehicle 
of concessions
8
 to private actors. Through these concessions, the government concedes 
public highways to private actors, allowing these private actors (“concessionaires”) to 
collect (and keep) tolls for use of the highway while typically giving those private actors 
                                                 
7
 The lack of resources is a common sense and it is an argument of both parties – the governments and the 
private entrepreneurs that manage the highways. Available in Portuguese at: 
<http://www.antt.gov.br/acpublicas/apublica2008_94/EstudosTecnicos/BR381/EstudosdeEngenhariaII_Par
te1.pdf> (accessed on 17 May 2010) 
It can be found at the Annual Report of 2007 of the Brazilian Association of Highway Concessionaires 
(ABCR) with the following reasons:  
“At the beginning of the highways concessions program, ABCR’s challenge was to show the society that 
the decision to transfer the administration of important sections of Brazilian highways to private enterprise 
was right. After all, the management, maintenance and expansion of these highways had been jeopardized 
due to a lack of public resources and increasingly more complex operational demands. Eleven years later, 
except for isolated positions, the country recognizes the capacity of the concessionaires to make large 
investments in the operation, maintenance, improvement and expansion of highways, for which they took 
charge. By joining their experiences, companies and public agents, they were able to aggregate new 
technologies to conceded highways, especially those applied to pavement, safety and signalling.” Annual 
Report of 2007 of the Brazilian Association of Highway Concessionaires. Online in English: 
<http://www.abcr.org.br/download/RelatorioAnual2007.pdf> (accessed on 14 July 2009) 
8
 For example, the concession of the BR-116 (BR-116 is a highway number) in 1996 – named highway 
President Dutra, the most important highway of the country, which connects the two largest cities of Brazil  
– São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Chapter 2 will enumerate the conceded highways in the country. 
  
7 
the responsibility for, most of the time, maintaining and, in some cases, improving the 
capacity of the highway.  
1.2 The Economic Benefits of Tolls 
 The lack of sufficient investment by the public sector to finance transport 
infrastructure, together with the growing expenditures associated with that infrastructure, 
have constrained the public authorities to allow private enterprises to participate more 
actively in this sector through concessions.  
The fact that the revenue obtained through taxes has not been allocated
9
 toward 
investments in infrastructure and transportation, i.e., to finance road construction and 
maintenance has compelled transport authorities to look for alternative solutions for 
infrastructure funding and development, not only for highways but also on ports, airports 
and railroads.  The most important projects for the purpose of encouraging investment in 
Brazil’s infrastructure are those related to public highways.  These projects have taken 
the form of highway concessions from the federal government to private actors.  Phase 1 
of this program of concessions and implemented by President Cardoso
10
 between 1994 
and 1998, was launched by the Brazilian government through the National Department of 
Highways
11
 (DNER). Through these concessions, the government generates significant 
revenues for public purposes, while the private concessionaires generate massive profits 
through the collection of tolls and the operation of concessions (the details of this 
arrangement are spelled out in chapter 2). 
                                                 
9
 See supra note 4. 
10
 34
th
 President of the Federal Republic of Brazil between 1st January 1995 and 31st December of 2002. 
11
 Official name in Portuguese: (former) Departamento Nacional de Estradas de Rodagem (DNER), 
currently Departamento Nacional de Infraestrutura de Transportes (DNIT) [National Department of 
Transport Infrastructure] [translated by author] 
  
8 
 To summarize, the purpose of Brazil’s program of highway concessions was to 
allow the government to achieve a sustainable level of investment in public works while 
(a) minimizing the level of public money needed to achieve such investments
12
, and (b) 
creating opportunities for the government’s private sector partners.  
 1.3 The Environmental Claim 
 At the beginning of the 1980s Brazil started to develop its legal framework 
pertaining to environmental matters. The National Environmental Policy
 
Act
13
 included 
provisions concerning environmental policy consistent with the principles and rules 
established by the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment of Stockholm,
14
 Sweden in 1972.  This event was held to coordinate 
international policy and the final Declaration contains 26 principles concerning the 
environment and development. 
                                                 
12
 The primary expenditures of the Brazilian federal government, i.e., the public payroll and the public 
expenditures required to maintain the public facilities and to provide social security and pension benefits, 
corresponded 14.01% of the GDP in 1997. In 2009 the primary expenditures increased to 17.96% of the 
GDP, a growth of 28.19% in 13 years. The nominal expenditures, that is, the amount of public resources of 
the federal government went from $131,5 billion Reais in 1997 to $572,1 billion Reais in 2009 – a growth 
of 435.05% in the same period. Available online at the National Treasury website: 
<www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/hp/downloads/resultado/Tabela3.xls>  
On the other hand  (as seen at the supra note 2) and regardless of the extraordinary increase on primary 
expenditures of the federal government, the investment in highways has decreased over the years. 
13
 BRAZIL, National Environmental Policy Act, Federal Law 6,938 of 31 August 1981. 
National Environmental Policy Act deals with the National Environment Policy.  
As the article 2nd states, the act establishes the National Environmental Policy which “is aimed at the 
preservation, improvement and restoration of environmental quality conducive to life, to ensure in the 
country, the conditions for socio-economic development, the interests of national security and the 
protection of the dignity of human life, attended the following principles:” 
14
 U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972) (Stockholm – Sweden : UN, from 5 to 16 
June 1972). Online: 
<http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503> (accessed 
on 15 June 2009) 
  
9 
  The foundations of Brazil’s legal framework for environmental law are found in 
Article 170, subsection VI
15
 of the Federal Constitution:  
Article 170. The economic order, founded on the appreciation of the value of human labor and 
on free enterprise, is intended to ensure everyone a life with dignity, in accordance with the 
dictates of social justice, with due regard for the following principles: 
(…) 
VI – environment protection, including by means of different treatments in accordance with the 
environmental impact of products and services and their respective production and rendering; 
(subsection amended by Constitutional Amendment 42
 
of 19 December 2003). 
   
According to this Article, there is a constitutional requirement to pursue 
economic development with “due regard” for environmental protection. Added to this 
requirement is Article 225
16
 of the Constitution, which is an exhaustive provision on 
environmental matters.  This Article deals with the preservation of the environment as a 
whole and the promotion of environmental education and public awareness of the need to 
preserve the environment. 
  Brazil’s Constitution requires the government to develop and give support to 
public policies concerning the preservation of the environment. One of the main concerns 
of our contemporary world is environmental degradation, i.e., the deterioration of the 
environment through the destruction of ecosystems, depletion of air, water and soil 
resources and the extinction of wildlife.   
                                                 
15
 BRAZIL. Federal Constitution. Article 170, VI. [translated by author]: “Artigo 170 – A ordem 
econômica, fundada na valorização do trabalho humano e na livre iniciativa, tem por fim assegurar a todos 
existência digna, conforme os ditames da justiça social, observados os seguintes princípios: 
... 
VI - defesa do meio ambiente, inclusive mediante tratamento diferenciado conforme o impacto ambiental 
dos produtos e serviços e de seus processos de elaboração e prestação; (Redação dada pela Emenda 
Constitucional nº 42, de 19.12.2003)” 
16
 Article 225 of the Federal Constitution of Brazil can be found online (in English):  
<http://web.mit.edu/12.000/www/m2006/teams/willr3/const.htm> (accessed on 5 February 2013) 
  
10 
Because environmental protection is enshrined in Brazil’s Constitution, it has 
become a fundamental element of Brazilian Law. As a result, it is a principle against 
which other constitutional rights must be balanced. Fiorillo e Rodrigues (1999)
17
 quoting 
Canotilho and Moreira, reaffirm that some restrictions, including tolls and related charges 
for the use of public resources, may be applied to the exercise of Brazilians’ 
constitutional rights as a result of environmental concerns:  
The protection of the environment may justify some restrictions to other protected constitutional 
rights. Thus, for example, the freedom of construction always connected with the right of 
property is configured nowadays as the potential freedom of construction which includes the 
rules of environmental protection.  
 
As will be seen in Section 1.3.1, below, the concession of highways to private 
actors might be seen as one way of promoting environmental policies by inhibiting 
environmental degradation.  
1.3.1 Environmental Policies  
 In addition to providing much-needed funding for transport infrastructure, toll 
roads may serve the purpose of decelerating environmental degradation. The ability of 
toll charges to form a component of environmental policy can be demonstrated through 
the example of “congestion charges”18 now used in England and Sweden. 
                                                 
17
 Celso Antonio Paduco Fiorillo and Marcelo Abelha Rodrigues. Manual de Direito Ambiental e 
legislação aplicável. [Enviromental Law Manual and applicable legislation] (1999) . São Paulo: Max 
limonad. [Translated by author]:  
“A defesa do meio ambiente pode justificar restrições a outros direitos constitucionalmente protegidos. 
Assim, por exemplo, a liberdade de construção, que muitas vezes se considera inerente ao direito de 
propriedade, é hoje configurada como liberdade de construção potencial, nas quais se incluem as normas de 
proteção ao meio ambiente.” 
18
 Congestion charge is a fee for motorists travelling within some zone of city centers to relive the traffic 
and improve the air quality.  
  
11 
Congestion charges are fees charged to motorists driving within congested city 
centers. These charges were created for the purpose of relieving traffic jams and air 
pollution and to encourage people to use public transit, car pool or ride bicycles to work. 
Todd Litman
19
 ably summarizes the impact of congestion charges: 
Just over a million people enter central London during a typical weekday morning peak  (7-10am). 
Over 85% of these trips are by public transport. Prior to the congestion pricing program about 
12% of peak-period trips were by private automobile. During the programs first few months 
automobile traffic declined about 20% (a reduction of about 20,000 vehicles per day), resulting in 
a 10% automobile mode share.   
The majority of drivers changing their travel patterns due to the charge have transferred to public 
transport with many choosing to travel by bus. Some, who had previously used central London as 
a cut through, have diverted from the zone. The remainder have switched to using their cars at 
different times, to different destinations, to taxis, motorcycles, pedal cycles, or to walking. 
 
These changes are also a way to raise funds to finance public transportation 
infrastructure. As an example, the city of London, England
20
 has adopted the congestion 
charge as a way to fund the maintenance of highways while at the same time reducing 
traffic congestion. Data collected by the city of London
21
 demonstrates that this policy 
has had the effect of reducing traffic
22
 in London’s city center while also raising funds for 
investment in London's transport system. Another report
23
 has pointed out that the city’s 
                                                 
19
 Todd Litman. “London Congestion Pricing. Implications for Other Cities.” (2004) (Victoria, BC : 
Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2004) 
 
20
 See official website of Transport of London online: 
<http://www.tfl.gov.uk/roadusers/congestioncharging/default.aspx> (accessed on 3 April 2009). 
21
 See footnote 19 above.  
22
 Data of the official Transportation website of the city of London shows that £137 million (about 203 
million of US Dollars) has been raised, in the financial year 2007/08, to invest back and improve 
transportation in London; 
23
 Sixth Annual Impacts Monitoring Report. Available online: 
<http://www.tfl.gov.uk/assets/downloads/sixth-annual-impacts-monitoring-report-2008-07.pdf> (accessed 
on 18 May 2010) 
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congestion in London is caused by the decreasing levels of road space
24
 and the 
congestion charge/fee would lead to reduced traffic.
25
  
 Motorized transportation is a major source of greenhouse gas emissions causing 
environmental problems. According to Oliveira:
26
  
Land transportation (48.6%) and methane from landﬁlls (23.5%) are the main sources of 
greenhouse gas emissions from the city of Sao Paulo, encompassing almost three forth of the 
total emissions. 
 
  Tolling and road pricing policies may be a method – among several other 
policies
27
  – of reducing the impact of vehicles’ gas emission on the environment. The 
congestion charge (which is simply a form of toll) is an efficient tool to motivate people 
                                                 
24
 The official Transportation website of the city of London, England  has shown the benefits of such 
obligation: 
 Traffic entering the original charging zone remains 21 per cent lower than  pre-charge levels 
(70,000 fewer cars a day); 
 Traffic entering the Western Extension has fallen by 14 per cent (30,000 fewer cars a day); 
 There has been a six per cent increase in bus passengers during charging hours;  
 There has been a 12 per cent increase in cycle journeys into the Western Extension; 
25
 In Canada, Toronto’s environmental commissioner is considering to adopt the United Kingdom’s 
“congestion charge” model, due to the huge congestion problems faced by Canada’s largest metropolis. 
Michael Vaughan. Look out for a Toronto congestion charge. Globe and Mail. (16 June 2010). Online: 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-drive/look-out-for-a-toronto-congestion-charge/article1606576/> 
(accessed on 19 November 2010):  
 “Ontario environmental commissioner recommends tolls to cut emissions 
It seems all but inevitable now that tax-happy Ontario and tax-loving Toronto will start charging drivers for 
using the roads. Ontario’s (non-elected) environmental commissioner Gord Miller has recommended tolls 
and congestion charges similar to those in place in London, England, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  
It’s interesting to look at London’s experience with congestion charges to get a sense of what’s coming 
here. The original congestion charge was introduced in February, 2003, at £5 ($7.50) a day and currently 
stands at £8 a day. Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London, plans to raise it to £10 a day while giving a free 
pass to drivers of low-emission vehicles.”  
Toronto is the 5
th
 largest metropolis in North America. See Toronto overview at the City of Toronto official 
website, online at <http://www.toronto.ca/invest-in-toronto/tor_overview.htm> (accessed on 22 February 
2011) 
26
 Jose Antonio Puppim de Oliveira. “The implementation of climate change related policies at the sub 
national level: An analysis of three countries.” Habitat International 33 (2009) 253–259. 
27
 Others environmental policies to reduce pollution include HOV (high occupancy vehicle) lanes, the 
encouragement of public transport use over private cars and the promotion of clean energy vehicles. 
See Shama, M. A.. Energy and Environment in Engineering Education, AEJ, Vol.36. (1997) Faculty of 
Engineering, Alexandria University, Egypt.  
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to use mass transit, and it has the capacity to reduce the emission of pollutants.
28
 In 
Milan, Italy, with the implementation of congestion pricing, there was a reduction of 
carbon dioxide by 15% (among other gas emissions) and an increase of 9.2% in the use 
of public transportation. 
The policy and enforcement of tolls and congestion charges applied on roads 
may, generally
29
, decrease the amount of congestion and consequently reduce emission of 
pollutants in the air. The reason, of course, is that tolls and congestion pricing make it 
more expensive to drive.
30
 As the cost of driving increases, we are likely to see a decrease 
in the demand for driving. That is, fewer people will drive if it costs more to drive. If 
fewer people drive, the rate of emissions and the congestion may lower.
31
   
                                                 
28
 See Lucia Rotaris, Romeo Danielis, Edoardo Marcucci, Jérôme Massiani. The urban road pricing 
scheme to curb pollution in Milan: a preliminary assessment. (Trieste :Università di Trieste - Dipartimento 
di Economia e Scienze Statistiche, 2009), about congestion charge of Milan – Italy: 
“… 
Pollution abatement 
It is claimed that the MES (Author’s Note – MES means Milan Ecopass Scheme)  reduced air emissions of 
PM10 by 19% (Author’s Note – PM means particulate matter or fine particles - also called soot. They are 
tiny subdivisions of solid matter suspended in a gas or liquid. 10 refers to particles of 10 micrometers – i.e. 
one-millionth of a metre  - 1/1,000 of a millimeter or less), of NOx by 14% (Author’s Note – NOx is the 
chemical formula of nitrogen oxides NO and NO2 - nitric oxide and nitrogen dioxide. They are produced 
from the reaction of nitrogen and oxygen gases in the air during combustion at high temperatures), and of 
CO2 by 15% (Author’s Note - CO2 is the chemical formula of carbon dioxide) (AMMA, 2008). 
Interestingly, similar results were obtained in London (-16%, -13,4% and -16%, respectively) and in 
Stockholm (-13%, -8,5% and -13%). 
… 
Modal transfer 
Public transport use, measured as the number of passengers exiting subway stations inside the tolled area, 
increased by 9.2%. No data are yet reported for buses.”  
29
 Certainly, there is a correlation between increased congestion and increased pollutants, because the same 
number of cars cause more pollutants when in congestion than they do when motoring-along freely.  
But a reduction of congestion does not necessarily mean a reduction of the amount of pollutants.  For 
example, if we doubled the number of cars on the road, but quadrupled the number of highways, we would 
reduce congestion by increasing the places where you could drive and thereby reducing traffic, but we 
would also increase pollutants because we would have doubled the number of cars on the road.   
30
 Tolls and congestion charges are additional expenditures – beside the ones that every vehicle owner must 
endure (as fuel, fuel taxes, vehicle insurance, licenses, permits and parking expenses, among others).  
31
 In economics, it is called price elasticity of demand or PED, which is the elasticity of the quantity 
demanded of a determined good or service to a change in its price. The PED can be measured regarding 
tolls versus travel demand. How sensitive is the road user to the cost of tolls? Samantha Ann Mohamed, a 
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  Toll roads may become a policy tool by which governments can slow the rate of 
environmental damage. Of course, the congestion and pollution may not decrease if the 
numbers of cars and drivers people increase at a rate that exceeds the effect of toll 
charges. For example, if Brazilians start driving 20% less due to the toll and congestion 
charges, but you suddenly double the number of drivers, overall emissions will rise 
despite congestion charges or highway tolls. That is what is happening now in Brazil with 
a high rate of growth of the national fleet (that is, the number of vehicles on Braizlian 
roads), according to the following clipping of the National Department of Traffic of 
Brazil: 
“Vehicle fleet grows 119% in ten years in Brazil, points National Department of Traffic 
(Denatran). The balance of the National Department of Traffic points out that Brazil ended 2010 
with exactly 64,817,974 licensed vehicles. In ten years, the cumulative increase is 119%, or 35 
million more vehicles arrived to the streets in the period.” 
 
 Despite this rise in the number of drivers, price theory suggests that the addition 
of toll charges, nevertheless, reduces the level of vehicle use below the level we would 
observe in the absence of those charges. All in all, tolls and traffic or congestion charges 
                                                                                                                                                 
south African scholar of the Cape Peninsula University of Technology conducted a research that shows the 
price elasticity of demand in the case of implementation of a congestion charge in Cape Town – South 
Africa, more precisely at the Cape Town business district (CBD), i.e., how road pricing would impact on 
road users’ behavior: “The introduction of an AM Peak cordon based charge of R50 could potentially 
reduce traffic volumes into the CBD on average by 12.56%. The reduction is based on travel demand 
elasticities of between -0.1 and -0.5. The potential reduction is within the reported range for road pricing of 
10% to 20% for affected travel as identified by Litman (2008). The results showed that even though there 
would resultantly be a decrease in traffic volumes, drivers would be less likely to change modes due only to 
an increase in travel costs. This finding is reinforced by the results of increasing the charge to R90, as it 
could potentially only reduce trips by at least 6.6%. An introduction of such high charge would give rise to 
socio-economic challenges, which the City would need to first address, along with a currently poorly 
perceived public transport system.” 
Samantha Ann Mohamed. “The feasibility of a congestion charge for Cape Town central business district 
from a traffic engineering perspective” (2008). CPUT Theses & Dissertations. Paper 68.  
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may be an answer and a restraint to air pollution
32
 caused by human activity and a matter 
of necessity. 
1.4 Tolling Policy Pros – The User-pay and the Polluter-pay Principles  
  Another benefit of the imposition of tolls on public highways relates to the “user-
pay”33 (or “polluter pay”) principle. In accordance with this principle, people who do not 
own a vehicle or do not use the highway should not be responsible for paying the cost of 
highway upkeep or environmental clean-up.  
  The “user-pay model” can be observed in action whenever people use a public 
facility or public resource, e.g., a public swimming pool, launching ramps on lakes, an ice 
rink, or a public zoo, etc. The payment of fees or charges is required for the use of some 
public facilities
34
 and the revenue raised by the charge or fee is used to fund the facility’s 
expenses. 
  Related to the “user-pay” principle is the environmental polluter-pay principle35 
where the polluter must pay the costs of pollution. As stated by Eric Larson:   
The Polluter Pays Principle is a normative doctrine of environmental law. Although the principle’s 
precise legal definition remains difficult to ascertain, the core of the principle derives from the 
fundamental, fair, and logical proposition that the parties who generate pollution, not the 
government, should bear the cost of abatement. 
 
  Of course, it is not merely drivers who are ultimately responsible for the use of 
roads. For example, non-driving consumers cause businesses to transport goods by 
                                                 
32
 The case of the congestion charge (as a similar fee as tolls on the highways), adopted by the city of 
London – UK, is a good example of how people decrease the use of vehicles and help the environment. 
33
 It is also called pay-per-use principle. 
34
 And that is why only those who benefit from the facility may pay.  
35
 See Eric Thomas Larson. “Why Environmental Liability Regimes in the United States, the European 
Community, and Japan Have Grown Synonymous with the Polluter Pays Principle” Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 38 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. (2005) page 545. 
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ordering goods that are not manufactured locally. In a case like this
36
 (where multiple 
parties are, in effect, responsible for the pollution), the effect of toll charges is to increase 
the cost of delivery, and the delivery company will pass this cost along to the ultimate 
consumer in the form of an increased price of either (a) the goods themselves, or (b) 
delivery. This principle is reflected in the concept of Pigouvian taxes. The Pigouvian Tax 
is well defined by Alain-Désiré Nimubona and Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné:
37
 
In his classical analysis of market failure, Arthur Pigou (1920) showed that the negative 
externalities caused by pollution would be internalized by the market if polluters paid a tax equal 
to the marginal social cost of polluting emissions. This proposition, derived under the assumption 
of perfect competition, was later amended by Buchanan (1969) and Barnett (1980): when the 
polluting industry is imperfectly competitive, an emission tax should be set lower than the 
marginal social cost of pollution, because it trades off the desire to provide incentives for 
abatement and the necessity to prevent a greater contraction of output. Several authors (see, for 
example, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas, 1995; Long and Soubeyran, 1999; Morgenstern, 1995; and 
Smith, 1992) have now explored, qualified and refined the latter conclusion under more specific 
industry structures. 
 
  In modern economics, the English economist Arthur Cecil Pigou is the developer 
of the concept of economic externalities
38
 and the Pigouvian tax is named after him. The 
tax is intended to correct the market outcome when the market activity generates negative 
externalities. Randal Graham
39
 points out the same remedy in the realms of torts and 
contracts:   
                                                 
36
 If I order a pizza, and the pizza delivery man drives to my house, which of us “caused” the pollution?  
The driver or me?  If I order furniture from City X, and have it delivered to City Y, who “caused” the 
emissions of the truck that delivers the furniture?  Me or the driver, or the company making the furniture?  
The “polluter pay” principle is a difficult “fit” with transportation.   
37
 Alain-Désiré Nimubona and Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné. “The Pigouvian Tax Rule in the Presence of an 
Eco-Industry” Ècole Polytechnique – Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique – Version 1 (2005)  
38
 Found at Arthur Cecil Pigou. “The Economics of Welfare – with a new Introduction by Nahid 
Aslanbeigui.” (2002). New Brunswick, Jersey. Transaction Publishers.   
39
 See Randal N. M. Graham. Legal Ethics: Theories, Cases and Professional Regulation. (2004) Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery. Page 185. 
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In contract and in tort, as well as in the market for legal services, the presence of negative 
externalities can give rise to market failures. In the realms of tort and contract remedial systems 
are designed to correct these market failures (and restore efficient resource allocation) by causing 
decision makers to pay for each of the costs that they impose. In other words, the remedial systems 
governing tort and contract force decision makers to internalize externalities they create. 
   
  In the case of externalities caused by highway usage, the polluter may pay the toll 
for the negative externalities (pollution and degradation) caused,  thereby internalizing 
the costs of the polluter’s economic activity.  
 The conclusion is the same in many countries and highly populated areas around 
the globe: the trend is the adoption of an environmental policy to discourage people from 
using their vehicles. The following excerpt from a report of Maclean’s magazine40 of 11 
January 2011, draws a picture of the situation and suggests tolls as a fast and reliable 
solution for externalities: 
The nub of the argument, whether we are talking about cars, or buses, or tennis rackets, is this: 
people make better decisions when they know what things cost. Right now the true cost of using 
the roads is hidden, leading people to drive more and in different ways than they would if they 
were better informed. 
Even a modest road-pricing scheme would be a start: traffic jams wouldn’t be entirely a thing of 
the past, but they would be a lot less common. And the more comprehensive the plan, the greater 
the payoff: shorter travel times. Lower fuel costs. Fewer accidents. Less noise and pollution. 
Higher productivity. Road pricing would make us richer, healthier, saner. If London, Stockholm 
and other cities can do it, why can’t we? Why, other than because it would be new, and because 
we would be paying for something we were used to getting for free. 
Only it isn’t free now. It’s hideously expensive. There ain’t no such thing as a free lunch, and as 
any commuter can tell you, there sure ain’t no such thing as a free road. 
   
                                                 
40
 Andrew Coyne, “Stuck in traffic. Our rush hours rank with the world’s worst. Andrew Coyne has the 
solution. Maclean’s, (11 January 2011) Available online at <http://www2.macleans.ca/2011/01/11/stuck-
in-traffic/4/> (Accessed on 4 February 2011) 
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  1.5 Conclusion  
 To summarize, it is important to say that the core of the thesis is that the toll road 
system in Brazil, while an important tool of public policy, is (as currently implemented) 
illegal.  The point of the present chapter is simply to show that toll roads can be important 
public policy tools: they are an important tool in the governance tool-box available to any 
national government. The possible usefulness of toll charge is clear. The objection 
presented on this thesis is not to the advisability or usefulness of toll roads, but to the 
manner in which they have been implemented by the Brazilian government (i.e., in 
violation of the Lawfulness Principle). This objection  will be explored in Chapter 3.   
 1.6 Purpose of the Next Chapter     
  Although toll roads can be effective and useful tools to promote important public 
policies, the toll road system currently in place in Brazil is illegal.  Arguments concerning 
the legality of Brazil’s toll road system will be developed in Chapter 3.  Before getting to 
those arguments, it is important to examine the manner in which toll roads have, in fact, 
been implemented by the Brazilian government.  This topic, along with a brief 
introduction to the basics of Brazil’s legal system, is discussed in Chapter 2.  
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Chapter II 
Tolls in Brazil and the Basics of Brazilian Law 
   2. Introduction    
  In order to understand the legality of the current toll road system in Brazil, it is 
necessary to understand the country’s existing toll road framework.  The subject has 
recently grown in importance due to the recent and ongoing spree of concessions and the 
great increase of the toll road industry affecting the life of millions of Brazilian drivers.
41
 
  This chapter lays out the contextual groundwork necessary to understand the 
legality of toll roads in Brazil. Specifically, it sets out (a) a birds-eye view of the legal 
system in Brazil, and (b) a descriptive account of the current toll road framework that 
exists in Brazil. The numbers shown below will demonstrate the spree of toll road 
                                                 
41
 The impact of the sudden spread of Brazilian toll roads was discussed at the Legislative Assembly of the 
State of Rio de Janeiro:  "Deputies Discuss Highway Concession with the local population  
The life of approximately 2.6 million citizens of Rio de Janeiro can change radically, if approved the notice 
that provides the concession of the highways BR-101 and BR-393. In all, 26 municipalities will be affected, 
from the sphere of education to trade and commerce. Prices of food, goods and intercity tickets must be 
increased, with the privatization of 540 km of both highways, 70% of federal highways in the state of Rio 
de Janeiro will be handed over to private enterprise. 
In April, a special commission was created to follow up the privatization of highways BR-101 and BR-393, 
which has held public hearings in municipalities that will be affected, to gather suggestions and criticisms 
to the notice. Since its creation, the commission held hearings in cities like São Gonçalo and Volta 
Redonda, where the local representative bodies were heard" 
Original in Portuguese: “Deputados discutem concessão de Rodovias com população local  
A vida de cerca de 2,6 milhões de cidadãos fluminenses pode mudar radicalmente, caso seja aprovado o 
edital que prevê a concessão das rodovias BR-101 e BR-393. Ao todo, 26 municípios terão sua estrutura 
afetada, desde a esfera da educação até o comércio. Os preços dos alimentos, das mercadorias e das 
passagens intermunicipais devem sofrer reajustes, uma vez que, com a privatização dos 540 quilômetros 
das duas vias, 70% da malha rodoviária federal do Estado do Rio de Janeiro estarão entregues à iniciativa 
privada.  
Em abril foi criada a Comissão Especial para acompanhar o processo de privatização das rodovias BR-101 
e BR-393, que tem realizado audiências públicas em municípios que serão afetados, para colher sugestões e 
críticas ao edital. Desde sua criação, a comissão realizou audiências em municípios como São Gonçalo e 
Volta Redonda, onde ouviu as entidades representativas locais.” Online at the website of the Legislative 
Assembly of the State of Rio de Janeiro at 
<http://www.alerj.rj.gov.br/Busca/OpenPage.asp?CodigoURL=16978&Fonte=Dados> (Accessed on 30 
August 2011). 
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concessions in Brazil and how it affects the lives of millions of people in the country.
42
 In 
the last decade more than 100 toll gates were opened in Brazilian public highways 
constructed by the Federal and State Governments.  
  The material presented in this chapter will form the foundation for subsequent 
discussions in Chapter 3 and will provide data to be used in the analysis in the following 
chapters. The goal of the current chapter is to demonstrate the impact of toll roads in 
Brazil. The legality of the system will be addressed in Chapter 3. 
 In order to understand the toll road system in Brazil, one must first have a “bird’s-
eye-view” of the legal context43 in which that toll road system arose.  As a result, the next 
section of this chapter provides a brief snapshot of the Brazilian legal system, including a 
brief history of the legal system, and an introduction to Brazilian Constitutional Law.  
                                                 
42
 There are several movements debating the tolling system in the country. See, for example, Popular 
Forum Against Tolls (in Portuguese) at <www.pedagio.org> (accessed on 05 February 2013) 
43
 While a general overview of Brazilian law is critical for the purposes of understanding material found in 
later chapters, a detailed understanding of the Brazilian legal system is not required. As a result, the next 
portion of the chapter provides a general introduction to the legal system regarding toll highways and 
concessions in Brazil. 
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 2.1 Brief Introduction of the History of the Legal System of Brazil 
  Brazil is a civil law country. It is also a Federation and Presidential Republic. It 
has three levels of Government: Federal, State and Municipal. It is constituted by 26 
States, 1 Federal District and 5,565 Municipalities.
44
 The three branches of government 
are structured as the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial. The Executive Chief is 
the President of the Republic, who is elected for a four year
45
 term of office (and may be 
re-elected for one additional term.   
  The origin of the Brazilian legal system owes much to its settlement by Portugal. 
European settlement in Brazil began in 1500 by the Portuguese navigator Pedro Alvares 
Cabral
46
 and the colonization of Brazil was a process of settlement, exploitation and 
domination of the territory by the Portuguese Court until 1822, when Brazil became 
independent. Throughout the period of colonization, Brazilian Law was encapsulated by 
the Ordinances of the Kingdom of Portugal. 
                                                 
44
See Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics – IBGE online: 
<http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/estatistica/populacao/censo2010/default.shtm> Accessed on 17 June 2011. 
“The conduction of a survey of this nature represents the ultimate challenge for a statistics bureau, 
especially in a country of continental dimensions like Brazil, with 8,514,876.60 km2 distributed in a 
heterogeneous and sometimes inaccessible territory, made of 27 federation units and 5,565 municipalities, 
encompassing approximately 67.2 million households.”  
45
 The Constitution at article 14, Subsection 5 authorizes members of the executive power to be re-elected 
for subsequent term only one time:  “Subsection 5. The President of the Republic, the State and Federal 
District Governors, the Mayors and those who have succeeded or replaced them during their terms of office 
may be re-elected for only one subsequent term.” Original in Portuguese: Article 14, subsection “§ 5º O 
Presidente da República, os Governadores de Estado e do Distrito Federal, os Prefeitos e quem os houver 
sucedido, ou substituído no curso dos mandatos poderão ser reeleitos para um único período subseqüente.” 
Online: < http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constitui%C3%A7ao.htm> (Accessed on 9 
August 2011). 
46
 In 1500 King Dom Manuel I trusted the command of the second expedition to the East Indies to the 
Portuguese navigator Pedro Álvares Cabral. He left Lisbon, Portugal on 9 March 1500 with 13 ships and 
1,500 men and sailed farther westward than his original planned route, and the Atlantic Ocean currents 
drove him even farther west. Cabral reached the lands of Vera Cruz (Brazil) on 22 April 1500 and claimed 
the land for Portugal. See Teresa A. Meade. A Brief History of Brazil. (2004). New York: Checkmark 
Books. Pages 18-24. 
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  The Portuguese Empire enacted the Afonsinas, Manuelinas and Filipinas
47
 
Ordinances. Under these Ordinances, civil rights in Brazil were merely extensions of 
civil rights in Portugal. As a result, Portuguese influence in the Brazilian legal system 
was substantial. 
  The Filipinas Ordinances were enacted during the reigns of Philip II and 
published in the year 1603 and had a huge impact on the legal system of Brazil. They 
were a legal compilation marked by the influences of Roman, Canon and Germanic 
Laws, which together constitute the founding elements of Portuguese law. Despite being 
enacted in Portugal, the Filipina Ordinance were applied in Brazil – as a colony of the 
Portuguese Empire – along with other rules from 1603 until 1916 when the Civil Code of 
Brazil was enacted.  
                                                 
47
 Arlindo Daibert, “Historical Views on Environment and Environmental Law in Brazil”, 40 GEO. 
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 779, 823 (2009). 
“In 1446, the Portuguese enacted the Afonsinas Ordinances, named in honor of King Afonso V, under 
whose rule their preparation was concluded. The Ordinances were a mixture of codified prior written 
sources, compilation of two other older pre-existing codifications, and aggregated royal resolutions, 
concordats, and national and local customs previously in force. The roots of the system were so strongly 
based on Roman law, however, that “imperial law” (that is, the law of Rome) was to be applied in case of 
omissions in the ordinances themselves, except in cases of “sin,” when the canonic law would take over.  
...  
In Portugal, meanwhile, King Manoel I, motivated by a wish to immortalize his name in a legal 
compilation, ordered the Manuelinas Ordinances, which replaced the Afonsinas Ordinances in 1521, the 
same year that monarch died. 
... 
In 1603, a point when Portugal — and hence Brazil — was still under the Spanish rule (1580–1640), King 
Felipe II from Spain enacted the Filipinas Ordinances, compiling all the Portuguese rules that had been 
issued to that date, and replacing the Manuelinas Ordinances. The new ordinances remained partially 
applicable in Brazil until the enactment of the Brazilian Civil Code in 1916.  
The ordinances maintained the same notion of applicability of Roman laws only “for the good reason upon 
which they were based,” but in reality, Roman law “was frequently employed in contravention of the 
express language of the [Ordinances].” 
... 
Brazil enacted a Civil (Private Law) Code in Brazil in 1916, finally superseding the remains of the 
seventeenth century Filipinas Ordinances...” 
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  Brazil’s political independence in relation to Portugal did not mean legal 
independence.
48
 From the independence of Brazil in 1822, the Filipinas Ordinances were 
gradually replaced by domestic Brazilian statutes, but remained as a major influence on 
the content of Brazilian legislation, including the Criminal Code of 1830
49
, the Code of 
Criminal Procedure of 1832 and the Commercial Code of 1850. In effect, the Brazilian 
legal system is the “child” of the Portuguese law, and this is by its turn part of continental 
European Law. As a result of the influence of Portuguese colonization, civil law
50
 system 
prevails in the Brazilian legal system.  
   As is the case in other civil law countries, Brazil’s Constitution plays a central 
role as the guardian of fundamental rights and guarantor of democratic relations between 
the State and the society. It is the law that disposes the division of the powers of 
Government. Thus, the Constitution is  the law of paramount importance of Brazil and is 
regarded as the "law of laws".
51
 
  Beyond the “basics” of Brazil’s legal system, one need only understand a few 
specific elements of that system in order to appreciate the issues surrounding the legality 
of Brazil’s toll road system. These specific elements are: (a) The Lawfulness Principle, 
(b) the Constitutional Rules on concessions, (c) the General Law of Concessions and (d) 
the doctrine of Constitutional Paramountcy.   
 
                                                 
48
 The law of 20 October 1823 determined that the newly resurgent Empire would last at the same time of 
the Ordinances, laws and decrees promulgated by the date of 25 April 1821 by the kings of Portugal. 
49
 It replaced the book V of the Philippines Ordinances. 
50
 The Civil Law started when the Emperor Justinian met all laws of the European continent, consolidating 
them into a single code, named the corpus iuris civilis of Justinian. The Corpus Iuris Civilis was composed 
of four collections and the most important was the Digest or pandect. Subsequently renamed the Copus 
Iuris of Civil Law, Continental Law and Roman Law. 
51
 All statutes must subordinate to the rules of the Federal Constitution which is the highest Law. Otherwise 
it can be considered unconstitutional. 
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  2.2 The Lawfulness Principle and Article 37 of the Constitution 
  The Lawfulness Principle is established by Article 37
52
 of the Federal 
Constitution which reads as follows: 
Article 37. The direct or indirect public administration of any of the powers of the Union, the 
States, the Federal District and the Municipalities, as well as their foundations, shall obey the 
Lawfulness Principle, … 
 
    According to Celso Antônio Bandeira de Melo
53
, one of the most influential 
administrative scholars of the country, Article 37...  
…means that the Administration can’t do anything but what the law requires. Unlike individuals, 
which can do everything that the law does not prohibit, the Administration may do what the 
law authorizes in advance. Hence, public management is to provide public interests so specified 
in the law, making it in accordance with the means and ways established by the law or 
individualized according to their provisions [sic]. 
 
   In other words, the Lawfulness Principle means that the government of Brazil, 
through the public administration, may only take actions that are authorized by law: every 
act undertaken by the government of Brazil must be preceded either by direct 
constitutional authority or through the constitutionally approved passage of an 
authorizing enactment.  
  The fundamental premise of “The Lawfulness Principle” is that the government 
holds no residual or extra-legal authority: every act it undertakes, in order to comply with 
                                                 
52
 Federal Constitution of Brazil – Article 37 translated by the author: “Artigo 37 - A administração pública 
direta e indireta de qualquer dos Poderes da União, dos Estados, do Distrito Federal e dos Municípios 
obedecerá aos princípios de legalidade, impessoalidade, moralidade, publicidade e eficiência e, também, ao 
seguinte:” 
53
 Celso Antônio Bandeira de Mello. Curso de Direito Administrativo. (2004) São Paulo: Malheiros 
Publishing House, page 95. Translated by the author:  
 “O princípio da legalidade, no Brasil, significa que a Administração nada pode fazer senão o que a lei 
determina. Ao contrário dos particulares, os quais podem fazer tudo o que a lei não proíbe, a Administração 
só pode fazer o que a lei antecipadamente autorize. Donde, administrar é prover aos interesses públicos, 
assim caracterizados em lei, fazendo-o na conformidade dos meios e formas nela estabelecidos ou 
particularizados segundo suas disposições.” 
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Article 37 of the Constitution, is legitimate only if authorized by statute, or authorized 
directly by the Constitution itself.  
2.3 The Lawfulness Principle and Article 5, Subsection II of the   
Constitution 
   A further instance of Brazil’s Lawfulness Principle is established by Subsection II 
of Article 5
54
 of the Constitution, which provides (in part) as follows: 
Article 5. All persons are equal before the law, without any distinction whatsoever, Brazilians 
and foreigners residing in the country being ensured of inviolability of the right to life, to liberty, 
to equality, to security and to property, on the following terms: 
… 
II - no one shall be obliged to do or not to do something other than by virtue of law; 
 
  The public administration is subject to both Article 37 and subsection II of Article 
5.  By virtue of Article 37, the government can act only through statutory authorization. 
And by virtue of subsection II of Article 5, the government can impose obligations on 
individuals only “by virtue of law”. Because Brazil is a civil law country, this reference 
to law means democratically enacted legislation as “common law” is unknown in the 
country. Any attempt to impose obligations by means other than democratically passed 
law is a violation of this provision of the Federal Constitution. As a result, any intrusion 
on individual liberty must, according to Article 5, be spelled out in legislation. The 
implications of this for the toll road system are discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
 
                                                 
54
 Federal Constitution – Subsection II of the Article 5th translated by the author: “Art. 5º Todos são iguais 
perante a lei, sem distinção de qualquer natureza, garantindo-se aos brasileiros e aos estrangeiros residentes 
no País a inviolabilidade do direito à vida, à liberdade, à igualdade, à segurança e à propriedade, nos termos 
seguintes: 
I - homens e mulheres são iguais em direitos e obrigações, nos termos desta Constituição; 
II - ninguém será obrigado a fazer ou deixar de fazer alguma coisa senão em virtude de lei;” 
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   2.4 Paramountcy of the Federal Constitution 
  The doctrine of “paramountcy”55 governs conflicts between the domestic laws 
within a jurisdiction, determining which law prevails in the event of inconsistency.  In 
Brazil, the paramountcy of the Constitution is described by the phrase “the Principle of 
the Supremacy of the Constitution” (or “Princípio da Supremacia da Constituição” in 
Portuguese), i.e., the Constitution is at the top of the hierarchy of legal norms in Brazil 
and all other ordinary laws must comply with it.  
  Luis Flávio Gomes and Valério de Oliveira Mazzuoli
56
 address the concept of the 
Supremacy of Brazil’s Constitution: 
Of course it is absolutely undeniable the superiority of the Constitution in the face of internal 
laws. It is, moreover, the origin, the basis or foundation of all other rules (the internal law). The 
Constitution has a binding power over the legislature, the interpreter and the judge. No legal 
interpretation can move away from its legal framework (or axiological).  
Interpretation conformed to the Constitution means to interpret all other provisions of law in 
accordance with constitutional rules and principles. This is the correct interpretation (not 
otherwise). 
 
  Brazil, as said before, is a federal state composed of autonomous States and there 
are three original sources of law – federal, state and municipal. The hierarchy stablished 
                                                 
55
 An excellent Canadian source on the doctrine of paramountcy can be found at Peter W. 
Hogg. Constitutional law of Canada (2007), 5th ed. supplemented. Scarborough, Ont.: Thomson Carswell.  
56
 Luiz Flávio Gomes and Valerio de Oliveira Mazzuoli. “Características gerais do direito (especialmente 
do direito internacional) na pós-modernidade.” [General features of law (especially international law) in 
postmodernity] (2010) Revista Forense, volume 412, pages 467-485. 
Original in Portuguese: 
“Claro que é absolutamente incontestável a superioridade normativa e jurídica da Constituição em face das 
leis internas. Ela é, ademais, a origem, a base ou o fundamento de todas as outras normas (do Direito 
interno). A Constituição possui força vinculante em relação ao legislador, ao intérprete e ao juiz. Nenhuma 
interpretação legal pode se afastar do seu quadro normativo (ou axiológico). Interpretação conforme à 
Constituição significa interpretar todas as demais normas do ordenamento jurídico de acordo com as regras 
e princípios constitucionais. Essa é a forma correta de interpretação (não o contrário).” 
Available online at <http://sare.anhanguera.com/index.php/rdire/article/view/1875/847> (accessed on 30 
August 2011) 
  
27 
by the Constitution makes it clear that a municipal law cannot conflict with the State law, 
while the latter cannot conflict with the provisions of a federal law. To the extent that 
such a conflict is found, state law is paramount over municipal law, and federal law is 
paramount to state law. In the event of conflict, the “paramount” law prevails, and the 
law which conflicts with the paramount law is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no 
force or effect. The Federal Constitution is the law at the top of the pyramid of hierarchy 
of laws, known as Hans Kelsen’s “normative pyramid”.57 All laws are unconstitutional to 
the extent that they do not comply with the Constitution.  
   As this thesis will demonstrate in Chapter 3, the current toll road regime in Brazil 
fails to comply with the Constitution’s Lawfulness Principle (found in Articles 5 and 37), 
largely because current toll concessions (and other elements of the toll road system) are 
not authorized by statute. As a result, the toll road system is unconstitutional (and 
therefore illegal). In order to understand the legal failings of the toll road system, it is 
necessary to understand the legal instruments which purport to authorize the concession 
of toll roads to private actors.  These instruments, which are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3, are introduced briefly in the following subsection of this chapter. 
   2.5 Article 175 of Brazil’s Constitution  
   Because the lion’s share of this thesis is concerned with the legality of toll roads 
in Brazil – specifically toll roads that are conceded to private actors – it is important, at 
this stage, to provide a brief introduction to the legal mechanism governing the 
concession of highways and the imposition of tolls. Concession is the main legal 
                                                 
57
 Known as Stufenbau. See Hans Kelsen. Teoria pura do direito. [Pure Theory of Law].  trans. Max 
Knight  (1967).  Berkeley: University of California Press. 
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arrangement for the private management and maintenance of highways in Brazil. The 
Brazilian Constitution authorizes concessions in Article 175:
58
  
Article 175 - In a manner prescribed by law, the Government is responsible for providing public 
utility services either directly or by concession or permit, which will always be through public 
bidding. 
Sole paragraph - The law shall provide for: 
I. the regime for public service companies, the special nature of their contract, and of the 
extension thereof, as well the conditions of forfeiture, control, and termination of the concession 
or permit; 
II. the rights of the users; 
III. rate policy; 
IV. the obligation of maintaining adequate services.  
    
   The General Law of Concessions – Federal Law 8,987 enacted on 13 February 
1995 is a statute passed pursuant to this part of the Constitution that  enacted provisions 
governing the system of conceding public services to private entitites.  
 The General Law of Concessions deals with the guaranteed provision of adequate 
services, the rights and obligations of highway users, rate policy, bidding procedures, 
contracts, permits, duties and obligations of the grantor and the concessionaires, 
intervention by government actors and the cessation of concession. The specific details of 
the General Law of Concessions are beyond the scope of this introductory chapter, but 
are discussed in great detail in Chapter 3. For now, it is sufficient to note that – as we will 
see in Chapter 3 – the specific provisions of the General Law of Concessions are 
insufficiently specific and precise to comply with Brazil’s Lawfulness Principle. This 
                                                 
58
 Federal Constitution – Article 175 translated by the author: “Art. 175. Incumbe ao Poder Público, na 
forma da lei, diretamente ou sob regime de concessão ou permissão, sempre através de licitação, a 
prestação de serviços públicos. 
Parágrafo único. A lei disporá sobre: 
I - o regime das empresas concessionárias e permissionárias de serviços públicos, o caráter especial de seu 
contrato e de sua prorrogação, bem como as condições de caducidade, fiscalização e rescisão da concessão 
ou permissão; 
II - os direitos dos usuários; 
III - política tarifária; 
IV - a obrigação de manter serviço adequado.” 
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argument, developed throughout the remainder of the thesis, is the cornerstone of the 
argument that Brazil’s current toll road regime is unconstitutional. 
 2.6 Summary of Brazilian Legal Principles 
  As we have seen in the foregoing sections of this chapter, the law of Brazil is 
based on a number of governing principles, including (a) the Supremacy of the 
Constitution, (b) Civilian Law, (c) the need for statutory authorization for government 
interference in the lives of Brazilian people, and (d) the principle of paramountcy in the 
event of inconsistency between laws.  These principles will be of central importance to 
the core legal argument of this thesis. In brief, the core arguments of this work are: (i) the 
law of concessions fails to address operational concerns and other core issues pertaining 
to the operation of toll road systems; (ii) the government has failed to authorize 
concessions in accordance with constitutional requirements, and this constitutes a 
violation of the Lawfulness Principle.  
  Having summarized the Brazilian legal system and the core legal argument of this 
thesis, it is important to understand the factual issues underpinning the arguments to be 
presented in Chapter 3. The next sections of this chapter lay the foundation for this 
discussion by explaining the toll highway system in Brazil. 
  2.7 Brazil’s Toll-Highway System: Design and Administration 
 Many countries adopt highway tolling systems
59
 as a method of raising funds to 
maintain existing highway facilities and build new ones. Statutory provisions governing 
toll highways vary from country to country. The legal framework and the on the ground 
                                                 
59
 G. Fischer, S. Babbar. “Private Financing of Toll roads” (1996) RMC Discussion Paper. Series No. 117, 
The World Bank. This paper cites some tolls in different countries. It is about 8 projects in 8 different 
countries: Chile, Colômbia, México, China, Malaysia, Hungary, United Kingdom and United States.  
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experience are distinct in each jurisdiction. One key distinction between different tolling 
systems is the method by which the toll systems are managed. There are two prevailing 
forms of management system: the Public Management System, and the Private 
Management System.   
 When public administrations choose to concede highways or highway systems to 
private actors, they typically do so through one of two forms of concession contracts. The 
first type is the Design-Build-Finance-Operate
60
 (DBFO) partnership. By this method, the 
private entrepreneurs bear the responsibility to design, build and finance a new highway
61
 
as well as responsibility to operate it. The second type of arrangement is the 
“maintenance and operational contracts” model, which is the model adopted in 100% of 
conceded highways in Brazil. By this method, the private actor is responsible only to 
maintain and operate an existing highway. In this form of concession arrangement, the 
government is responsible for designing, building and financing the creation of the 
highway.   
  The main difference between the two prevailing forms of concession contract is 
that, under the “maintenance and operational contract” form of concession, the private 
actor is relieved of the obligation to build new highways. This thesis will investigate the 
arrangement of “maintenance and operational contract”, which, as noted above, is the 
                                                 
60
 There is a variation of the DBFO schemes which is the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) adopted in some 
Asian countries as Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines and Taiwan. In Canada and New Zealand is it 
called Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT). The approach can be found online at the website of the 
Federal Highway Administration of United States: 
<http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/p3/defined/design_build_finance_operate.htm> (Accessed on 24 April 
2013). 
61
 Most turnpikes in the United States adopted the DBFO Approach. 
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exclusive arrangement used in Brazil. The nature of this arrangement is discussed in the 
following section.   
 2.8 Maintenance and Operational Contracts  
  Brazil has a unique toll road system. As noted in the previous section, all 
conceded tolled highways in the country are under “maintenance and operational 
contract”. They are regulated by concession contracts signed pursuant to the provisions of 
the General Law of Concessions and through the National Procurement Law of Brazil.
62
 
Both laws cited establish the rules for concessions.  
  The purpose of a “maintenance and operational contract” is demonstrated by the 
following contractual clause released by the Agência Nacional de Transportes Terrestres 
(ANTT – National Agency of Ground Transportation) of Brazil:63  
2 Contract Object 
2.1 The object of the contract is the concession for exploration of infrastructure and 
rendering of public service of recovery, management, maintenance, surveillance, 
conservation, improvement and enlargement of the highway system’s capacity 
(“Concession”), on the terms and provisions established by the contract and according to 
the performance parameter and minimal specifications established on the Exploitation 
Program of the Highway (Programa de Exploração da Rodovia –PER). 64   
                                                 
62
 Law 8,666 of 21 June 1993 applies to government procurement at the Federal, State and Municipal levels 
and to public bodies and agencies.  
63
 Bid 001 of 2008 of the Agência Nacional de Transportes Terrestres (ANTT) – It is about the concession 
contracts of  
a) the Federal Highways BR 116 – State of Bahia – from Feira de Santana to the State border of 
Bahia and Minas Gerais.  
b) BR 324 – State of Bahia from Salvador to Feira de Santana; 
c) the following State Highways: BA-526 and BA-528; (Higways were delegated from the State of 
Bahia to the Federal Government, that, by its turn, performed the Concession through its national 
body – the National Agency of Ground Transportation – ANTT);  
Online: <http://appeantt.antt.gov.br/avisolicitacao/bahia/ContratoConcessao_v2.pdf> (Accessed on 22 June 
2009) translated by the author:  
“2 Objeto do Contrato 
2.1 O objeto do Contrato é a concessão para exploração da infra-estrutura e da prestação do serviço público 
de recuperação, operação, manutenção, monitoração, conservação, implantação de melhorias e ampliação 
de capacidade do Sistema Rodoviário (“Concessão”), no prazo e nas condições estabelecidos no Contrato e 
segundo os Parâmetros de Desempenho e especificações mínimas estabelecidas no PER.” 
64
 Exploitation Program of the Highway – PER is the basic project of investments and activities of the 
concessionaire's winning bid. 
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    In general, public administrations all over Brazil build the highways
65
 and 
then concede them to private entrepreneurs as a general policy.
66
 Pursuant to these 
highway concessions, the private actors have the duty to operate and maintain and, 
sometimes, improve the capacity of existing highways as traffic or revenue increase.   
 
 
                                                 
65
 The Rodoanel is an example. It is planned and partially built in the metropolitan area of São Paulo city as 
a beltway with the length of 172 km, interconnecting several state and federal highways, as seen in the 
following news: 
“Initially proposed to be ready in June of 2011, the connection of the west segment with the south part of 
the Rodoanel is anticipated in contract to April of 2010.   
... 
The celebration will have the attendance of the governor José Serra, probably the president Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva and, certainly, the Minister of the Civil Cabinet, Dilma Rousseff, because one third of the 
southern part is financed by the federal government – just like the west segment.  
In 2002, the west segment cost $1,4 billion Reais and the federal government of Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso contributed with almost a third part, $400 million Reais. 
The engineering work, dispossessions, resettlements, environmental mitigations and compensations, the 
total cost of the south part of Rodoanel, in prices of December of 2005, is expected to be $3,6 billion Reais 
– $58.6 million Reais per kilometre. The civil works were budgeted to cost $2,587 billion Reais.  
The State Government will invest $2,4 billion Reais. The Federal Government, $1,2 billion Reais, with 
allocation of the “Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento” (PAC – Growth Acceleration Program of the 
Federal Government of Brazil – it is comparable in Canada with the Canada’s Economic Action Plan), and 
with rigorous quarterly disbursement of $75 million of Reais.” At newspaper Valor Econômico of 4 June 
2009 apud Webtranspo. Translated by the author: “Previsto inicialmente para junho de 2011, o encontro 
dos trechos Oeste e Sul do Rodoanel foi antecipado em contrato para abril de 2010.  
... 
A festa terá a presença do governador José Serra, muito provavelmente do presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da 
Silva, e, certamente, da ministra da Casa Civil, Dilma Rousseff, pois um terço do trecho Sul é financiado 
pelo governo federal - como já acontecera com o trecho Oeste. Em 2002, o Oeste custou $ 1,4 bilhão e o 
governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso participou com pouco menos de um terço, $ 400 milhões. 
Em obras de engenharia, desapropriações, reassentamentos, compensações e mitigações ambientais, o custo 
total do trecho Sul, a preços de dezembro de 2005, é de $ 3,6 bilhões - $ 58,6 milhões o quilômetro. As 
obras civis foram orçadas em $ 2,587 bilhões. O Estado investe $ 2,4 bilhões. O governo federal, $ 1,2 
bilhão, com verbas do Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC), e desembolsos rigorosamente 
trimestrais de $ 75 milhões.” Online: 
<http://www.webtranspo.com.br/modais/rodoviario/4556-rodoanel-avanca-na-periferia-da-sao-paulo-
sitiada.html> (accessed on 23 June 2009). 
The Growth Acceleration Program is a Federal Program to stimulate the economy just like Canada’s 
Economic Action Plan. 
See Rodoanel Mario Covas online: <http://www.dersa.com.br/rodoanel/especial/index.html> (accessed on 
23 June 2009)  
66
 There is no visible reason for that.  
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  2.9 The Brazilian Highway Network  
  The highway network of Brazil comprises Federal, State and Municipal
67
  
highways.  The only explicit reference to highways in the Brazilian Constitution is the 
2nd paragraph of Article 144.
68
 It provides that the federal highway police force is the 
only police force permitted to “patrol the federal highways”. Under the constitutional 
division of powers regarding public works, the Federal Union is responsible for the 
federal highways, the State highways are under the responsibility of the States, the 
Municipal highways are under the responsibility of the municipal governments, and the 
highways of the Federal District are under the responsibility of the Federal District 
administration. These features are very important for concession arrangement matters. 
                                                 
67
 Including the highways at the Federal District. Those highways which connect multiple States altogether 
are characterized by the initials "BR", and three numbers of the highway afterwards, while Brazilian 
regional and State highways are the one running entirely in the States, and they are named with the 
abbreviation of the State name where the highway is located (two letters) and, likewise, the  Federal 
highways, with three numbers. As the BR-101 along the cost of Brazil. It has the length of 4,551 km from 
north to south. As the PR-445, State Highway of the State of Paraná. Those highways which connect 
multiple States altogether are characterized by the initials "BR", and three numbers of the highway 
afterwards, while Brazilian regional and State highways are the one running entirely in the States, and they 
are named with the abbreviation of the State name where the highway is located (two letters) and, likewise, 
the  Federal highways, with three numbers. As the BR-101 along the cost of Brazil. It has the length of 
4,551 km from north to south. As the PR-445, State Highway of the State of Paraná. 
68
 Federal Constitution. “Article 144. Public Safety, which is the duty of the State and the right and 
responsibility of all, is exercised to preserve public order and the invulnerability of persons and property, 
by means of the following bodies: 
… 
2
nd
 Paragraph - The federal highway police is a permanent body structured into a career and intended, 
according to the law, to ostensibly patrol the federal highways.” 
Statutory provision in Portuguese: 
“Article 144. A segurança pública, dever do Estado, direito e responsabilidade de todos, é exercida para a 
preservação da ordem pública e da incolumidade das pessoas e do patrimônio, através dos seguintes órgãos: 
... 
§ 2º A polícia rodoviária federal, órgão permanente, organizado e mantido pela União e estruturado em 
carreira, destina-se, na forma da lei, ao patrulhamento ostensivo das rodovias federais.(Redação dada pela 
Emenda Constitucional nº 19, de 1998).”  
However, there is an unusual case at the State of Paraná where the extinct National Department of 
Highways (DNER), currently National Department of Transportation Infrastructure (DNIT), a Federal 
transportation entity, delegated several stretches of federal highways through the convention of 
delegation number 007 of 1996 to the Department of Highways of Paraná (DER-PR), and this entity, by its 
turn, granted them to private entrepreneurs in 1998.  
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Highway concessions must of course be made by the entity entitled to govern the relevant 
highways.
69
 
 Usually, each entity (Federal Union, States, Municipalities or the Federal District) 
has jurisdiction over the highways that they build. Brazil has a total of 1,73 million km 
(1,074 million miles) of highways, of which 217,833.2 km
70
 are paved.
71
 There are 
exceptional situations in which responsibility for a highway can be delegated from one 
entity to another. This includes the situation dealt with in this thesis: the delegation of 
highways to private entrepreneurs for their maintenance and operation.
72
 Naturally, 
conceded highways, no matter if granted by the Federal Union, States, and Municipalities 
or by the Federal District are under private management, and the investors are legally (by 
contract) responsible for maintenance and/or improvement of the highway. The following 
sub-chapters relay the data on conceded highways in the country.  
 
 
                                                 
69
 There is another case of delegation of Federal Highways to State Governments. It happened at the State 
of Rio Grande do Sul.  
DNER in Portuguese – Departamento Nacional de Estradas e Rodagem. Currently DNIT – Departamento 
Nacional de Infraestrutura de Transporte (National Department of Transportation Infrastructure). Available 
online: <http://www.dnit.gov.br> (accessed on 1
st
 May 2010) 
70
 Data collected at the website of the DNIT – Departamento Nacional de Infraestrutura de Transporte 
(National Department of Transportation Infrastructure). Available online: <http://www.dnit.gov.br/plano-
nacional-de-viacao/totais-gerais.pdf> (accessed on 1
st
 May 2010). 
71
 In the case of the Federal Union, the Law 10,233 of 5 June 2000 that created the National Agency of 
Ground Transportation and the National Department of Transportation Infrastructure (or Departamento 
Nacional de Infraestrutura Terrestre – DNIT), requires general maintenance from the latter, according to 
the article 82, Subsection I:  
“Article 82. The duties of DNIT in its sphere of activity: 
I - Establish standards, technical standards and specifications for the programs of operational safety, 
signaling, maintenance or preservation, restoration of roads, terminals and facilities;”  
72
 Indebted States may delegate State highways to the Federal Union in order to ensure federal 
investments. Or the opposite, the Federal Government may delegate a federal highway to some State that 
may invest resources and maintain it. The Law 9,277 of 10 May 1996 authorizes the federal government to 
delegate to Municipalities, States and the Federal District, the administration and operation of federal 
highways and ports. 
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 2.10 Data Collected of Existent Tolls in Brazil 
  Currently Brazil has a total of 284
73
 privately operated toll booths in 9 States out 
of 26 and the Federal District. It is among the countries with the most toll gates in the 
world  – granted to 55 different private concessionaires operating highways.  
 
Figure 1 – States with Toll Facilities in Brazil74 
                                                 
73
 The privately operated tolls are in 9 states out of 26 – the 3 States of the South Region, the 4 States in the 
Southeast Region, 2 States in the Northeast Region. There are also another 11 publicly operated tolls in 
Brazil: 1 in Ceará – in the Northeast Region; 1 in Mato Grosso do Sul and 4 in Mato Grosso, States of the 
Center-West Region, 4 publicly operated tolls in the State of Rio Grande do Sul in the South Region and 1 
in the State of São Paulo in the Southeast Region. Source: ABCR – Brazilian association of highways 
concessionaires. Online: <http://www.abcr.org.br/Conteudo/Secao/46/recursos+operacionais.aspx> 
Accessed on 25 March 2013.  
74
 The states with toll facilities privately operated in Brazil are the ones in gray. 9 out of 26 States and 1 
Federal District, comprising 68.26% of the total population and 78.5% of the total Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of the country.  Source – Population (2012) and GDP (2010) – National Institute of Geography and 
Statistics – Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). Online at 
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 2.11 Increase in the Number of Tolls  
  The increase in the number of private operated toll facilities in Brazil is quite 
remarkable. In five years, from 1994 to 1997, they grew from 2 to 46. A big increase 
happened  in 1998 when there was 137 toll booths in the country. From 1999 until to 
2012, they more than doubled from 137 to 284 booths  in only 13 years.  
Table 1 – Evolution – Numbers of Private Operated Toll Facilities in Brazil 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Number of Tolls 2 15 16 46 137 137 165 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Number of Tolls 169 169 169 169 169 169 175 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012   
Number of Tolls 223 261 277 284 284   
 
 
 
 Chart 1 – Increase of the Numbers of Private Operated Toll Facilities in Brazil 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
<http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/estimativa2012/estimativa_tcu.shtm> and 
<ftp://ftp.ibge.gov.br/Contas_Regionais/2010/pdf/tab01.pdf> (Accessed on 9 January 2013). 
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 Since 1994, in the past 18 years, on average, Brazil has built just over one toll 
facility per month, or 4 new toll facilities every 3 months (15 to 16 yearly).
75
   
 2.12 Ratio of Privately operated Highways vs Paved Highways 
  Out of Brazil’s 10,343.7 Km of multilane highways, 53.98% (see table below76) 
are privately operated. This means that over half of the multilane highways in Brazil are 
under private management rather than maintained and operated by public authorities. 
    Table 2 – Ratio Paved Highways vs Private Concessions in Brazil
77
 
 Single 
Lane (Km) 
Multilane 
Construction
78
 (Km) 
Multilane 
(Km) 
TOTAL 
Total
79
 200,289.5 1,227.6 10,161.8 211,678.9 
Roads Conceded
80
  7,380.77  5,485.60 12,866.37 
%  3.69%  53.98% 6.07% 
     
  The State of São Paulo has a total of 4,624 Km of multilane highways and 
77.99% of them are conceded to private companies.  In this case, almost 8 out of 10 km 
of multilane highways are under private management in São Paulo. This places the State 
                                                 
75
 In 18 years (1994 – 2012) it was built in Brazil 284 toll facilities, with an extraordinary average of 15.77 
tolls facilities per year or 1.314 tolls built per month. Online: 
<http://www.abcr.org.br/Conteudo/Secao/46/recursos+operacionais.aspx> Accessed on 25 March 2013. 
76
 All the data collected from the websites of ABCR (above) and DNIT (below). Statistic calculated by the 
author. 
77
 See Departamento Nacional de Infraestrutura de Transportes – DNIT  (National Department of 
Transportation Infrastructure) online:  
<http://www.dnit.gov.br/menu/rodovias/rodoviasfederais/index_html#Quilometragem%20das%20Rodovia
s> (accessed on 6 April 2009). Not included Concessionaires Cart and Rodovias do Tietê. 
78
 By the public sector. 
79
 Not included Concessionaires Cart and Rodovias do Tietê. Source –  PNV – Plano Nacional de Viação 
(Road Network National Plan) at the Departamento Nacional de Infraestrutura de Transportes – DNIT  
(National Department of Transportation Infrastructure) online: 
<http://www.dnit.gov.br/menu/rodovias/rodoviasfederaisarquivos> (accessed on 22 June 2009)  
80
 Not included Concessionaires Cart and Rodovias do Tietê. Source – Associação Brasileira de 
Concessionária de Rodovias (ABCR – Brazilian Association of Highway Concessionaires) Online: 
<http://www.abcr.org.br/publi/pub_osetor_trechos.php> (accessed on 24 June 2009)  
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of São Paulo at the top of any list of States featuring toll roads conceded to private actors. 
This makes it clear that the policy of conceding highways and toll facilities to private 
entities has become a key feature of governance in Brazil. 
Table 3 – Ratio Paved Highways vs Private Concessions in the State of São Paulo 
 Single 
Lane (Km) 
Multilane 
Construction (Km) 
Multilane 
(Km) 
TOTAL 
Total
81
 28,775.20 83.0 4,624.10 33,482.30 
Roads Conceded
82
  1,721.80  3,606.21 5,624.71 
%  5.98%  77.99% 16,80% 
 
2.13 Toll Industry Concessionaires 
  In 2012,
83
 there were 55
84
 private concessionaires managing highways in Brazil, 
listed by the Associação Brasileira de Concessionária de Rodovias (ABCR – Brazilian 
Association of Highway Concessionaires).
85
 These concessionaires operate 15,469.00 
Km of Highways. At least 4 new concession bids
86
 will take place in the next few years 
and will concede to private corporations (i) the highway BR–040 in Minas Gerais, Goiás 
and the Federal District, (ii) the Highways BR–116, (iii) the BR–381 in Minas Gerais and 
                                                 
81
 Not included the concessionaires Concessionária Rodovias do Tietê, Concessionária Auto Raposo 
Tavares and future Highway concession Rodoanel Mario Covas – southern section. Source –  PNV – Plano 
Nacional de Viação (Road Network National Plan) at the Departamento Nacional de Infraestrutura de 
Transportes – DNIT  (National Department of Transportation Infrastructure) online: 
<http://www.dnit.gov.br/menu/rodovias/rodoviasfederaiS.A.rquivos> (accessed on June, 22
nd
 of 2009) Not 
included Concessionaires Cart and Rodovias do Tietê. 
82
 Source – Associação Brasileira de Concessionária de Rodovias (ABCR – Brazilian Association of 
Highway Concessionaires) Online: <http://www.abcr.org.br/publi/pub_osetor_trechos.php> (accessed on 
24 June 2009)  
83
 as of numbers of 2012. Source: – Associação Brasileira de Concessionária de Rodovias (ABCR – 
Brazilian Association of Highway Concessionaires) Online: 
<http://www.abcr.org.br/Conteudo/Secao/43/estatisticas.aspx> (accessed on 25 March 2013) 
84
  as of numbers of 2012. 
85
 List of operating concessionaires in Brazil. Online: 
<http://www.abcr.org.br/publi/pub_osetor_trechos.php> (accessed on 24 June 2009) 
86
 See the website of Agência Nacional de Transportes Terrestres (ANTT – National Agency of  Ground 
Transportation) online: <http://www.antt.gov.br/> (accessed on 26 June 2009) 
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(iv) the Southern part of the Rodoanel Mário Covas, the beltway of the largest
87
 city of 
the country – São Paulo, capital city of the State of São Paulo.  
Table 4 – Number of Private Concessionaires in Brazil and km Conceded  
Year Number of Concessionaires Km operated 
1995 5 765.00 
1996 6 822.00 
1997 13 3,438.00 
1998 31 8,303.00 
1999 31 8,303.00 
2000 35 9,719.00 
2001 36 9,859.00 
2002 36 9,859.00 
2003 36 9,859.00 
2004 36 9,859.00 
2005 36 9,859.00 
2006 37 9,865.00 
2007 38 10,237.00 
2008 46 12,868.00 
2009 52 15,243.00 
2010 53 15,365.00 
2011 55 14,569.00 
2012 55 15,469.00 
 
  The three major players of the toll industry operate 6,256.3 km of highways in 
Brazil. These are (i) the Spanish contractor OHL Brasil
88
, (ii) the multinational Brazilian 
                                                 
87
 with 10,99 million habitants in the municipality, and 19,61 millions habitants in the metropolitan area 
that comprehends 39 municipalities. 
88
 See Obrascón Huarte y Lain Brasil S.A. OHL Brasil. Online in English: 
<http://www.ohlbrasil.com.br/> (accessed on 26 June 2009) pages 10 and 19. The Spanish contractor OHL 
Brasil
88
, subsidiary of OHL Concesiones – this one a division of Obrascon Huarte Lain S.A. of Spain – is 
the leading concession holder in Brazil and it is the sole owner of 9 Concessions in 4 different States of 
Brazil. 
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based Companhia de Concessões Rodoviárias
89
 (CCR – Highway Concessions Company) 
and (iii) the Brazilian corporation Primav Ecorodovias Co. (owned by Italian 
shareholders as well).
90
  In absolute numbers, these three concession holders manage 21 
concessions out of 53 currently existing ones.   
Table 5 – Largest Private Concessionaires  
 Concessionaire Km operated 
1 OHL 3,226.00 
2 CCR 1,571.00 
3 Ecorodovias 1,459.30 
Total Conceded 6,256.30 
Total of Conceded Highways
91
 12,866.37 
 
  2.14 - Toll Revenues   
  In 16 years (1996 to 2011), the total revenue collected with tolls in Brazil was 
$30.824 billion USD
92
, or an average of $1.96 billion USD annually, according to data at 
the Associação Brasileira de Concessionária de Rodovias (ABCR – Brazilian Association 
of Highway Concessionaires). The revenue from the toll business has been increasing 
year over year.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
89
 The Companhia de Concessões Rodoviárias (CCR – Highway Concessions Company) runs 5 
concessionaires in 3 states and is the major shareholder of 2 Concessionaires in 2 other States. 
90
 The Primav Ecorodovias Corporation owns 4 concessionaires in 2 States and is a major shareholder of 1 
Concessionaire in another State. 
91
 In Brazil. 
92
 Numbers of 2012. Source: – Associação Brasileira de Concessionária de Rodovias (ABCR – Brazilian 
Association of Highway Concessionaires) Online: 
<http://www.abcr.org.br/Conteudo/Secao/42/dados+financeiros.aspx> (accessed on 25 March 2013) 
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Chart 2 – Evolution – Total Revenue – Toll Industry in Brazil (million USD) 
 
 
 
    The report from the daily Folha de São Paulo of 25 December 2009
93
 
shows that toll revenues in the State of São Paulo have reached record heights: 
Collection of toll hits record in São Paulo 
Reporting by Agnaldo Brito this Friday for Folha de São Paulo reveals that the collection 
of tolls on highways in São Paulo will reach $4.55 billion reais [approximately $1.97 
billion USD] in 2009, a record level, 17.3% higher than that collected in 2008. The data 
are from Artesp (Transportation Agency of the State of São Paulo). 
                                                 
93
 Article translated by the author: “Arrecadação de pedágio bate recorde em SP 
Reportagem de Agnaldo Brito para a Folha desta sexta-feira revela que arrecadação de pedágios nas 
rodovias paulistas vai atingir $ 4,55 bilhões em 2009, nível recorde, 17,3% superior ao arrecadado em 
2008. Os dados são da Artesp (Agência de Transportes do Estado de São Paulo). 
A transferência de recursos dos usuários de rodovias para as concessionárias ao longo deste ano foi 
impulsionada pela a correção pelo IGP-M  dos 12 contratos antigos e a abertura de 21 novas praças de 
pedágios em todo o Estado. 
Com esses novos lotes em operação, o Estado alcançará um número de 117 praças de pedágio, a maioria 
com cobranças nos dois sentidos. 
Segundo a Artesp, desde o início do processo de concessões de rodovias em São Paulo, a arrecadação com 
pedágios no Estado já soma R$ 27 bilhões. 
Mauro Arce, secretário dos Transportes de São Paulo, argumenta que o modelo de concessão paulista não 
considera reduzir o custo do pedágio se as concessões obtiverem taxas de retorno acima das projetadas 
inicialmente. 
Arce diz que essa previsão não existe em São Paulo porque optou-se por transferir ao concessionário todo o 
risco contido na previsão de tráfego de veículos pela rodovia. Mas o risco se dilui numa economia em 
crescimento como a atual.” Available online: 
<http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u671139.shtml> (accessed on 5 April 2010).  
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The transfer of resources from users of highways to concessionaires this year was 
stimulated by the monetary restatement using the General Price Index of the Market [in 
Brazil, the Indice Geral de Preços do Mercado - IGPM] for 12 old contracts and the 
opening of 21 new toll plazas throughout the State. 
With these new concessions in operation, the state will reach a number of 117 toll plazas, 
with most of them charging in both directions. 
According to Transportation Agency of the State of São Paulo – Artesp, since the 
beginning of the process of highway concessions in the State of São Paulo, the tolls have 
already raised $27 billion reais [approximately $11.681 billion USD]
94
 in the State. 
Mauro Arce, Secretary of Transportation in São Paulo argues that the concession scheme 
of São Paulo does not consider the reduction of the cost of tolls to obtain return rates 
above to the originally projected. 
Arce says that this prevision does not exist in São Paulo because it was decided to transfer 
all risk to the private actors and in the prediction of the traffic of the highways. But the 
risk is diluted in a growing economy like the current one. 
 
   In short, private entrepreneurs of highways in the State of São Paulo 
collected $1.98 billion USD  in 2009 and $11.681 billion USD since the program of 
Highway concessions started in São Paulo. By comparison, the Ministry of 
Transportation  of the Federal Government
95
 allocated
96
 the total federal budget for 
transportation of any kind, for 2009 a total of $12.97 billion reais
97
 or $5.61 billion USD. 
The executed budget for the same period was $7.72 billion reais,
98
 or $3.34 billion USD – 
                                                 
94
 Or equivalent to $11.681 billion USD. Currency exchange rate  12/31/2008 – 2.3113  – in $ (Brazilian 
Reais) for  $1.00 USD (United States Dollars). “Certified by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for 
customs purposes as required by section 522 of the amended Tariff Act of 1930” on line: 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/H10/Hist/dat00_bz.txt> (accessed on 5 April 2010) 
95
 Federal Government.  
96
 Information available online at the Brazilian Senate website: 
<http://www8.senado.gov.br/businessobjects/enterprise115/desktoplaunch/siga/abreSiga.do?docId=213398
2&kind=Webi> (accessed on 6 April 2010) 
97
 Or equivalent to $5.611 billion USD. Currency exchange rate  12/31/2008 – 2.3113  – in $ (Brazilian 
Reais) for  $1.00 USD (United States Dollars). “Certified by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for 
customs purposes as required by section 522 of the amended Tariff Act of 1930” on line: 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/H10/Hist/dat00_bz.txt> (accessed on 5 April 2010) 
98
 Or equivalent to $3.340 billion USD. Currency exchange rate  12/31/2008 – 2.3113  – in $ (Brazilian 
Reais) for  $1.00 USD (United States Dollars). “Certified by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for 
customs purposes as required by section 522 of the amended Tariff Act of 1930” on line: 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/H10/Hist/dat00_bz.txt> (accessed on 5 April 2010) 
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59.52% of the total allocated. In sum, private entrepreneurs collected
99
 in 2009 35% of 
the allocated budget and almost 60% of the budget executed by the public sector
100
. 
Table 6 – Private and Public Investment in Transportation 
 Investment Budget Allocated 
(Billion USD) 
Budget Executed 
(Billion USD) 
1 Public – Union – 
Ministry of Transport 
5.61
101
 3.34 
2 Private – 
Concessionaires – only in 
SP  
1.98 1.98 
% of the Federal Government 35.29% 59.28% 
 
   The numbers above show the importance of the toll industry in Brazil and the 
scale of its role in the economy. Toll roads have became an important source of revenue 
and an important tool of public policy in Brazil. The wisdom of the use of toll roads on 
such a massive scale is beyond the scope of this thesis. Given the scope of the toll road 
system’s on Brazil’s governance and economy, one would expect the government to pay 
careful attention to the legality and constitutionality of toll road arrangements. 
Unfortunately, Brazil’s government has failed to do so. The next chapter will explain 
why much of Brazil’s toll road system is illegal.   
  2.15 Other Countries 
 The importance of the use of toll roads in Brazil is perhaps best demonstrated by 
comparing the use made of toll road concessions in other countries. In Canada, according 
                                                 
99
 with tolls. 
100
 Usually, concessionaires’ revenue is subject to pay income tax among other taxes, and such revenue is 
not shared with the public government, except for new highway concessions’ arrangements in the State of 
São Paulo.  
101
 In billions of dollars. 
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to Fred Nix
102
 there is a grand total of 18 toll facilities
103
, 12 of which are border 
crossings to the United States and only six of which are entirely in Canada (representing 
a total of 344 Kms
104
 of tolled highways
105
). The operation of the Canadian highways 
varies considerably. There are two privately operated highway connections between 
Canada and the United States and two privately operated toll highways in Canada – the 
first one is the highway 407
106
 managed by 407 International Inc. 
107
 (“407 ETR”) – 
which extends 108 kilometers east–west just north of Toronto.108 The second one is the 
Fredericton-Moncton highway
109
 in New Brunswick.  
  By its turn, United States has a total of 8,215.44 Km
110
 (5,104.90 miles) of tolled 
highways, bridges and tunnels
111
 comprised of 297 toll facilities. There are 51 new toll 
                                                 
102
 Fred Nix, “Alternative Road Financing Arrangements” (2001) Canada Transportation Act Review. 
Available online: <http://www.reviewcta-
examenltc.gc.ca/CTAReview/CTAReview/english/reports/nix.pdf> (accessed on 30 June 2009). 
103
  The tolls are distributed along 5 Provinces: 12 bridges and 1 private owned toll Highway in 
Ontario, 3 in Nova Scotia, 1 Bridge in New Brunswick and 1 bridge between New Brunswick and Prince 
Edward Island. The 18 tolls facilities are: (i) Angus L. MacDonald Bridge; (ii) A. Murray MacKay Bridge; 
(iii) Cobequid Pass ; (iv) Confederation Bridge ; (v) Saint John Harbour Bridge; (vi) Seaway International 
Bridge; (vii) Ogdensburg Bridge; (viii) Thousand Islands International Bridge; (ix) Highway 407; (x) 
Lewiston-Queenston Bridge; (xi) Whirlpool Rapids Bridge; (xii) Rainbow Bridge; (xiii) Peace Bridge; 
(xiv) Ambassador Bridge; (xv) Detroit-Windsor Tunnel; (xvi) Blue Water Bridge ; (xvii) Sault Ste Marie 
and (xviii) Fort Francis-International Falls Bridge;  
104
 Including the Coquihalla Tolled Highway – toll recently closed. 
105
 The toll in Coquihalla highway in British Columbia was taken off in September of 2008 
106
 See ETR 407 online: <http://www.407etr.com/> (accessed on 30 June 2009)  
107
 407 International Inc. is owned by a consortium comprised of the Canadian 
subsidiary of a Spanish company called Cintra Concesiones de 
Infraestructuras de Transporte – which is co-owned by Grupo Ferrovial and 
Australian-headquartered Macquarie Infrastructure Group – and Canadian-based 
SNC-Lavalin of Montreal. 
108
 This highway features a very developed system of toll charge – by filming license plates and toll charges 
are based on kilometers travelled. 
109
 See MRDC Operations Corporation online:  <http://www.mrdc.ca/mrdc/en/index.aspx> (accessed on 30 
June 2009) 
110
 Source:  USDOT – Department of Transportation online: 
<http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/tollpage/facts.htm> (accessed on 30 June 2009) 
111
 See “Toll Facilities in the United States Bridges-Roads-Tunnels-Ferries” of December 2007, of the 
Office of Highway Policy Information of the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT). 
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facilities currently being planned
112
 making a total of 348 toll facilities in 35 out of 50 
States, most of them operated by public authorities.  
  Of all existing toll facilities in the US, just over 50% are found in 5 states (Texas, 
Florida, New York, New Jersey and Illinois) – precisely 50.43%113 of the toll gates of the 
country.  
 
Figure 2 – US States114 with Toll Facilities – in Gray. 
  In Asia, an account of the newspaper China Daily
115
 of 26 June 2006 places China 
as the world leader in the use of toll gates. The country used to hold 71.4 % of the world's 
                                                 
112
 In operation, under construction, and financed as of 1
st
 January 2007. 
113
 See footnote 112 above. 
114
 In grey. 
115
 See China Daily News article “Road tolling policy to stay – minister”– “Tolls on China's roads are here 
to stay as they are the only way to pay for the rapid construction and maintenance of expressways and 
highways, Minister of Communications Li Shenglin has announced.  
"Without this policy, the national road network development plan would not be realized within the time 
limit and the huge debt would never be repaid," Li said.  
The road tolling policy established in 1984 stipulated that toll revenues be dedicated to repaying the cost of 
construction and supporting maintenance and new road construction.  
Official figures show 90 percent of expressways, 70 percent of first-grade highways and 40 percent of 
second-grade highways are funded with toll revenues.  
However, a growing number of motorists have expressed resentment at the policy, calling for more free 
roads.  
China has 3,112 toll charge points and 71.4 percent of the world's 140,000 kilometers of tolled roads.  
Li pointed out that toll charges on second-grade highways were the worst problem.  
"Toll charge points on second-grade highways need to be cut as they have two thirds of the country's tolled 
mileage and points, but contribute less than one third of the total toll revenue," Li said.  
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140,000 kilometers of tolled roads: 99,960 Km of tolled highways and a total of 3,112 
toll facilities. Recently, however, the country decommissioned 65% of all of its toll 
gates
116
 of secondary highways in 12 provinces. This decomissioning was completed at 
the end of April of 2009.   
  In absolute numbers, China’s government is shutting down 1,300 tolls. The 
government is preserving 653 tolls (35%) out of 1,867 on secondary highways. It is also 
                                                                                                                                                 
"However, the road tolling policy should remain unchanged as China will need it for a long time to come."  
Li said the ministry was considering measures to control the scale of tolled roads, while encouraging local 
governments in developed areas to buy out some of the second-grade roads.  
At the end of last year, 1.597-million kilometers roads had been built in China with expressways and first 
and second-grade highways accounting for 20.4 percent.  
China has classified main roads into expressway, and first-grade, second-grade, third-grade and forth-grade 
highways according to their traffic volume and function. The expressway and the first-grade highway 
require an average daily traffic volume of more than 10,000 small passenger cars and second-grade 
highways 2,000 to 7,000.” 
Online: <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/26/content_625475.htm> (accessed on 27 June 
2009) 
116
 See China Daily News article of 5 June 2009: “Free ride as toll gates disappear” – “Motorists and 
haulage companies using more than 70,000 km of roads in 12 eastern and central provinces will find a 
wide-open highway ahead following the decommissioning of 1,300 toll gates.  
The toll charge points – accounting for some 65 per cent of all toll points on second-grade highways – were 
cleared away in recent weeks and were gone by the end of April, said He Jianzhong, a spokesman with the 
Ministry of Transport.  
The move will reduce transportation costs and boost economic activity, He said.  
But there will be a heavy cost. Some 70,000 toll point workers now need new jobs, added Li Hua, head of 
the ministry's highway bureau.  
Li said local governments have drafted relocation plans for displaced workers and expect to reassign them 
to crack down on overloaded trucks, collect tolls on new expressways and maintain rural roads.  
The 12 provinces that are decommissioning the toll points will calculate their loss of income and the size of 
remaining debts for the construction of the roads, said Wu Xiao, deputy director general of the Basic 
Industries Department with the National Development and Reform Commission. The State Council, or 
China's Cabinet, will allocate $26 billion Yuan out of the fuel tax revenue each year to help local 
governments repay the debts, he said.  
China had more than 3,000 toll charge points, and more than 70 percent of the world's 140,000 km of tolled 
roads in 2006, according to a Xinhua News Agency report.  
China has 260,000-km of second-grade highways. Many of those roads were tolled and second-grade 
highways recently made up around 60 percent of all total tolled roads in China.  
However, the second-grade highways accounted for less than one-third of the total toll revenue, Minister of 
Transport Li Shenglin was earlier quoted as saying in a Xinhua report.  
In January, when the State Council launched its fuel tax reform, it stipulated that by 2012, tolls on second-
grade highways in eastern and central China would be reduced by 60 percent. Provinces and regions in 
Western China are not taking part in the current decommissioning of toll points.  
In Western China, governments can decide to keep the toll charge points on second-grade highways if they 
are needed to pay back debts, maintain roads and support new road construction.” Available online: 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-06/05/content_8253884.htm> (accessed on 27 June 2009)  
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preserving all 1,159 tolls found on major expressways. Even with its recent reduction in 
the use of toll highways, China still holds world leadership in the toll industry with a 
current total of 1,812 tolls gates.
117
  
 The table below gives an overview of the toll industry in the world. Brazil, which 
is one of the world’s largest countries in terms of land mass, features the second most 
extensive network of toll highways in the world (measured by overall length of tolled 
highways).
 118
  
  Table 7 - Toll Plazas in Selected Countries 
 
  Country Kms operated Number of toll facilities Companies 
1 China 99,960 1245 N/A
119
 
2 Brazil 15,469 284 55 
3 United States 8,215 349 N/A 
4 France 8,522  124 17 
5 Argentina 8,837 59 11 
6 Japan 6,900 N/A N/A 
7 Croatia 1,198 73 4 
8 Norway 835 88 35 
9 Indonesia 630 N/A N/A 
10 South Africa N/A 75 N/A 
11 Chile N/A 30 N/A 
12 Canada 344 18 N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117
 See footnote 115. 
118
 As China, Canada and United States. 
119
 not available. 
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Table 8 – Km Conceded - Selected Countries120 
Country Total 
Network 
Km Conceded 
Brazil 1,584,103 15,469 
Germany 644,288 12,788 
France 951,200 8,847 
Italy 487,700 5,689 
Spain 667,064 3,365 
Austria 110,778 2,176 
Turkey 424,964 2,000 
Portugal 76,802 1,701 
Greece 116,711 1,658 
Czech Republic 130,573 1,319 
Croatia 29,248 1,241 
Hungary 197,534 1,081 
Norway 93,247 872 
Slovenia 38,872 607 
Serbia and Montenegro 40,130 603 
Slovakia 43,848 415 
Ireland 96,424 329 
Poland 383,313 300 
Great Britain 419,634 42 
Denmark 73,257 34 
Netherlands 136,135 20 
Switzerland 71,355 17 
Sweden 574,741 16 
Albania 18,000 N/A 
Belgium 153,595  N/A 
Bulgaria 40,231  N/A 
Estonia 58,034  N/A 
Finland 78,860 N/A 
Latvia 69,684  N/A 
Lithuania 81,030 N/A 
Macedonia 13,922 N/A 
Romania 198,817 N/A 
Russia 963,000  N/A 
Source: ASECAP/AA/IRF 
 
   
 
                                                 
120
 Numbers of 2012. Source: – Associação Brasileira de Concessionária de Rodovias (ABCR – Brazilian 
Association of Highway Concessionaires) Online: 
<http://www.abcr.org.br/Conteudo/Secao/43/estatisticas.aspx> (accessed on 25 March 2013) 
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  2.16 Conclusion  
  Obviously, the country of Brazil has quickly become a “world leader” in both 
highway tolling and the concession of highways to private actors. The massive revenues 
(and we are talking about over $30 billion USD in the past 16 years) generated by the toll 
system is dreived, of course, from rates paid by ordinary people driving on Brazilian 
highways – rates that add directly to the cost of moving from place to place. This 
constitutes a large change in the lives of Brazilian commuters. Given the scope and scale 
of the impact of toll roads on Brazilians, it is important to assess the legality of this toll 
road system. That is the overall goal of this thesis, and the specific focus of the next 
chapter.   
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Chapter III  
The Lawfulness Principle and the 
Lack of Regulation on Tolls 
 
“When law ends, discretion begins, and the exercise  
of discretion may mean either beneficence or tyranny, 
 either justice or injustice, either reasonableness  
or unreasonableness.  
Philip Anizman
121
 - 1975 
 
   3.1 Introduction 
   As we saw in chapter 2, the Brazilian Constitution features a principle known as 
“The Lawfulness Principle”.122 This principle roughly corresponds to what we might call 
“The Rule of Law” in North America. Pursuant to this principle, all government acts 
must be authorized by law: whether the government is levying taxes, conceding resources 
to private actors, or establishing fines and penalties, the government must proceed 
through the passage of a statute and (where necessary) detailed regulations. Without a 
prior law, there can be no valid government action. 
  Celso Antônio Bandeira de Mello
123
 writes that “The principle of Lawfulness, in 
Brazil, means that the public administration can do nothing but what the statute 
                                                 
121
 Philip Anizman (ed.) (1975) “A Catalogue of Discretionary Powers in the Revised Statutes of Canada”, 
1970. Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada.  
122
  Also known as “The principle of legality”. All three phrases mean the same thing: The principle 
of Lawfulness, Lawfulness principle and the principle of legality. For translation purposes, in Portuguese 
these three phrases are interchangeable. On the general nature of the Lawfulness principle, see Cármem 
Lúcia Antunes Rocha. Princípios Constitucionais da Administração Pública. [Constitutional Principles of 
the Public Administration] (1994) Belo Horizonte: Del Rey Publishing house. Page 81 and Odete Medauar, 
Direito Administrativo Moderno [Modern Administrative Law] (2011), RT Publishing House, São Paulo. 
123
  See Celso Antônio Bandeira de Mello. Curso de Direito Administrativo [Administrative Law 
Course] (2003) São Paulo: Malheiros Publishing House 2003, page 95. Translated by the author: 
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authorizes.”  Similarly, Diógenes Gasparini124, an expert in Brazilian administrative law, 
explains the Lawfulness Principle as follows: 
The Lawfulness Principle means that the public administration, in all its activity, is bound to the 
commandments of the law and cannot move away from it, due to the invalidity of the act and the 
responsibility of its author. Any state action without the corresponding legal provision or 
exceeding the meaning of the law is contrary to the principle and subject to annulment. The 
government’s field of action, as can be seen, is much smaller than that of the individual.  
 
  In chapter 2, Brazil’s Lawfulness Principle is enshrined in Articles 5, Subsection 
II
125
, and Article 37
126
 of the Brazilian Constitution: 
“Article 5. All persons are equal before the law, without any distinction whatsoever, Brazilians 
and foreigners residing in the country being ensured of inviolability of the right to life, to liberty, 
to equality, to security and to property, on the following terms: 
... 
II - no one shall be obliged to do or refrain from doing something except by virtue of law;” 
 
“Article 37. The direct or indirect public administration of any of the powers of the Union, the 
states, the Federal District and the municipalities, as well as their foundations, shall obey the 
principles of lawfulness, impersonality, morality, publicity and also the following:”  
                                                                                                                                                 
 “O princípio da legalidade, no Brasil, significa que a Administração nada pode fazer senão o que a 
lei determina. Ao contrário dos particulares, os quais podem fazer tudo o que a lei não proíbe, a 
Administração só pode fazer o que a lei antecipadamente autorize. Donde, administrar é prover aos 
interesses públicos, assim caracterizados em lei, fazendo-o na conformidade dos meios e formas nela 
estabelecidos ou particularizados segundo suas disposições.” 
124
  Diógenes Gasparini. Direito Administrativo [Administrative Law] (2003) São Paulo : Saraiva 
Publishing House. Pages 7 and 8. Translated by the author: "O princípio da legalidade significa estar a 
administração pública, em toda a sua atividade, presa aos mandamentos da lei, deles não se podendo 
afastar, sob pena de invalidade do ato e responsabilidade de seu autor. Qualquer ação estatal sem o 
correspondente calço legal, ou que exceda ao âmbito demarcado pela lei, é injurídica e expõe-se à anulação. 
Seu campo de ação, como se vê, é bem menor que o do particular. De fato, este pode fazer tudo que a lei 
permite e tudo que a lei não proíbe; aquela só pode fazer o que a lei autoriza e, ainda assim, quando e como 
autoriza." 
125
  Original in Portuguese: “Art. 5º Todos são iguais perante a lei, sem distinção de qualquer 
natureza, garantindo-se aos brasileiros e aos estrangeiros residentes no País a inviolabilidade do direito à 
vida, à liberdade, à igualdade, à segurança e à propriedade, nos termos seguintes: 
... 
II - ninguém será obrigado a fazer ou deixar de fazer alguma coisa senão em virtude de lei;” 
126
 Federal Constitution of Brazil – Article 37 translated by the author: “Artigo 37 - A administração 
pública direta e indireta de qualquer dos Poderes da União, dos Estados, do Distrito Federal e dos 
Municípios obedecerá aos princípios de legalidade, impessoalidade, moralidade, publicidade e eficiência e, 
também, ao seguinte:” 
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    Both provisions will be discussed, below. The purpose of the first part of this 
chapter is to examine the Lawfulness Principle as it applies in Brazil, and to consider its 
impact on the Brazilian toll road system. The chapter will conclude with a discussion on 
the dearth of laws authorizing the executive to grant concessions on roads in the country.  
As we shall see below, the only law purporting to provide authority for the concession of 
toll roads in Brazil is Brazil’s General Law of Concessions.127  For reasons given below, 
the General Law of Concessions is insufficient to constitute compliance with the 
Lawfulness Principle – in other words, this chapter will argue that the statutory authority 
purporting to concede Brazilian toll highways to private actors is insufficient, and the 
grant of such concessions in the absence of sufficient statutory authority violates the 
Lawfulness Principle. Because these concessions violate Brazil’s Lawfulness Principle, 
they are offside of the Brazilian Constitution, and therefore illegal.   
  Brazil’s Lawfulness Principle will help us answer a key question for the purposes 
of this thesis, namely, what are the Constitution’s specific requirements with respect to 
the concession of public utilities?  In other words, what must be included for a 
“concession law” for that law to count as a constitutionally permissible “concession 
law”? In order to answer this question, two points must be addressed: (1) the meaning 
and scope of Articles 5 and 175 of the Constitution and (2) the content of the General 
Law of Concessions.  These points are the topics of the next sections of this chapter.  
 
 
                                                 
127
 Law number 8,987 of 13 February 1995. It can be found online, only in Portuguese - 
<http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L8987cons.htm> (Accessed on 28 October 2011) 
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3.2 The  Lawfulness Principle 
  The main legal source for the Lawfulness Principle is Brazil’s Constitution. The 
Constitution prohibits state action without prior legislative authorization and this includes 
the concession of state resources, such as highways. As noted above, this principle is set 
out in Article 37
128
 of the Federal Constitution. Cleary, Article 37 of the Constitution 
establishes that the government of Brazil is bound by “Lawfulness”. What is this 
“Lawfulness Principle”?  Pursuant to Brazil’s Lawfulness Principle, the public 
administration or the administrator can only do what is expressly authorized by pre-
existing statutes.
129
    
  Beyond its entrenchment in Article 37 of the Federal Constitution, the Lawfulness 
Principle finds additional expression (as noted above) in subsection II of Article 5 of the 
Federal Constitution. As we have seen, this provision states that no person (whether 
Brazilian or a foreigner resident in the country) can be obliged (by the government) to do 
any act, unless that obligation is established “by virtue of law”. This applies to any 
obligation that the government seeks to impose, whether directly or indirectly. If the 
                                                 
128
  Federal Constitution of Brazil – Article 37 translated by the author: “Article 37. The direct or 
indirect public administration of any of the powers of the Union, the States, the Federal District and the 
municipalities, as well as their foundations, shall obey the principles of lawfulness, impersonality, morality, 
publicity and also the following:”  
 Original in Portuguese:  “Artigo 37 - A administração pública direta e indireta de qualquer dos 
Poderes da União, dos Estados, do Distrito Federal e dos Municípios obedecerá aos princípios de 
legalidade, impessoalidade, moralidade, publicidade e eficiência e, também, ao seguinte:”  
129
  Hely Lopes Meirelles. Direito Administrativo Brasileiro [Brazilian Administrative Law] (2005) 
30
th
 Edition. São Paulo: Malheiros Publishing House. Translated by the author – “The Lawfulness 
principle, as a principle of the public administration means that the public administrator is, in all 
its functional activity, subject to the commandments of statutes and the requirements of the common 
good, and they can not move away or divert, otherwise the act will be invalid and they will be subject to 
civil and criminal liability, as appropriate" 
Original in Portuguese: “A legalidade, como principio de administração (CF, art. 37, caput), significa que o 
administrador público está, em toda a sua atividade funcional, sujeito aos mandamentos da lei e às 
exigências do bem comum, e deles não se pode afastar ou desviar, sob pena de praticar ato inválido e 
expor-se à responsabilidade disciplinar, civil e criminal, conforme o caso.” 
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government seeks to impose an obligation for any person to pay tolls for the use of public 
resources (for example), it may impose that obligation only “by virtue of law”.130  It 
cannot impose such obligations by simple administrative fiat: any attempt to do so would 
constitute a clear violation of this provision of the Federal Constitution.
131
  
 3.3 The General Concession Law and Article 175 of the Constitution 
 In addition to the general requirements established in connection with the 
Lawfulness Principle, Brazil’s Constitution also includes specific requirements with 
respect to the governments’ actions in supplying public utility services. These additional 
specific constitutitonal obligations are spelled out in Article 175.  
It is incumbent upon the Government, as set forth by law, to provide public utility services, either  
directly or by concession or permission, which will always be through public bidding. 
Sole paragraph - The law shall provide for: 
I - the operating rules for the public service concession- or permission- holding companies, the 
special nature of their contract and of the extension thereof, as well as the conditions of forfeiture, 
control and termination of the concession or permission; 
II - the rights of the users; 
III – the rate policy; 
IV - the obligation of maintaining adequate service. 
 
  Clearly, Article 175 requires not only the provision of public utitlities, but also the 
regulation of several key aspects of those utilities.  
   The sole paragraph of Article 175 requires regulation of public utilities and the 
content of such regulation must provide for: (i) the regime for public service companies; 
                                                 
130
  Note that that the quote of Gasparini above is in the context of a Civil Law country (as opposed to 
a common law jurisdiction).  As a result, when Gasparini notes that the public administration “can only do 
what the law allows”, he uses the phrase “the law” to mean “legislation” (as opposed to common law or 
custom).  In other words, Gasparini makes it clear that, in order for Brazil’s government to take any action, 
that action must be directly authorized by a statute. One point here is that in Civil Law systems, “Law” 
must mean “statute”, rather than simply a common law principle or tradition. 
131
  See Odete Medauar below at Chapter 3.5.1. 
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(ii) the rights of utility users; (iii) the rate policy and (iv) the obligation of maintaining 
adequate services. In order for the Government’s provision of public utilities to pass 
constitutional muster the law (required by the Lawfulness Principle) must follow the 
specific rules laid out in Article 175, and spell out regulations on each of the specified 
subjects.  
  At present, an advocate of the government’s current position regarding tolls might 
contend that the regulations required by the Constitution do exist, specifically in the form 
of the General Law of Concessions. For reasons set out below, this position should be 
rejected.    
  My contention is that the General Law of Concessions fails to provide an 
adequate framework to constitute compliance with the Lawfulness Principle, together 
with the specific requirements articulated in Article 175.  This Article expressely requires 
specific provisions to regulate the rights of users and rate policy. The current law fails to 
meet this basic constitutional requirement. Savaris
132
, administrative scholar, Federal 
Justice in Curitiba and Professor of the Magistracy School of Paraná summarizes the 
current regulation of toll roads in Brazil as follows:     
The collection of tolls on federal highways does not meet any legal parameter. Everything is 
possible. There is no law requiring an alternative free route to the tolled highway. There is no law 
that sets the price. And this is, indeed, the greatest weakness of the collection of tolls on federal 
highways: there is no law.  
 
                                                 
132
  José Antônio Savaris. Pedágio: Pressupostos Jurídicos. [Highway Tolls: Legal presupposition] 
(2004) Curitiba: Juruá Publishing House. Page 260 translated by the author: “A cobrança de pedágio nas 
vias federais concedidas não respeita qualquer parâmetro legal. Tudo é possivel. Não há lei que a 
condicione à existência de via alternativa gratuita. Não há lei que fixe o preço. E esta é, realmente, a chaga 
maior da cobrança de pedágios nas rodovias federais: não há lei.” 
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  With respect, Savaris is correct. There are no meaningful laws regulating toll 
roads in Brazil – certainly none that regulate the specific subject matters described by 
Article 175 of the Constitution (namely, the rights of users and rate policy). As a result, it 
is clear that the requirements of Article 175 are not fulfilled by the General Law of 
Concessions.  
 To the extent that the government has made any attempt to regulate toll roads, it 
has been through the passage of the General Law of Concessions.  This law is inadequate, 
and fails to comply with Article 175. On the subject of “rate policy”, for example (one of 
the features requiring regulation under Article 175), the General Law of Concession 
states in section IV, Article 13
133
, only that rates “may vary”.   This statement is too 
vague to constitute compliance with (a) the Lawfulness Principle, and (b) the 
Constitution’s requirement to regulate rate policy. It is important to note that this is 
Brazil’s only statutory provision purporting to regulate rates on toll roads.  The meaning 
and impact of the provision stating that the rates “may vary” is discussed in Section 3.3.2 
of this chapter.  
3.3.1 Contracts as Brazilian Law 
While it is clear that there is insufficient statutory authority regulating toll rates, 
one might be tempted to argue that other legal instruments – such as private contractual 
agreements – fill the regulatory void. For example, Brazil’s government has entered 
various contracts with private concessionaires, and many of these contracts stipulate rules 
with respect to toll road rates.  While these contracts may (if enshrined in duly enacted 
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 Article 13 of the General Law of Concessions translated: “Article 13. The rates may be variable 
according to the technical characteristics and specific costs from the service to different user segments.” 
Original in Portuguese: “Art. 13. As tarifas poderão ser diferenciadas em função das características técnicas 
e dos custos específicos provenientes do atendimento aos distintos segmentos de usuários.” 
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legislation) supply the level of detail required to constitute compliance with “the 
Lawfulness Principle” or the Constitution’s requirement to regulate rates in Article 175, 
these contracts do not have the force of law in Brazil, and have not been incorporated into 
legislation.  
In a civil law jurisdiction such as Brazil, the government cannot discharge its 
constitutional obligations (or comply with the Lawfulness Principle) through the creation 
of private instruments, such as contracts. In order to fulfil its obligations under the 
Lawfulness Principle, the government of a civil law jurisdiction must pass appropriate 
legislation. As a result, the details found in contractual provisions cannot cure the 
vagueness and unconstitutionality of the General Law of Concessions, as any such details 
must themselves be provided through legislation or regulations. This argument is further 
developed in the following sub-chapter. 
  3.3.2 Contract versus Law – The Lawfulness Principle  
  In civil law jurisdictions such as Brazil, the State is held to a particular “form” 
when satisfying the Lawfulness Principle – that is, the “rules” must be expressed through 
legislation, rather than through the terms of a contract between the State and a 
concessionaire.  In civil law jurisdictions, neither private or public contracts count as 
legislation
134
 for the purposes of the Lawfulness Principle, i.e., as a means of discharging 
constitutional obligations in civil law jurisdictions like Brazil. This is why the 
government cannot discharge its Constitutional obligations via contract due to the 
Lawfulness Principle. 
                                                 
134
 Legislation is the only mechanism through which obligations under the Lawfulness principle can be 
discharged.  
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 Marçal Justen Filho
135
 has said that contract may not count as legislation for 
constitutional purposes, which is a role of the legislators:  
Contract is as an act produced by the combination of will of two or more parties, legally 
authorized to create, modify or terminate legal relations, but not in the exercise of State legislative 
function.  
 
 Odete Medauar
136
 echoes this statement, pointing of that compliance with the 
Lawfulness Principle requires the passage of legislation: 
 In general, within the measures with higher impacts on citizens' rights, there is a strict bond of the 
administrative act to the content of the legislation. It should also be noted that for many issues, 
the Federal Constitution, State Constitutions and organic laws of the 
municipalities require formal discipline by legislation, that is, by statutes which 
must necessarily arise from the process by the legislative body. 
 
 Contracts
137
 are not legislation. While they might be authorized by legislation or 
they might even be created through legislation, in every case, they are not the legislation 
itself.   
  As a technical matter, it may be important to note that, while the contracts 
governing toll roads in Brazil are not legislation, the statute authorizing them – namely, 
the General law of Concessions – is an ordinary statute that arose by legislative process. 
As we have seen, this statute authorizes the government to enter contracts in which the 
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Marçal Justen Filho. Teoria geral das concessões de serviço público. [General Theory of the 
Concessions of Public Services] (2003) São Paulo: Dialética Publishing House. Page 152. Original in 
Portuguese: “O contrato conceitua-se como ato jurídico produzido pela conjugação da vontade de duas ou 
mais partes, autorizada normativamente a criar, modificar ou extinguir relações jurídicas, mas não no 
exercício de função legislativa estatal." 
136
Odete Medauar. Direito administrativo moderno. [Modern Administrative Law] (1996) São 
Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais publishing house. Page 140. Original in Portuguese: “Em geral, nas medidas 
de repercussão mais forte nos direitos dos cidadãos, há vinculação mais estrita da medida administrativa ao 
conteúdo da norma. 
Deve-se lembrar também que, para muitas matérias, a Constituição Federal, as constituições estaduais e as 
leis orgânicas de municípios exigem a disciplina por lei formal, ou seja, por lei que deverá necessariamente 
resultar de tramitação no Legislativo.” 
137
As the highways concession contracts between the State and a private corporation. 
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rates “vary”. So one could argue that we do have a law that applies, and that it came from 
the ordinary legislative process. 
  At this point, it is important to remember the core claim of this chapter, namely, 
that the General  Law of Concessions is insufficiently precise to count as compliance 
with the Lawfulness Principle. While pertinent details have, in some cases, been fleshed 
out in contracts, there is simply no legal basis for claiming that contracts can legally 
supply details that a public law lacks. Simply put, the required precision cannot come 
from contracts and discretionary action by the Government without democratically 
enacted guidelines or regulation.  
  3.3.3  The General Law of Concessions
138
 – Broad Sense of the Law 
  As mentioned in section 3.3.1 above, the General Law of Concessions lacks the 
specificity needed for the lawful implementation of toll highways in Brazil. It is 
impermissibly vague and does not exhibit the level of specificity required in order to 
comply with the Lawfulness Principle. The overall goal of this section is to explore why 
further regulation, (apart from the General Law of Concessions) is required by the 
Lawfulness Principle of the Constitution. 
   The General Law of Concessions is not a law aimed directly at highway 
concession. On the contrary, it sets up the rules for the conceding of public resources to 
private actors, and in doing so it deals with many different types of economic activities 
and services. The General Law of Concessions does not contain specific provisions 
governing individual economic activities or resources, but instead establishes broad, 
general procedures that regulate the process of conceding public resources without 
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  The translation of the General Law of Concessions is at Appendix A.  
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actually regulating the specific (and Constitutionally required) terms of those 
concessions. 
   Brazil’s legal framework allows dozens of types of concessions to be 
implemented through reliance on the General Law of Concessions, namely: (i) 
concession of urban public bus transportation; (ii) concession of urban public railway 
transportation; (iii) concession of intercity or interstate bus transportation; (iv) concession 
for waterway transportation services; (v) concession for airway transportation services; 
(vi) concession for railway transportation services; (vii) concession of ports; (viii) 
concession of airports; (ix) concession of highways; (x) concession for the provision of 
sewage services; (xi) concession for the provision of basic sanitation services; (xii) 
concession for the public service of supply of water; (xiii) concession for the public 
service of supply and distribution of piped gas; (xiv) concession for public service of 
supply and delivery of electric energy; (xv) concession for the public service of garbage 
collection; (xvi) concession for the implementation and maintenance of the landfill; (xvii) 
concession for the provision of funeral services; (xviii) concession for public postal 
services.  
  All these types of concessions have been granted. Apart from toll highway 
concessions, all were granted and implemented through additional legislation beyond the 
simple procedures set out by the General Law of Concessions – see, for example, the 
discussion of telephony in Subchapter 3.4. The toll industry started 26 years
139
 ago with 
                                                 
139
See the introductory website of the national agency of ground transportation – ANTT online: 
<http://www.antt.gov.br/concessaorod/apresentacaorod.asp> (Accessed on 29 November 2011). 
“Our goal with the use of this mean of communication is disclose in a comprehensive and transparent way 
the information about the Federal program of Highways Concessions. The implementation process began in 
1995 with the concession by the Ministry of Transport of 858.6 km of federal highways. 
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the first Federal program of highways concessions and still lacks any specific 
implementing legislation. It is unique among publicly conceded resources in this respect. 
   In other words, the existence of specific laws for public services such as 
sanitation, ground water, ground transportation, etc. in Brazil suggests that the Brazilian 
legislature considers these laws necessary, in other words, the legislature itself regards 
the General Law of Concessions as insufficiently specific to regulate these activities. This 
suggests, as a matter of legislative intent, that the General Law of Concessions is not 
designed to cope with individual economic activities, but instead simply provides a 
framework pursuant to which specific legislation can be passed.  
 While the presence of specific laws for other types of concession suggests that the 
government feels such laws are necessary (as a matter of legislative intent), it is equally 
true that the absence of such a law with respect to toll roads could be construed as a 
signal of legislative intent that this level of specificity is not (for some reason) required 
with respect to toll roads. However, this is unpersuasive. It is unlikely that a rational 
legislature would regard the General Law of Concessions as a sufficiently precise law for 
the regulation of roads. This is because the scope of the General Law of Concessions is 
extraordinarily broad, and that the sole
140
 provision (apart from the General Law of 
Concessions
141
) relating directly to highway concessions in Brazil is Article 1
142
 of Law 
9,074 of 7 July 1995
143
: 
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 And only. 
141
 There is a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Law – Law 11,074 of 30 December 2004, dealing with 
concessions as well and with no reference at all to highways concessions, neither regulating the industry. 
See the PPP Law online – only in Portuguese: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-
2006/2004/lei/l11079.htm> (accessed on 5 February 2013). The PPP Law has not being used by public 
governments to concede highways in Brazil. The only known case in the industry, is in the State of Minas 
Gerais – the PPP of the highway MG-050. Available online, only in Portuguese: 
  
62 
The concession or, where applicable, the permission shall be subject, under the Law 8,987 of 13 
February 1995, to the following services and public works of the Union: 
... 
IV - federal highways, preceded or not by the execution of public works; 
 
  No further guidance is provided. While there are generic bidding and rate 
procedures mentioned in the General Law of Concessions, no specifics are laid out with 
respect to specific forms of conceded resources, including highways. And as we have 
seen, for other resources, the government has passed legislation spelling out all the 
necessary details. Highways concession is one left with a regulatory void.  
  3.3.4 The Rate Policy – Requirement of a Specific Law  
   As noted in Section 3.3 above, the Constitution requires the government to 
legislate “rate policy” if it chooses to concede a public utility. Article 13144, the last 
Article of Chapter IV of the General Law of Concessions deals with rate policy. It is, 
therefore, crucial to determine if this provision fulfills the relevant constitutional 
obligation to regulate rates. Article 13 of the General Law of Concessions provides as 
follows:  
Article 13. The rates may vary according to the technical characteristics and specific costs from 
the service to different segments of users. 
 
  It is important to recall that the General Law of Concessions purports to regulate 
all forms of conceded public utilities – it is not specifically aimed at regulating toll roads. 
                                                                                                                                                 
<http://www.ppp.mg.gov.br/projetos-ppp/projetos-celebrados/mg-050/noticias/equipe-de-licitacao-abre-
propostas-de-precos-para-obras-da-mg-050-1> (accessed on 14 January 2013). 
142
Law 9,074 of 1995. Article 1st translated by the author: “Art. 1o Sujeitam-se ao regime de concessão ou, 
quando couber, de permissão, nos termos da Lei n
o 
8.987, de 13 de fevereiro de 1995, os seguintes serviços 
e obras públicas de competência da União: 
... 
IV - vias federais, precedidas ou não da execução de obra pública;”  
143
 This provision authorizes only the concession of federal highways – neither State or regional ones. 
144
 General Law of Concessions – Law 8,987 of 1995. Article 13. translated by the author: “Art. 13. As 
tarifas poderão ser diferenciadas em função das características técnicas e dos custos específicos 
provenientes do atendimento aos distintos segmentos de usuários.” 
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The meaning of specific provisions of the law in the context of toll roads must 
accordingly be examined. In the present context, what does it mean to say that toll rates 
“may vary”? Taken at face value, this provision means that toll rates can vary in response 
to some un-named criteria. For example, rates might vary depending upon the 
characteristics of the consumers or users of the relevant utility, the nature of the 
concession or some other variables. One good example is the case of energy supply 
concessions where the rates vary if the use is residential, commercial or industrial.  In the 
case of toll highways, the rates charges to users currently vary according to the type, 
weight or even emissions’145 class of the vehicles.146   
  Article 13 of the General Law of Concessions authorizes rates that “vary”. This 
raises a question: Is this provision enough to constitute compliance with Article 175 of 
the Constitution? Article 175 of the Constitution specifically requires that the government 
must regulate “rate policy” for any public resource that it concedes. Despite the 
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 As in the case in Germany. 
146
  Germany adopted the toll system only for trucks of twelve tonnes gross weight or more. The 
German system is based on distance and emission class of the vehicle. Toll charges/fees are determined by 
satellite technology through Global Positioning System (GPS) so as not to affect the flow of traffic. The 
charge is calculated on a per kilometer basis, depending on the number of axles, but the most positive 
surprising fact was the adoption on 1
st
 January 2009 of charges according to the vehicle's emission category 
– an innovative advancement: 
“The level of the toll is based on the emissions class and number of axles on the truck and on the distance 
travelled on the toll route. The new German Heavy Goods Vehicle Toll Level Ordinance, that came into 
force on 1st January 2009, assigns each vehicle to one of four categories, A to D, based on its emissions 
class. The new toll rates mean that trucks with the latest-generation exhaust systems and those that have 
been upgraded with particle reduction systems pay significantly less than high-emission vehicles. 
Therefore, trucks in emissions class S2, combined with particle reduction levels 1, 2, 3 or 4, now enjoy the 
lower toll rates of category C, while vehicles in emissions class S3, combined with particle reduction levels 
2, 3 or 4, pay the category B rates. Users are required to make accurate declarations of emissions classes 
(principle of self-declaration). Registered vehicles classified in emissions classes 2 or 3, fitted with the 
required particle reduction systems, can be re-registered to a lower toll rate with Toll Collect.”  
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Constitutional requirement, the General Law of Concessions makes no further provision 
for rate policy with respect to toll roads except that the rates may “vary”.147 
  Of great significance is the fact that the General Law of Concessions authorizes 
different rates for different kinds of consumers/users whitout specifying or regulating any 
further aspects of the rate policy. Several questions, therefore, arise in connection with 
rate policy: To which group of users or consumers do the rates apply? For which kind of 
concession is the rate policy assigned?
148
 Does this include highway concessions? If so, 
what is the specific rate policy for highway concessions? What kinds of vehicles are 
subject to the rate policy of the General Law of Concessions? Which kinds of highways 
are subject to rates? Are two lane
149
 highways subject to tolls? Can the price of a toll vary 
by the number of lanes in a highway? 
  The General Law of Concessions currently cannot answer these important 
questions because it is too vague. In order to clarify the issue of tolls on roads, new laws 
must be written, as no current legislation offers the information necessary for compliance 
with constitutional requirements to regulate “rate policy”.  
  The regulation of rate policy is a Constitutional requirement and the General Law 
of Concessions merely authorizes that rates “may vary”.  What is required by the 
Constitution is more than a single provision of the General Law of Concessions 
                                                 
147
 In the case of public utilities other than toll highways, the specific ways in which rates may vary are 
spelled out in subordinate legislation, discussed below. 
148
 Presumably, the General Law of Concessions reference to rate policy refers to all types of concessions. 
149
 In Brazil, there are several tolls on single carriageways, also known as undivided highways or two-lane 
highways specially in the States of Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul. Hely Lopes Meirelles, one of the most 
important (and now deceased) administrative scholars in Brazil taught: "In the particular case of the toll 
highway, it is required that the highway may present special conditions of road traffic (expressed high-
speed highway and good levels of security), be gridlocked and offer alternative possibility for the user 
(another road that leads to the same free destination), although on less advantageous terms of traffic." 
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authorizing variable rates. Moreover, saying that a rate “may vary” is the same as saying 
nothing at all.  If a rate “may” vary, it “may not” vary too.  
  In sum, the meaning of the phare “the rates may vary” it is so empty, that it is 
logically the same as having no rate policy at all.  
  If no direction is given to “how much” or “how little” something might vary, or 
along which lines it might vary, then the phrase “rates may vary” is essentially 
meaningless. In effect, this means that there is no rate policy at all, and if there is no rate 
policy at all, the General Law of Concessions violates Article 37
150
 and Article 175
151
 of 
the Constitution.    
  In effect, the government’s current regulation of toll road rates amounts to no 
regulation of rates at all. In other words, the government has not actually passed a 
meaningful regulation concerning the rates that apply on conceded toll roads. The 
outcome is that the General Law of Concessions’ “rate policy” is insufficient to constitute 
a true “rate policy” within the meaning of Article 175. As a result, there is no statutory 
rate policy with respect to highways concession, and the concession system is 
accordingly unconstitutional.    
 
                                                 
150
Article 37. The direct or indirect public administration of any of the powers of the Union, the States, the 
Federal District and the municipalities, as well as their foundations, shall obey the principles of 
Lawfulness, impersonality, morality, publicity, efficiency and also the following: 
151
Article 175. It is incumbent upon the Government, as set forth by law, to provide public utility services, 
either directly or by concession or permission, which will always be through public bidding. 
Sole paragraph - The law shall provide for: 
 I - the operating rules for the public service concession- or permission- holding companies, the 
special nature of their contract and of the extension thereof, as well as the conditions of forfeiture, control 
and termination of the concession or permission; 
 II - the rights of the users; 
 III - rates policy; 
 IV - the obligation of maintaining adequate service. 
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  3.3.5 Second Regulatory Lacuna: User Rights and Vehicle Classes 
  Article 175 of the Federal Constitution imposes an obligation for the Federal 
government to regulate the highway tolling system in Brazil. In the previous sections of 
this chapter, we saw that the government’s failure to regulate applicable rates violates this 
constitutional provision. That is not, however, the only constitutional defect related to 
Brazil’s current highway system.  
  Another specific example of Brazil’s failure to regulate toll roads can be seen in 
the government’s failure to specify rights of highway users based on vehicle 
classification. For example, there are presently no regulations differentiating the rates or 
rights applicable to emergency vehicles, transport companies or “ordinary” commuter 
traffic. Such regulation is common in other jurisdictions (discussed below), and seems 
intuitively necessary, either under the constitutional requirement to establish “rate policy” 
or the similar constitutional requirement to establish “rights of users”. Unfortunately, the 
government of Brazil has utterly failed to pass legislation explaining or expressing the 
rights or tolls applicable with respect to different vehicle classes. This stands in stark 
contrasts to the regulatory regimes of other countries, where regulation by reference to 
vehicle class is a matter of course. 
  One good example of regulation can be found at the Office of Highway Policy 
Information
152
 in the Federal Highway Administration – FHWA of United States of 
America. They have a series of detailed regulations and policies governing the ways in 
                                                 
152
 The Office of Highway Policy Information – OHPI of Federal Highway Administration – FHWA of 
United States of America is the body that serves as a national source for surface transportation data, 
development, implementation of decisions, policies, legislation, programs and performance goals. 
Available online: <http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/aboutus.cfm> (Accessed on 24 April 2013)  
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which rights and rates vary by reference to vehicle classification, summarized in the 
following policy:
153
 
The classification scheme is separated into categories depending on whether the vehicle carries 
passengers or commodities. Non-passenger vehicles are further subdivided by number of axles and 
number of units, including both power and trailer units. Note that the addition of a light trailer to a 
vehicle does not change the classification of the vehicle. 
Automatic vehicle classifiers need an algorithm to interpret axle spacing information to correctly 
classify vehicles into these categories. The algorithm most commonly used is based on the 
"Scheme F" developed by Maine DOT in the mid-1980s. The FHWA does not endorse "Scheme 
F" or any other classification algorithm. Axle spacing characteristics for specific vehicle types are 
known to change from State to State. As a result, no single algorithm is best for all cases. It is up 
to each agency to develop, test, and refine an algorithm that meets its own needs. 
FHWA Vehicle Classes with Definitions 
Motorcycles -- All two or three-wheeled motorized vehicles. Typical vehicles in this category have 
saddle type seats and are steered by handlebars rather than steering wheels. This category includes 
motorcycles, motor scooters, mopeds, motor-powered bicycles, and three-wheel motorcycles. 
Passenger Cars -- All sedans, coupes, and station wagons manufactured primarily for the purpose 
of carrying passengers and including those passenger cars pulling recreational or other light 
trailers. 
Other Two-Axle, Four-Tire Single Unit Vehicles -- All two-axle, four-tire, vehicles, other than 
passenger cars. Included in this classification are pickups, panels, vans, and other vehicles such as 
campers, motor homes, ambulances, hearses, carryalls, and minibuses. Other two-axle, four-tire 
single-unit vehicles pulling recreational or other light trailers are included in this 
classification. Because automatic vehicle classifiers have difficulty distinguishing class 3 from 
class 2, these two classes may be combined into class 2. 
Buses -- All vehicles manufactured as traditional passenger-carrying buses with two axles and six 
tires or three or more axles. This category includes only traditional buses (including school buses) 
functioning as passenger-carrying vehicles. Modified buses should be considered to be a truck and 
should be appropriately classified. 
NOTE: In reporting information on trucks the following criteria should be used: 
Truck tractor units traveling without a trailer will be considered single-unit trucks. 
A truck tractor unit pulling other such units in a "saddle mount" configuration will be considered 
one single-unit truck and will be defined only by the axles on the pulling unit. 
Vehicles are defined by the number of axles in contact with the Road. Therefore, "floating" axles 
are counted only when in the down position. 
The term "trailer" includes both semi- and full trailers. 
Two-Axle, Six-Tire, Single-Unit Trucks -- All vehicles on a single frame including trucks, camping 
and recreational vehicles, motor homes, etc., with two axles and dual rear wheels. 
Three-Axle Single-Unit Trucks -- All vehicles on a single frame including trucks, camping and 
recreational vehicles, motor homes, etc., with three axles. 
Four or More Axle Single-Unit Trucks -- All trucks on a single frame with four or more axles. 
Four or Fewer Axle Single-Trailer Trucks -- All vehicles with four or fewer axles consisting of 
two units, one of which is a tractor or straight truck power unit. 
Five-Axle Single-Trailer Trucks -- All five-axle vehicles consisting of two units, one of which is a 
tractor or straight truck power unit. 
Six or More Axle Single-Trailer Trucks -- All vehicles with six or more axles consisting of two 
units, one of which is a tractor or straight truck power unit. 
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See the Federal Highway Administration – FHWA Vehicles Classification. Available online: 
<http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohpi/vehclass.htm> (Accessed on 10 April 2012)  
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Five or fewer Axle Multi-Trailer Trucks -- All vehicles with five or fewer axles consisting of three 
or more units, one of which is a tractor or straight truck power unit. 
Six-Axle Multi-Trailer Trucks -- All six-axle vehicles consisting of three or more units, one of 
which is a tractor or straight truck power unit. 
Seven or More Axle Multi-Trailer Trucks -- All vehicles with seven or more axles consisting of 
three or more units, one of which is a tractor or straight truck power unit. 
  
  Depending upon the classification into which a vehicle falls, the rights, tolls and 
rules applicable to that vehicle vary greatly. This is an example of the detailed regulation 
of highway traffic. 
 While the notion of vehicle classification is not unknown to Brazilian law, it is 
not used in the context of toll concessions. Laws concerning the classification of vehicles 
can be found in the Brazilian Traffic Code
154
, for example, where classification is used 
for driver’s licenses purposes.155 Furthermore, Ordinance number 1,207156 of 15 
                                                 
154
Law 9,503 of 23 September of 1997. 
“Article 96. The vehicles are classified:  
I – by traction:  
a) propelled; b) electric; c) human propulsion; d) animal traction; e) semi-trailer or trailer;  
II - on the species:  
a) by passenger: 
1 - bicycle; 2 - moped; 3 - scooter; 4 - motorcycle; 5 - tricycle; 6 – All-terrain vehicle – 
ATV; 7 - car; 8 - minibuses; 9 - bus; 10 - tram; 11 - trailer or semi-trailer; 12 – horse cart;  
b) by load:   
1 - scooter; 2 - motorcycle; 3 - tricycle; 4 - All-terrain vehicle – ATV; 5 – pickup truck;  
6 - truck; 7 - trailer or semi-trailer; 8 – horse cart; 9 - handcart;  
c) mixed: 
  1 - Coach; 2 - utility; 3 - other; 
d) competition; 
e) traction:  
  1 - truck-tractor; 2 - tractor; 3 - crawler tractor; 4 – mixed tractor; 
f) special; 
g) collection; 
III – by category: 
a) official; 
b) of diplomatic representation from consular offices or international organizations accredited by 
the Brazilian government; 
 c) private; 
 d) rental vehicles; 
 e) learning vehicles; 
155
 The vehicles classifications at the Brazilian Traffic Code and at the Ordinance 1,207 of 2010 are not 
used for toll fees purposes. 
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December 2010 of the National Department of Traffic (Departamento Nacional de 
Trânsito - DENATRAN) has a detailed classification of vehicles. However, this 
classification is also not applied to highway concessions. To the extent that vehicle 
classification has been used in the context of governing toll road usage, vehicle 
classification rules can be found only in contracts: not in public law instruments capable 
of fulfilling the government’s constitutional obligations. For example, Clause 16.2.6 of 
the contract
157
 of the Highway BR-101 in the States of Bahia and Espírito Santo of the 
National Agency of Ground Transportation – ANTT (Concessionaire Rodovia da Vitória) 
has the following wording:  
16.2.6 The toll fees are classified based on vehicle category and on the number of axles. 
 
  The classification of the vehicles can be found in the table below, which also is 
part of the contract. There is a multiplier factor
158
 that must be used (multiplying by the 
basic toll fee)
159
 depending upon the type of vehicle:  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
156
See the ordinance 1,207 of 2010 online – only in Portuguese: 
<http://www.denatran.gov.br/download/Portarias/2010/PORTARIA_DENATRAN_1207_10.pdf> 
(Accessed on 10 April 2012)  
157
Original contract in Portuguese: “16.2.6 As tarifas de pedágio são diferenciadas por categoria de veículos 
e em razão do número de eixos”. See the contract online – only in Portuguese – page 23: 
<http://br101esba.antt.gov.br/upd_blob/0000/639.pdf> (Accessed on 10 April 2012)  
158
Just multiply the factor of the table by the basic toll fee. For example: If you are riding a motorcycle and 
the basic toll fee is CAD 5.00, just multiply by 0.5 and the fee will be CAD 2.50, If you are riding a 
passenger car with a semi-trailer and and the basic toll fee is CAD 5.00, just multiply by 1.5 and the fee 
will be CAD 7.50. 
159“Basic toll fee” is the basic charge of highways tolls. This “basic toll fee”, as a multiplier factor, is often 
used as a specific clause at concessions contracts. 
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Table 9- Toll Charges by Vehicles Classes from the National Agency of Ground Transportation (ANTT) 
Category Vehicle type Number of 
axles  
Multiplier factor 
1 Passenger car, pickup truck and van 2 1.0 
2 Light truck, bus, semi-trailer truck and 
van 
2 2.0 
3 Passenger car and pickup truck 
with semi-trailer 
3 1.5 
4 Truck, truck tractor,  semi-trailer truck 
with semi-trailer and bus 
3 3.0 
5 Automobile and truck with full trailer 4 2.0 
6 Truck with full trailer, truck tractor 
with semi-trailer 
4 4.0 
7 Truck with full trailer, truck tractor 
with semi-trailer 
5 5.0 
8 Truck with full trailer, truck tractor 
with semi-trailer 
6 6.0 
9 Motorcycles, scooters and motorized 
bicycles  
2 0.5 
10 Official vehicles
160
 and vehicles of the 
Diplomatic Corps 
- - 
 
  Clause 4.3 of the contract
161
 of the Autoban Concessionaire
162
 of the Regulatory 
agency  of delegated public services of transportation of the State of São Paulo (Agência 
reguladora de serviços públicos delegados de transporte do Estado de São Paulo - 
ARTESP) has similar wording in its contract, with the same multiplier factor:  
 
 
                                                 
160
Generally speaking, the vehicles are classified as “official” vehicles and that would include ambulances, 
police and enforcement forces, military forces and public authorities’ vehicles.  
161Original contract in Portuguese: “16.2.6 As tarifas de pedágio são diferenciadas por categoria de veículos 
e em razão do número de eixos”. See the contract online – only in Portuguese – page 23: 
<http://br101esba.antt.gov.br/upd_blob/0000/639.pdf> (Accessed on 10 April 2012)  
162
 Original contract in Portuguese: “4.3 As tarifas de pedágio deverão ser diferenciadas por categoria de 
veículos”. See the contract online – only in Portuguese – page 6 of 8 of annex 4: 
<http://www.artesp.sp.gov.br/download/editais/edital_01_autoban.pdf> (Accessed on 10 April 2012)  
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Table 10 – Toll Charges by Vehicles classes from the Regulatory Agency of Delegated Public Services of 
Transportation of the State of São Paulo (ARTESP) 
4.3 The toll fees are classified based on vehicle category. 
 Category Vehicle type Number of 
axles  
Multiplier factor 
1 Passenger car, pickup truck and van 2 1 
2 Light truck, bus, semi-trailer truck and 
van 
2 2 
3 truck tractor,  semi-trailer truck with 
semi-trailer and bus 
3 3 
4 Truck with full trailer, truck tractor 
with semi-trailer 
4 4 
5 Truck with full trailer, truck tractor 
with semi-trailer 
5 5 
6 Truck with full trailer, truck tractor 
with semi-trailer 
6 6 
7 Passenger car and pickup truck 
with semi-trailer 
3 3 
8 Passenger car and pickup truck with full 
trailer 
4 4 
9 Motorcycles, scooters and motorized 
bicycles  
- - 
10 Armed Forces
163
 and Military Police - - 
 
  The most obvious difference between both cases
164
 (Autoban and Rodovia da 
Vitória concessionaires) is the fact that at the Autoban contract, drivers of motorcycles, 
scooters and motorized bicycles are exempt from tolls,
165
 i.e., they are not required to pay 
a toll at all. The classification of the vehicles and multiplier factor are slightly different in 
both contracts. The passenger car and pickup truck with semi-trailer multiplier factor 
(line number 3 – three axles) at the Rodovia da Vitória contract is 1.5, while in the 
Autoban contract (line number 7 – three axles) is 3. 
                                                 
163
 Army, Navy and  Air Force. 
164
 Based on the contracts. 
165
 See the one classified at category 9. 
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  In the Rodovia da Vitória contract, official vehicles and vehicles of the diplomatic 
corps are exempt (line number 10), while in the Autoban contract, only the armed forces 
and military police vehicles are exempt (line number 10).  
  These clauses of concession contracts are samples of potentially appropriate 
forms of regulation, but they are not enshrined in any law. The legislation of Brazil offers 
no guidelines at all, and different (and contradictory) quasi-regulatory arrangements have 
been spelled out in hundreds of contracts all over the country. This leads to different rules 
and different consumer/user rights from road to road, with no reference to any regulatory 
policy laid out in legislation. A driver can determine his or her rights only by examining a 
contract, and the contracts have not been incorporated by reference into legislation. As 
noted above, in a Civil Law jurisdiction, regulation via contract is insufficient: only by 
the passage of valid legislation can the government discharge its constitutional 
obligations. Since rights with respect to vehicle classifications (a component of “user 
rights” for the purposes of Article 175 of the Constitution) are regulated only via 
contract, the government of Brazil has failed to comply with the Lawfulness Principle as 
expressed in Article 175. There is, in effect, no lawfully authorized pattern or guideline 
as rights and obligations flowing from vehicle classifications. 
 The Federal Government’s failure to regulate rates has led to the unfortunate 
result that toll road rates vary widely – and impermissibly – across the country.  Instead 
of fulfilling its Constitutional obligations by establishing or regulating rates, the 
government has conferred unfettered discretion on State and Federal Departments or 
regulatory agencies, effectively allowing them to set rates without meaningful 
government (or legislative) oversight. The government cannot discharge its 
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Constitutional obligations by failing to oversee or control the way in which delegated 
powers are exercised. 
  The Federal government has failed in its Constitutional obligations by actually 
giving discretion
166
 to State and Federal governmental and transportation bodies. The 
Federal government has violated the Constitution by (in essence) abdicating regulatory 
responsibility, and allowing State and Federal governmental and transportation bodies to 
govern a public resource in accordance with their whims. The State and Federal 
transportation bodies are merely exercising discretion through contractual provisions.   
  David Mullan
167
 has written about the legal limits of governmental discretion. He 
makes it clear that discretion must have a legal limit, especially when the exercise of 
discretion affects the rights and interests of individuals:   
The following four observations indicate that it is misleading to attempt to draw too sharp a 
distinction between law and discretion as administration tools, a point now accepted by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Baker. First, the terms of an agency’s enabling statute frequently do 
not yield a clear meaning that identifies the “correct” answer to a specific problem. Because many 
situations are not foreseen at the time of enactment, statutory provisions require interpretation by 
officials. The process of filling the silences and resolving the ambiguities in statutory language 
that interpretation so often involves can be described as the exercise of an implicit discretion to 
elaborate unclear or incomplete legislative instructions. Second, even the most detailed and precise 
regulatory codes are not self-enforcing; typically officials are left with ample and unstated 
discretion about the circumstances in which they will actually be enforced against individuals.  
Third, just as rules contain grants of implicit discretion (both of interpretation and enforcement) so 
all express grants of discretion to public officials are subject to some legal limits at least when 
their exercise affects the rights and interests of individuals. The courts have normally asserted that 
                                                 
166
  By the Lawfulness principle – the public administration must act based on an existing law 
(statute) as a general regulation and no “discretion” must be used by the grantor power. 
“Discretion” here is not the “core” of the argument. The “core” argument is the requirement of regulation 
due to the Constitutional principle. 
167
 J.M. Evans, H.N. Janisch, David J. Mullan, and R.C.B. Risk. Administrative Law: Cases, Text, 
and Materials (2003) Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 5th ed. Page 950.  
 
  
74 
in our system of Constitutional government there are no legally unlimited public powers, 
regardless of whether they are claimed by an independent administrative agency, a municipality, a 
minister of the Crown or the governor (or lieutenant governor) in council. It is an essential 
function of the courts to determine what those limits are by reference to the terms of an the 
enabling statute, common law principles, the Constitution Acts 1867-1982 (including the Charter) 
and now, on occasion, the underlying principles of the Canadian Constitution.  
 
 In this case, we have (a) the impermissible grant of unfettered discretion to State 
and Federal governmental and transportation bodies where we should have regulations, 
and (b) the apparent abdication of the Federal government’s Constitutional 
responsibilities to the private actors who entered concession contracts.  
  The result of the Government’s failure to regulate the issue has been chaos. 
Private concessionaires have wildly different contractual arrangements
168
 in each State 
when levying tolls. Some concessionaires charge tolls in single carriageways,
169
 others in 
multilane highways;
170
 private concessionaires increase toll rates using different official 
price indices
171
 - some States’ contracts use more than one price index172 depending on 
the contract; in some States and as seen above, motorcycles are exempt from paying tolls 
                                                 
168
 In this case the concessionaires act differently and the contracts vary.  It is not the case where private 
concessionaires break the law and breach contracts by imposing whatever rates and rules they like.  It is a 
matter of lack of rules – especially by imposing a clear rate for example  – by the government. 
169
See contract clauses above at footnotes 158 and 163. Some private concessionaires charge tolls in single 
carriageways as the States of Rio Grande do Sul and Paraná;  
170
Some private concessionaires charge tolls in multilane highways, mostly in the State of São Paulo; 
171
as the Highway Castelo Branco – Highway SP–280 in São Paulo;  
172
 as the case of São Paulo. See Q&A – Toll rates rise – in the State of São Paulo (only in Portuguese) by 
the governmental body and department of transportation of the State known as the The Regulatory 
Transportation Agency of the State of São Paulo – ARTESP. Online: 
<http://www.artesp.sp.gov.br/tarifas2011/Q&A-pedagio.pdf> (Accessed on 29 November of 2011). 
“3. What criteria to raise toll rates? 
For the concessions between 1998 and 2000 it was used the IGP-M Index - general 
market prices index, published by the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, between June of  
the previous year and may of the current year, and it is applied every July, the 1st. On the highways  
whose concession contracts were signed between 2008 and 2009, it was used the  
IPCA Index - national index of general consumer prices, calculated by Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics – IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística). 
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on some highways
173
 and not in others; the price per kilometer is different for each 
highway concession; there are concessions of the same highway shared between three 
different concessionaires;
174
 on the other hand, there are two or more highways granted to 
the same private corporation in the same concession.
175
  
  All the above situations are examples of “non-ruled” procedures. It is important to 
point out that these variations are a result of contractual provisions, and not as a result of 
any law or statute, simply because there are no laws, neither at State nor Federal levels.   
 An important contribution in this matter is given by Mullan:
176
    
Fourth, it is sometimes assumed that while a rule bound solution to a dispute requires the decision 
maker to base it on precedent and general legal principles, those exercising discretion need to 
consult only their own preferences. Discretionary decisions must be made by reference not only to 
the statutory purposes and other legal limits of the power but they should also be informed by any 
policy objectives formulated by the agency, guidelines that it has issued, and its past practice. 
Arbitrariness is as much the antithesis of the effective exercise of discretion as the mechanical 
application of rules is of the just administration of the law. The differences between discretionary 
and rule-based decisions are of degree, not kind.  
 
 The overall argument is that (a) there is no legislation providing guidelines for the 
content of contractual terms
177
 and as a result, (b) the terms of contracts vary widely,  and 
                                                 
173
It must be pointed out, that there are still no rules in this regard. If you are driving in United States in one 
State (let’s say Michigan), there are no tolls there. If you cross the border to Ohio – or to Indiana and to 
Illinois – there are tolls everywhere. In Brazil, a motorcycle rider does not need to pay the toll in Santa 
Catarina, while at the other side of the border, in the State of Rio Grande do Sul, the payment of toll by 
motorcycle riders is required because motorcycles are not exempt. This is a discretionary choice by the 
public administration (transportation body or agency) at the bidding procedure of concession. 
See the website of Brita Rodovias online: <http://www.britarodovias.com.br/index.php?pg=categorias> 
(Accessed on 26 March 2012). Motorcycles are exempt in the highways conceded to Brita Rodovias 
Concessionaire. 
174
as the concessionaires Viaoeste,  Rodovia das Colinas and SPVias that share stretches of the State 
Highway Castelo Branco (SP-280) in the State of São Paulo; 
175
as the concessionaire CART – Concessionária Auto Raposo Tavares which manages three different 
stretches of doubled and multilane highways with different lengths in the State of São Paulo – Highway 
João Baptista Cabral Rennó – SP–225, Highway Orlando Quagliato – SP–327 and Highway Raposo 
Tavares – SP–270. 
176
J.M. Evans, H.N. Janisch, David J. Mullan, and R.C.B. Risk. Op. Cit. Page 950. 
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(c) the terms of contracts cannot, without specific legislation that mandates the terms of 
contracts, count as “laws” laid down by the State. They cannot, therefore constitute 
compliance with the Lawfulness principle. 
 The final outcome of the lack of regulation – in the case of Brazilian toll highway 
concessions – is that there are no apparent limits to the variability of concession 
contracts. All of this violates the Constitution, both by a failure to comply with the 
Lawfulness Principle and failure to adhere to the terms of Article 175. 
  3.4 Example of Regulations in Brazil – Telephony  
  What level of concession regulation is required in order to achieve compliance 
with the Lawfulness Principle? A useful example is provided by the regulation of 
telecommunications in Brazil. Although telephony is not regulated by the General Law of 
Concessions,
178
 an examination of the regulation of telecommunications in Brazil 
provides a helpful example of the appropriate (and Constitutional) regulation of rates for 
services in Brazil. 
  The area of telecommunications provides an example of the government’s ability 
to discharge its Constitutional duty by carefully regulating the rates that apply to a public 
service. With respect to telecommunications services, the government has promulgated 
                                                                                                                                                 
177
See the quote of Savaris above. 
178
 Article 210 of the General Law of Telecommunications states that telecommunications are ruled only by 
this law, and the General Law of Concessions – Law 8,987 of 13 February 1995 - among others, does not 
apply. 
“Article 210. The concessions, permits and authorizations for the service telecommunications and use of 
radiofrequency and their tenders are governed exclusively by this Law, and the Laws 8,666 of 21 June 
1993,  8,987 of 13 February 1995 and  9,074 of 7 July 1995 and its amendments, do not apply.” 
Original in Portuguese: “Art 210. As concessões, permissões e autorizações de serviço de telecomunicações 
e de uso de radiofreqüência e as respectivas licitações regem-se exclusivamente por esta Lei, a elas não se 
aplicando as Leis nº 8.666, de 21 de junho de 1993, nº 8.987, de 13 de fevereiro de 1995, nº 9.074, de 7 de 
julho de 1995, e suas alterações. 
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detailed regulations governing telephony.
179
  These regulations cover matters as detailed 
as rules for land lines and mobile telephones, rules governing the regulatory body 
                                                 
179
 An array of statutes on telecommunications in Brazil (in English) can be found online: 
<http://www.teleco.com.br/en/en_legis.asp> (Accessed on 5 March 2012). 
The General Law on Telecommunications is the General Law of Telecommunications. This law provides 
rules for the organization of telecommunications services, the creation and  
operation of a regulatory body and other institutional aspects. 
The General Law of Telecommunications above also created the National Telecommunications Agency – 
ANATEL.  
There are at least 3 additional and important laws regarding  telecommunications in Brazil, among others:  
a) Law number 4,117 of 27 August 1962, establishing the Brazilian Telecommunications Code 
(CBT). 
b) Law number 9,998 of 17 August 2000 establishing the Universal Fund for Access to 
Telecommunications Services (Fust). 
c) Law number 10,052 of 28 November 2000 establishing the Fund for the Technological 
Development of Telecommunications (Funttel).  
Along with the laws above, there are several Decrees approving regulations and specific rules on 
telecommunications concerning mobile telephony, landline telephony and also internet and 
communications issues. 
a) Decree number 2,338 of 7 October 1997 approves the regulation of the National 
Telecommunications Agency (Anatel). 
b) Decree number 3,624 of 5 October 2000 provides for the regulation of the universal access to 
telecommunications services fund (Fust). 
c) Decree number 3,737 of 30 January 2001 provides the regulation of the technological 
development of telecommunications fund (Funttel). 
d) Decree number 4,149 of 1st March 2002 changes and adds provisions to the Decree Number 3,737 
of 30 January 2001, which provides for the regulation of the technological development of the 
telecommunications fund (Funttel). 
e) Decree number 4,733 of 10 June 2003 provides public policies for telecommunications. 
f) Decree number 4,769 of 27 June 2003 approves the general target plan to universalize landline 
telephony services rendered by the public regime. 
There are also some regulations issued by the national agency of telecommunications – ANATEL (Agência 
Nacional de Telecomunicações) as the telephone number portability on landlines and mobiles. It is a 
regulation of the service of telephony allowing consumers to transfer either an existing fixed-line or mobile 
telephone number assigned by a carrier and reassign it to another carrier, as a measure to improve 
competitiveness between carriers.  
Somehow, the 79 articles of the general rules of portability brings to the user and the carriers the 
definitions, features of portability, rights and duties of the users and the carriers, the prices to be charged, 
the types of portability, the operational procedures, the service itself, the procedures to request the service, 
the conditions of refusal and cancellation, the terms and timing of contracts and applicable sanctions. 
Another source of regulation of the national agency of telecommunications – ANATEL (Agência Nacional 
de Telecomunicações) is the annex to the resolution number 477 of 7 August 2007 approving the regulation 
of personal mobile service – SMP, ruled by the Law 9,472 of 16 July 1997, General Law of 
Telecommunications (Lei Geral de Telecomunicações – LGT). It is a sample of mobile telephony 
regulation which deals in details with definitions, rights and duties of the users and concessionaires, rules 
of the rendered services of mobile telephony, rates policy, contract terms, pre- and post paid policies, the 
services basic plan, dispute resolution, debit complaints and among others rules.  
It is quite clear that there are laws, decrees and even administrative regulations issued by the legislative 
power and by different governmental bodies, including the national agency of telecommunications – 
ANATEL, ruling telecommunications services in Brazil.   
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(National Telecommunications Agency - ANATEL), several regulations on funding 
sources in the development of telecommunications and public policies, clearly 
demonstrating the government’s ability to turn its mind to the minutae that must be 
addressed when regulating a public service. No similar attempt has been made to regulate 
toll roads or the rates that apply on toll roads, notwithstanding clear Constitutional 
requirements.  As we have seen, the government has made no such attempt to carefully 
regulate the rates that apply to toll roads, notwithstanding the fact that the same 
Constitutional requirement (i.e., to establish and regulate rates) applies in both contexts.  
If the government of Brazil wishes to ensure the constitutionality of its (thus far illegal) 
concession of toll roads, it should be guided by the example of the telecommunications 
sector: it must regulate the detailed application of the policy, such that users are able by 
know – by reference to statutory authority – how the rates for the use of conceded public 
resources will be charged.
180
  
  3.5 Laws on Tolls – Ontario 
  3.5.1 Statutes for Highway 407 in Canada 
  The Canadian experience with respect to privately run toll highways relates to 
Highway 407181 managed by 407 International Inc. (“407 ETR”). Highway 407 runs north 
and west of the Greater Toronto area, beginning at Burlington. This highway extends 108 
                                                 
180
It would be unfeasible for the service of telecommunications, either mobile or landline, to be rendered 
without rules to govern important matters as the rates policy, the concession procedures, the duties and 
rights of the users and the service providers, the competitiveness among telephony operators and telephony 
consumers rights (in spite of the existence of the Consumer’s Protection Act) along with other disciplines.  
It would be impractical, for example, different mobile operators freely charging different prices, selling cell 
phones or issuing distinctive contracts without any regulation or rules. This is the case on highway tolls. 
The sole legal base to implement tolls by the government is the General Law of Concessions. Apart from 
that, there are no laws or regulation and the Government and regulatory bodies issue bidding processes with 
different arrangements. 
181
 See ETR 407 online: <http://www.407etr.com/> (accessed on 30 June 2009)  
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kilometers east–west just north of Toronto. Tolls on this highway are based on the 
number of kilometers travelled by each vehicle, with the assessment of “kilometers 
travelled” based on photographic evidence (from cameras on the highway) or 
transponders.  
  The 407 ETR has its own statutory provisions – the Highway 407 Act182 – that 
specifies procedures applicable to the highway. The legislation also specifies important 
issues such as the designation of Highway 407,
183
 liability for maintenance and repair, the 
obligation to pay the toll, the powers of the owner, methods for the payment of tolls, 
liability for failure to pay the toll, the resolution of disputes, etc.  At the end of the Act 
there is a requirement of regulation by the Lieutenant Governor in Council “defining any 
words or expressions” used at the Highway 407 Act,  together with any other necessary 
regulations:  
Regulations 
65.  The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations, 
(a) defining any word or expression used in this Act but not defined in this Act; 
(b) respecting additional procedures to be used by the owner for enforcing payment of tolls on 
Highway 407; 
(c) prescribing matters for the purposes of section 24; 
(d) prescribing greater penalties for the purposes of sections 32 and 35; 
(e) prescribing any other thing that may be prescribed under this Act. 1998, c. 28, s. 65. 
66., 67.  Omitted (amends or repeals other Acts). 1998, c. 28, ss. 66, 67. 
68.  Omitted (provides for coming into force of provisions of this Act). 1998, c. 28, s. 68. 
69.  Omitted (enacts short title of this Act). 1998, c. 28, s. 69. 
      
  Unlike the situation in Brazil, the provincial government in Ontario has 
promulgated specific rules and regulations governing toll rates and the rights of the users. 
                                                 
182
Highway 407 Act, 1998 – S.O. 1998, Chapter 28. Highway 407 Act online: <http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_98h28_e.htm> (accessed on 12 March 2010) 
183
 One of the authors of the Highway 407 Act is Professor Randal Graham, supervisor of the author of this 
work. He is Goodmans LLP Fellow in Legal Ethics; LL.B. (Osgoode Hall ) 1995, D.Jur (Osgoode Hall) 
1999, called to the Bar of Ontario in 1997; Professor and Director of Graduate Programs of the Faculty of 
Law of Western University. 
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Using this “Ontario model” would allow public Brazil’s government (at Federal and State 
levels) to comply with the Lawfulness Principle.   
  3.6 Attempts to Regulate   
     It is important to note that the lack of regulation of highway tolls in Brazil has 
given rise to public dissent.  A group that opposes the current tolling system – the 
National Forum Against Tolls
184
 – began to collect signatures in support of bill of popular 
initiative in 2009.  Through this bill, the group aims to convince the government to do its 
constitutional duty by regulating tolls in the country. Article 61, paragraph 2 of the 
Federal Constitution
185
 authorizes the creation of bills of popular initiative, which are 
regulated by Articles 13 and 14 of Law 9,709 of 18 November 1998.   The collection 
of signatures started in the State of Paraná and the campaign is now spread throughout 
the country. The goal is to collect 1.9 million signees as required by the Constitution. 
                                                 
184
  Entity – “Forum Popular Contra o Pedágio” [National Forum against tolls]. Available online only 
in portuguese: <http://www.pedagio.org/> (accessed on 2 December 2009) 
185
  In Brazil the Constitution authorizes people to present Bills at the Legislative House. 
The subscription of at least 1% of Brazilian voters is required (which would be more than 1.9 million 
signatures) from at least 5 different States with no less than 0.3% in each State. 
In brief, 0.3% subscription of the voters of 5 States, at a minimum, totalling the 1.5% required by the 
Federal Constitution and the Law.  
The 2nd paragraph of the article 61 of the Constitution reads:  
 “Article 61 - ... 
... 
2
nd
 Paragraph – Public initiative bill may be exercised by presentation, to the House of Representatives, of 
a bill of law subscribed by, at least, one percent of Brazilian voters, distributed throughout, at least, five 
States, with no less than three tenths percent of the voters of each of these States.” 
Article 61, paragraph 2 translated by the author:  
“Artigo 61 - ... 
... 
§ 2º - A iniciativa popular pode ser exercida pela apresentação à Câmara dos Deputados de projeto de lei 
subscrito por, no mínimo, um por cento do eleitorado nacional, distribuído pelo menos por cinco Estados, 
com não menos de três décimos por cento dos eleitores de cada um deles.” 
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  In brief, the proposed bill
186
, which will not be evaluated in detail in this work, 
remains unclear because it does not regulate any “rate policy” or “rights of the users” – it 
mainly authorizes tolls on privately-constructed highways and prohibits tolls on publicly-
constructed roads. As a result, while the bill appears to be better than the complete legal 
vacuum currently surrounding Brazil’s toll highways, the bill would still (if passed) fail 
to provide the level of detail constitutionally
187
 required through the Lawfulness 
Principle. 
  Despite its shortcomings, this initiative represents an attempt to mobilize people 
and to call the attention of the citizenry to the increased numbers of highways being 
conceded to private actors in the country, the inefficiency of the current regime and the 
lack of regulation. At a minimum, this may enhance the highway-funding debate across 
Brazil.  
 A second group of concerned citizens has tried to draw attention to the 
government’s failure to regulate toll highways. This group, which is named The 
Participatory Citizenship Commission
188
 of Indaiatuba
189
, is a social movement of city 
leaders, State representatives, mayors and associations against the current policies of 
highway concessions in the State of São Paulo. 
                                                 
186
  The proposed bill of popular initiative is available online – only in Portuguese: 
<http://projetodelei.com.br/> at the hyperlink “Projeto de Lei Para Regulamentar o Pedágio no Brasil” (Bill 
to regulate tolls in Brazil).  (accessed 2
nd
 December 2009) 
187
  The direct action of unconstitutionality is filed against legal provisions that are contrary to the 
Constitution.  
188
  participatory citizenship commission is “Comissão Cidadania Participativa de Indaiatuba”. 
189
  Indaiatuba is a municipality in the State of São Paulo in Brazil, with 181,124 inhabitants (2006) 
and has an area is 311.34 km². It is surrounded by tolls. 
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  This group invited people to attend the second meeting
190
 of the movement 
against abusive tolls in State of Sao Paulo and to discuss the actions and proposals for a 
new policy of transportation and highway concessions to be implemented by the State 
Government. The creation of such groups demonstrates how Brazilian citizens are 
dissatisfied with the abuses associated with the complete lack of rules and regulations of 
tolls in Brazil.  
  The Congress itself has several proposed bills on tolls. Only 2 out of 72
191
 
proposed bills regarding toll policies
192
 are ready to be voted on by the parliament. The 
other 70 bills are still in process. 
   The first one is Bill 3,062 of 2008 presented on 19 March 2008 and sponsored by 
the legislator federal deputy Angela Amin of Progressist Party (PP) of the State of Santa 
Catarina. It amends the Law 9,277 of 10 May 1996 granting exemption of payment of the 
charge/fee to the owner of a vehicle that resides in the county where a toll plaza is 
located.  
  The second one is Bill 4,251 of 2001 presented on 13 March 2001 and sponsored 
by the federal deputy Luiz Bittencourt, member of Brazilian Democratic Movement Party 
(PMDB) of the State of Goiás. It modifies the Decree-Law 791 of 1969 granting 
exemption of payment of tolls for motor vehicles owned by people with physical 
disabilities.  
                                                 
190
  It was held at the city of Campinas on 23rd March 2010. 
191
  Research made at the National Congress of Brazil. Online at 
<http://www2.camara.gov.br/proposicoes> (accessed on 5 April 2010). 
192
  Which would include rates policies, users’ rights, exemptions, regulation and amendments of the 
General Law of Concessions.  
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  Nevertheless, none of the 72 proposed bills in process aim to modify or regulate 
in general the tolls on highways in Brazil. They are merely statutory provisions proposed 
generally to create exemptions for different classes of drivers and highway users.  
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CONCLUSION  
 
  The need for investment in and maintenance of Brazil’s logistical network, 
coupled with the public administration’s failure to prioritize such investments, have 
recently led to a spree of concessions of highways. More than 200 toll gates
193
 have been 
created on highways in the past 14 years in Brazil. The revenue collected with tolls in the 
first 10 months in 2012, only in the State of São Paulo, has surpassed $2,5 billion 
USD.
194
 
  However, the development of the toll industry industry has not followed legal 
requirements. While the toll road system in Brazil is an important tool of public policy, it 
is (as currently implemented) illegal.  The objection is not to the advisability or 
usefulness of toll roads, but to the manner in which they have been implemented by the 
Brazilian government, i.e., in violation of the Lawfulness Principle.   
  The Federal Government’s failure to regulate toll highways has led to the 
unfortunate result that toll road rates vary widely – and impermissibly – across the 
country.  Instead of fulfilling its Constitutional obligations by establishing or regulating 
rates and other aspects of toll highways, the government has conferred unfettered 
discretion on State and Federal governmental and transportation bodies (State and 
Federal departaments or regulatory agencies), effectively allowing them to set rates – 
always through contracts and not by statute or regulation –  without meaningful 
government oversight. All in all, there is no effective regulation of toll roads in Brazil. 
                                                 
193
 Toll booths. 
194
 See the estimator pedagiômetro (toll-ometer) at <http://pedagiometro.com.br/> (Accessed on 22 October 
2012). This is 14.12% of the total budget costs of the Province of Ontario for 2012, estimated in $17.7 
billion USD. See <http://news.ontario.ca/mof/en/2012/03/strong-action-for-ontario.html> (Accessed on 22 
October 2012). 
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 To summarize, despite the benefits of toll highways amd concessions, toll 
arrangements in Brazil
195
 currently constitute a violation of the Lawfulness Principle. The 
lack of regulation of the toll highway industry and the  lack of legislative authorization 
for divestiture of public assets and highway concessions are the main weaknesses of the 
current system.  As we have seen, the government has made no attempt to carefully 
regulate tol rates (or other important issues relating to toll roads), notwithstanding the fact 
that Constitutional requirement demand such regulation.  If the government of Brazil 
wishes to ensure the constitutionality of its (thus far illegal) concession of toll roads, it 
should be guided by the example of the telecommunications sector: it must regulate the 
detailed application of the conceded public resource, such that users are able by know – 
by reference to statutory authority – how the rates for the use of conceded public 
resources will be charged. Only by passing such legislation, can the government of Brazil 
correct the grave Constitutional defect that currently exists with respect to the concession 
of public highways. Only through the passage of legislation governing rates and rights of 
users, among other relevant issues concerning toll highways concessions, can the 
government ensure that toll highways – a phenomenon impacting the lives of virtually all 
Brazilian citizens – comply with the requirement of Brazil’s Constitution. 
                                                 
195
 So far. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
GENERAL LAW OF CONCESSIONS – TRANSLATED 
 
Law number 8,987 of 13 February 1995. 
Regulates the concession and permission of the provision of public services provided in 
Art. 175 of the Federal Constitution, and provides other provisions. 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC makes public that the Congress decrees and I 
sanction the following Act: 
CHAPTER I 
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 
Article 1 - The concessions of public services and works and utilities permits will be 
governed by the terms of Article 175 of the Federal Constitution, by this Act, the rules 
and the concerning statutes and required clauses of the contracts. 
Single paragraph. The Union, the States, the Federal District and the municipalities shall 
promote the review and the necessary adaptations of its legislation with the provisions of 
this Act, seeking to meet the peculiarities of the various modalities of their services. 
Article 2 - For the purposes of this Act, shall be deemed: 
I - grantor: the Union, the State, the Federal District or the municipality in whose 
jurisdiction lies the public service, preceded or not by the execution of public works, the 
object of concession or permit; 
II - public service concession: delegation of the render by the grantor, through bidding 
process, in the form of competition to legal entity or consortium of companies that 
demonstrate capacity to perform, at its own risk and for a specified period; 
III – public service concession preceded by the execution of public works: construction, 
total or partial, conservation, refurbishment, expansion or improvement of any works of 
public interest, delegated by the grantor, through bidding process, in the form of 
competition, to corporate or consortium of companies that demonstrate capacity to carry 
them out, at their own risk, so that the concessionaire's investment is paid and amortized 
through the exploitation of the work or service for a specified period; 
IV – permission of public service: delegation, on a temporary basis, through a bidding 
process, the provision of public services, made by the grantor to a person or entity that 
demonstrates the ability to perform, at own risk. 
Article 3 The concessions and permits will be subject to supervision by the regulatory 
body responsible for the delegation, with the cooperation of users. 
Article 4 The concession of public service, preceded or not by the execution of public 
works, shall be formalized by contract, which shall observe the terms of this Act, the 
relevant rules and at the invitation to bid. 
Article 5 The grantor shall publish, prior to the bidding process, the invitation to bid, the 
justification of the convenience of concession or permission, featuring its object, area and 
term. 
Chapter II 
THE APPROPRIATE SERVICE 
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Art 6 – Every concession or permission requires the provision of adequate service to fully 
serve the users, as provided in this Act, at the rules and at the contract. 
1st Paragraph - Adequate service is the one that satisfies the conditions of regularity, 
continuity, efficiency, safety, modernity, generality, politeness on its rendering and 
moderateness of the rates. 
2nd Paragraph – The modernity comprises modern techniques, equipment and facilities 
and their conservation, as well as the improvement and expansion of service. 
3rd Paragraph –  It is not regarded discontinuity of the service, its interruption on an 
emergency or after prior notice, when: 
I - motivated by technical reasons or safety of the facilities and, 
II - by non-compliance
196
 by the users, considering the collectivity’s interest. 
Chapter III 
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF USERS 
Article 7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Law 8,078 of 11 September 1990, the rights 
and obligations of users are: 
I - receive adequate service; 
II - receive from the grantor Power and from the concessionaire, information for the 
defense of individual and collective interests; 
III - obtain and use the service, with freedom of choice between different service 
providers, as applicable, subject to the rules of the grantor Power. 
IV - to inform the government and the concessionaire about deviations that may have 
knowledge, regarding the service provided; 
V – inform the competent authorities the illegal acts practiced by the concessionaire 
while providing the service; 
VI - contribute to remain  the good conditions of public assets through which services are 
rendered to them. 
Article 7-A. The concessionaires of public services, public and private, in the States and 
at the Federal District, are required to offer to the consumer and to the user, within the 
due month, a minimum of six optional due dates for the payment of debts. 
Single paragraph. (Vetoed) (Included by Law 9,791 of 1999) 
RATE POLICY 
Article 8 (Vetoed) 
Article 9 The rate of public service granted shall be determined by the price of the 
winning bid of the bidding procedure and retained by standard guidelines provided in this 
Act, at the invitation to bid and at the contract. 
1
st
 Paragraph - The rate will not be subject to prior specific legislation and only in the 
cases expressly specified by law, the collection may be subject to the existence of free 
and alternative public service provided to the user. 
2nd Paragraph - The contracts may provide mechanisms for review of rates in order to 
keep the economic and financial balance. 
3
rd
 Paragraph - Except the income taxes, the creation, modification or termination of any 
taxes or legal charges, after the submission of the proposal, when a downturn
197
 is 
proven, will lead to the revision of the rates, increasing or decreasing it, as appropriate. 
                                                 
196
 to the rules. 
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4
th
 Paragraph – By having a unilateral amendment of the contract that affects the initial 
economic and financial balance, the grantor power must restore it, concomitantly with the 
amendment. 
Article 10 - Whenever the terms of the contract are met, it is regarded that the economic 
and financial balance has been maintained. 
Article 11 - In compliance with the peculiarities of each public service, the grantor Power 
may predict, on behalf of the concessionaire, in the invitation to bid, the possibility of 
alternative sources of revenue, complementary, ancillary or from associated projects, 
with or without exclusivity, with the intend to promote the reasonability of rates
198
, 
subject to the provisions of Article 17 of this Law. 
Single paragraph. The sources of revenue mentioned at this Article shall be taken into 
account to the initial measurement of financial-economic balance of the contract. 
Article 12 - (Vetoed) 
Article 13 - The rates may vary according to the technical characteristics and specific 
costs from the service to different segments of users. 
BIDDING PROCEDURE 
Article 14 - Every concession of public service, preceded or not by the execution of 
public works, will be subject to prior bidding procedure, under the proper legislation and 
in compliance with the Principles of legality, morality, publicity, balance, judgment by 
objective criteria and the bindability to the invitation to bid. 
Article 15 - At the decision of the bidding procedure, it will be considered one of the 
following criteria: 
I - the lowest rate of public service to be rendered; 
III - the combination, two by two, of the criteria described in Items I, II and VII; 
IV – the best technical proposal, with prices determined in the invitation to bid; 
V – the best proposal on the grounds of by the combination of the criteria of the lowest 
rate of public service to be rendered with the best technique; (Included by Law 9,648 of 
1998) 
VI - best proposal on the grounds of the combination of the criteria of highest offer for 
the concession granted with the best technique, or (Included by Law 9,648 of 1998) 
VII - best offer of payment for the concession granted after the qualification of the 
technical proposals. (Included by Law 9,648 of 1998) 
1
st
 Paragraph - The use of the criteria laid down in paragraph III shall be permitted only 
when previously established in the invitation to bid, including rules and precise formulas 
for economic and financial evaluation. 
2
nd
 Paragraph - For the purposes of using the provisions of sections IV, V, VI and VII, 
the invitation to bid will enclose parameters and requirements for the formulation of 
technical proposals. 
                                                                                                                                                 
197
 The General Law of concession uses the term impact – as a financial and economic impact. “when an 
impact is proven”. We’ve replaced for “downturn which is more appropriate.  
198
 In Brazil, there is a principle where the rates are required to be reasonable, i.e., may 
not be expensive or abusive. It is called  principle of the reasonability of rates, which is 
expressed in this provision. 
  
96 
3
rd 
Paragraph - The grantor power will refuse financially unfeasible proposals manifestly 
incompatible with the aims of the bidding procedure. 
4
th
 Paragraph – On equal terms, preference will be given to the proposal made by a 
Brazilian company. 
Article 16 - The granting of concessions or permits will not have an exclusive feature, 
except in the case of technical or economic infeasibility justified in the act referred by the 
5
th
 Article of this Law. 
Article 17 - It will regarded disqualified, the proposal that, for its feasibility, requires 
subsidies or benefits not previously authorized by law and available to all competitors. 
1
st
 Paragraph - It will regarded disqualified as well, the proposal of State entity
199
 
unrelated to the political-administrative sphere of the grantor Power that, for its 
feasibility, requires benefits or subsidies by the government that controls the referred 
entity. (Renumbered by the sole paragraph by Law 9,648 of 1998) 
2
nd 
Paragraph – It is included among the benefits and allowances mentioned in this 
Article, any special tax treatment, though in consequence of the nature of the competitor, 
which may compromise the fiscal equality that should prevail among all competitors. 
(Included by Law 9,648 of 1998) 
Article 18. The invitation to bid will be prepared by the grantor Power, subject, where 
applicable, the criteria and general rules of specific legislation about tenders and 
contracts and shall contain, in particular: 
I - the object, goal and termo f the concession; 
II - the description of the conditions required to provide adequate service; 
III - the deadline for the bids, the bidding award and contract signing; 
IV - place, date and time that will be provided to interested parties, data, studies and 
required projects for the preparation of budgets and submission of tenders; 
V - the criteria and the list of documents required for the measurement of technical 
capacity, financial capacity and the legal and tax regularity of the tenders; 
VI - the possible sources of alternatives revenue, complementary or accessory, as well as 
those from associated projects; 
VII - the rights and obligations of the grantor Power and the concessionaire in relation to 
changes and expansions to be undertaken in the future, in order to ensure continuity of 
service rendered; 
VIII - the criteria of adjustment and review of the rates; 
IX - the criteria, price indexes, formulas and parameters to be used at the technical and 
economical-financial proposal; 
X - a statement of the reversible assets
200
; 
XI - the features of the reversible assets and the conditions under which they will be 
made available, where a prior grant have been extinguished; 
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 Public State entity. 
200
 Assets that may return back (reverse) to the grantor Power after the end of the termo f the 
concession/contract. 
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XII - the explicit indication of the responsible for condemnations required for the 
implementation of the service or public work, or for the establishment of public 
easements; 
XIII - the leading  conditions of the liable company, in the event that is allowed the 
participation of a consortium of companies; 
XIV – in the case of concession, the draft of the contract, which shall contain the 
essential clauses referred to in Article 23 of this Law, when applicable; 
XV - in cases of concession of public service preceded by the execution of public works, 
the data relating to the public work, among which the basic design elements that enable 
its full identification, as well as the required warranty for this specific part of the contract, 
appropriate to each case and limited to the cost of the public work; 
XVI – in the cases of permission, the terms of the adhesion contract to be signed. 
Article 18-A. The invitation to bid may provide the reversion of the order of the phases of 
license and award, in which case: 
I - closed the classification round of tenders or bids, the envelope will be open with the 
documents enabling the highest-ranked bidder, to verify the compliance of the conditions 
set out in the invitation to bid; 
II - verification of compliance with the requirements of the tender, the bidder will be 
declared the winner; 
III – if the top-ranked bidder is disqualified, the license documents of the second place 
bidder will be examined, and so on until a qualified bidder meets the conditions set in the 
invitation to bid; 
IV - declared the final result of the tender, the object will be awarded to the winner in the 
technical and economic conditions offered. 
Article 19. When allowed in the bidding procedure, the participation of companies in the 
consortium will observe the following rules: 
I - evidence of commitment, public or private, of formation of consortium, signed by the 
consortium; 
II - indication of the main company, responsible for the consortium; 
III - submission of documents required in sections V and XIII of the preceding Article, by 
each consortium member; 
IV – it is forbidden the participation of consortium companies in the same bidding 
procedure, through more than one consortium or separately. 
1st Paragraph - The successful bidder is required to promote, before signing the contract, 
the constitution and registration of the consortium, under the subsection I referred in this 
Article. 
2nd Paragraph - The leading company of the consortium is responsible for compliance 
with the grantor Power of the concession contract, without prejudice to the joint liability 
of the other consortium members. 
Article 20. It is optional to the grantor Power, if provided in the invitation to bid, in the 
interest of the service to be provided, determine to the successful bidder in case of 
consortium, to register the company before the contract is signed. 
Article 21. The studies, investigations, surveys, designs, works and expenditures or 
investments already made, bounded to the concession, useful for the bidding procedure, 
conducted by the grantor power or with its permission, will be available to interested 
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parties, when the winning bidder must reimburse the related expenditures specified in the 
invitation to bid. 
Article 22. It is assured to any person, to obtain a certificate of acts, contracts, decisions 
or legal opinions regarding the bidding procedure or concessions. 
THE CONCESSION AGREEMENT 
Article 23. The essential clauses of the concession contract are the one regarding: 
I - the object, the area and term of the concession; 
II - the mode, manner and conditions of service provision; 
III – the criteria, price index, formulas and parameters defining the quality of service; 
IV - the price of the service and the criteria and procedures for the review and adjustment 
of rated; 
V - rights, warranties and obligations of the grantor power and the concessionaire, 
including those related to expected needs of future change and service expansion and 
consequent modernization, improvement and expansion of equipment and facilities; 
VI - the rights and duties of users to obtain and use the service; 
VII - the form of inspection of facilities, equipment, methods and practices for 
implementing the service, as well as identifying the bodies competent to exercise it; 
VIII – the contractual and administrative sanctions to which the concessionaire is subject 
and its enforcement; 
IX - to cases of termination of the concession; 
X - the reversible assets; 
XI - the criteria for the calculation and payment of compensation due to the 
concessionaire, if applicable; 
XII - the conditions for extension of the contract; 
XIII - the requirement, form and periodicity of accountability of the concessionaire to the 
grantor Power; 
XIV - the requirement of publication of periodic financial statements of the 
concessionaire, and 
XV - the jurisdiction and the friendly solution of contractual disagreements. 
Single paragraph. Contracts for the provision of public service, preceded by the execution 
of public works shall additionally: 
I - stipulate physical and financial timelines for the execution of works related to the 
concession, and 
II - require warranty to the faithful compliance, by the concessionaire, of the duties 
relating to the public works bounded to the concession. 
Article 23-A. The concession contract may provide for the use of private mechanisms for 
resolving disputes, arised from or related to the contract, including the arbitration, to be 
held in Brazil and in Portuguese, under the Law 9,307 of 23 September 1996. 
Article 24. (Vetoed) 
Article 25. It is the duty of the concessionaire the execution of the service granted, and it 
is liable for all damages caused to the grantor Power, users or third parties, and the 
supervision exercised by the competent may not waive or mitigate that liability. 
1
st
 paragraph - Without prejudice to the liability referred to in this Article, the 
concessionaire may contract third parties for the development of activities related, 
  
99 
ancillary or complementary to the service rendered, as well as the implementation of 
associated projects. 
Article 26. The sub-concession is allowed, pursuant to the concession contract, if of 
expressly authorized by the grantor Power. 
1
st
 Paragraph - The granting of sub-concession will always be preceded by competition. 
2
nd
 Paragraph – the sub-concessionaire shall sub-rogate all rights and duties of sub-
grantor within the limits of the sub-concession. 
Article 27. The transfer of concession of corporate control of the concessionaire without 
prior consent of the grantor Power lead to the forfeiture of the concession. 
1
st
 Paragraph - For the purposes of obtaining the consent
201
, mentioned in this Article, the 
concessionaire must: 
I - meet the requirements of technical, financial probity and legal and tax regularity 
required to undertake the service, and 
II - comply with all the terms of the existing contract. 
2
nd
 Paragraph - Subject to the conditions in the concession contract, the grantor Power 
shall authorize the corporate control transfer by the grantee
202
 and by its funders to 
promote its financial restructuration and ensure continuity of the service provision. 
3
rd
 Paragraph - In the case mentioned in the second paragraph of this Article, the grantor 
Power will require funders that meet the requirements of legality and tax regularity, being 
able
203
 to amend or waive other requirements of 1
st
 Paragraph, subsection I of this 
Article. 
4
th
 Paragraph -   The corporate control transfer authorized in accordance with 2
nd
 
paragraph of this Article will not change the duties of the concessionaire and its 
controllers before the grantor Power. 
Article 28. On finance contracts, the concessionaires can offer as collateral, the 
concession emerging rights, to the extent that does not compromise the operation and 
continuity of service provision. 
Article 28-A. To secure long-term loan agreements for investment related to concession 
contracts in any modality, concessionaires may assign to the lender, on a fiduciary basis, 
part of its future operating credits, subject to the following conditions: 
I - the contract of assignment of credit shall be registered in the Registry of Deeds and 
Documents to be effective against third parties; 
II - without prejudice to subsection I of this Article, the assignment of credit will have no 
effect in relation to the grantor Power, only when this is formally notified; 
III - future credits assigned under this Article shall be made under the ownership of the 
lender, regardless of any additional formality; 
IV - the lender may refer the financial institution to perform the billing and receiving 
payments of credits assigned or allow the concessionaire to do so, as the representative 
and trustee; 
V – in cases where a financial institution has been referred, as provided in section IV of 
this Article, the concessionaire is required to submit the credits for billing; 
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VI - the payments of the loans assigned shall be deposited by the concessionaire or by the 
institution in charge of collecting, at bank account bounded with the loan agreement; 
VII - the depository financial institution shall transfer the amounts received to the lender, 
as the loan contract obligations become due, and 
VIII - the assignment agreement shall provide for the return of excess funds to the 
concessionaire, being forbidden to withhold the full balance, after the full compliance of 
the contract. 
Single paragraph. For purposes of this Article, shall be considered long-term contracts 
those whose bonds have an average due date of more than five (5) years. 
Grantor Power Duties 
Article 29. The duties of the Grantor Power are: 
I - permanently regulate and supervise the service granted and its provision; 
II - implement regulatory and contractual penalties; 
III – intervene at the service rendered, in the cases and conditions provided by law; 
IV - terminate the concession, as provided in this Act and in the manner provided in the 
contract; 
V - approve adjustments and revise the rates in the terms of this Act, the pertinent rules 
and the contract; 
VI - respect and enforce the regulations of the service and the contractual terms of the 
concession; 
VII - ensure the good quality of service, receive, investigate and resolve complaints and 
claims by users, who will be informed, within thirty days of the measures taken; 
VIII - declare of public utility, the necessary assets for the implementation of public work 
or service, promoting condemnations, directly or by granting powers to the 
concessionaire, in which case will be in charge for compensation measures; 
IX - declare of need or public interest, for purposes of imposition of easements, the 
required assets for the execution of service or public work, promoting it directly or by 
granting authority to the concessionaire, in which case this will be in charge for the 
appropriate compensation; 
X – stimulate quality and productivity increase, environment preservation and 
conservation; 
XI – foster competitiveness, and 
XII – stimulate the formation of users associations to advocacy for the rights concerning 
the service rendered. 
Article 30. When exercising the supervision, the grantor Power will have access to data 
concerning the administration, accounting, technical resources, economic and financial 
aspects of the concessionaire. 
Single paragraph. The supervision of the service shall be made by the technical body of 
the grantor Power or by convened authority and, periodically, as set forth by regulation, 
by commission composed of representatives of the grantor Power, by the concessionaire 
and by the users. 
Duties of the Concessionaire 
Article 31. Duties of the concessionaire: 
I - provide adequate service, as provided in this Act, at the technical regulations and at 
the contract; 
  
101 
II - update the inventory and records of the assets bounded to the concession; 
III – render accountability of the management of the service to the grantor Power and 
users, as defined in the contract; 
IV - to respect and enforce the rules of the service and contractual terms of the 
concession; 
V - allow free access at any time to people in charge of supervisiono of the public works, 
equipment and facilities of the service, as well as its accounting records; 
VI - promote the condemnation and easements authorized by the granting authority, as 
provided in the invitation to bid and at the contract; 
VII - protect the integrity of the assets bounded to the service rendered, as well as secure 
them properly, and 
VIII - collect, invest and manage the financial resources necessary to provide the service. 
Single paragraph. Hired workers, including labor-power
204
, by the concessionaire shall be 
governed by the provisions of private law and by labor law, do not constitute 
employment relationship between the hired workers by the concessionaire and the grantor 
Power. 
INTERVENTION 
Article 32. The granting authority may intervene in the concession, in order to ensure the 
adequate provision of the service, and the faithful fulfillment of the contract terms, 
regulations and pertinent laws. 
Single paragraph. The intervention will be implemented by decree of the grantor Power, 
which will comprise the name of the intervener, the term of the intervention and the goals 
and limits of the measure. 
Article 33. Declared the intervention, the grantor Power shall, within thirty days, start 
administrative proceedings to testify the determinants of the measure and investigate 
liability, guaranteed the right of legal defense. 
1st Paragraph - If it is proved that the intervention did not observe the legal parameters 
and regulations, it will be declared a nullity, the service shall be immediately returned to 
the concessionaire, without prejudice to the right to compensation. 
2nd Paragraph - The administrative procedure referred to in the heading of this Article 
shall be completed within one hundred and eighty days, otherwise the intervention it will 
be invalid. 
Article 34. Ceased the intervention, if not extinct the concession, the service 
administration will be returned to the concessionaire, preceded by account by the 
intervener, who liable for acts during his tenure. 
Chapter X 
Extinction of the Concession 
Article 35. The concession can be extinguished by: 
I – the end of the contract term; 
II - condemnation; 
III - forfeiture; 
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IV - rescission
205
; 
V - annulment, and 
VI - bankruptcy or dissolution of the company, and death or incapacity of the holder, in 
the case of sole proprietorship. 
1
st
 Paragraph - Extinguished the concession, all reversible assets, rights and privileges 
transferred to the concessionaire shall return to the grantor Power, as provided in the 
invitation to bid and settled in the contract. 
2
nd
 Paragraph - Extinguished the concession, the grantor Power will be taken in charge of 
the service immediately by the grantor Power, proceeded by to surveys, evaluations and 
liquidations required. 
3
rd
 Paragraph – Taking the charge of the service, authorizes the occupancy of the 
premises and use of all reversible assets by the grantor Power. 
4
th
 Paragraph - In the cases of subsections I and II of this Article, the grantor Power, 
anticipating the termination of the concession, shall conduct surveys and assessments 
necessary to determine the amount of compensation that is owed to the concessionaire, in 
the form of Articles 36 and 37 of this Law. 
Article 38. The total or partial non-fulfillment of the contract shall result, at the discretion 
of the grantor Power, the declaration of forfeiture of the concession or the application of 
contractual penalties, subject to the provisions of this Article, Article 27, and the rules 
agreed between the parties. 
1
st
 Paragraph - The forfeiture of the concession may be declared by the grantor Power 
when: 
I - the service is being rendered improperly or sparingly, based on the standards, criteria, 
indicators and parameters that define the quality of the service; 
II - the concessionaire fails to comply with contractual, legal or regulatory provisions 
concerning the concession; 
III – the concessionaire paralyze the service or concur for it, except if caused by 
fortuitous event or force majeure; 
IV - the concessionaire loses economic, technical or operational conditions to maintain 
the adequate rendered service granted; 
V - the concessionaire fails to comply with the penalties imposed for violations in 
appropriate deadlines; 
VI - the concessionaire does not answer the legal notice of the grantor Power in order to 
regularize the service rendered, and 
VII - the concessionaire does not answer the legal notice to the grantor Power for, in 180 
(one hundred eighty) days, submit documentation regarding the tax compliance, during 
grant, pursuant to Article 29 of Law number 8,666 of 21 June 1993. (Amended by Law 
number 12,767 of 2012). 
2
nd
 Paragraph - The declaration of forfeiture of the concession must be preceded by 
verification of non compliance by the concessionaire in an administrative proceeding, 
guaranteed the right to legal defense. 
3
rd
 Paragraph – It will not be established administrative proceedings about non 
compliance before reported to the concessionaire, in detail, the contractual breaches 
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referred to in 1st Paragraph of this Article, giving to the concessionaire a deadline to 
correct the flaws and transgressions pointed, and for the legal framework under the 
contract. 
4
th
 Paragraph - Initiated the administrative process and proven the non compliance
206
, the 
forfeiture shall be declared by decree of the grantor Power, regardless of prior indemnity, 
calculated during the procedure. 
5th Paragraph -  The compensation mentioned in the preceding paragraph, shall be 
payable in the form of Article 36 of this Act and the contract, disregarding the amount of 
the contractual fines and damages caused by the concessionaire. 
6
th
 Paragraph - Declared to forfeiture, it will not result to the grantor Power any kind of 
liability for the charges, liens, bonds or commitments with third parties or employees of 
the concessionaire. 
Article 39. The concession agreement may be terminated at the initiative of the 
concessionaire, in case of breach of contract rules by the grantor Power, through lawsuit 
filed especially for this purpose. 
Single paragraph. In the case referred to in this Article, the services rendered by the 
concessionaire shall not be interrupted or discontinued until the final court decision. 
Chapter XI 
The Permits  
Article 40. The permits of public service shall be formalized by an adhesion contract, 
which may comply with the terms of this Law, the other relevant rules and at the 
invitation to bid, including the precariousness
207
 and unilateral termination of the contract 
by the grantor Power. 
Chapter XII 
FINAL AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article 41. The provisions of this Law does not apply to concessions, permission and 
authorization for the broadcast service of sounds and images. 
Article 42. The public service concessions granted prior to the entry into force of this 
Act, shall be deemed to be valid for the period specified in the contract or deed of grant, 
subject to the provisions of Article 43 of this Law (See Law number 9,074 of 1995) 
1st Paragraph – Expired the term mentioned in the contract or deed of grant, the service 
may be provided by agency or entity of the grantor Power, or delegated to others through 
new contract. 
2nd Paragraph – The concessions have a precarious feature, and the ones with expired 
term and in effect with indeterminate term, even under previous legislation, shall remain 
valid for the necessary time to fulfill the required surveys and assessments for the 
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 by the concessionaire. 
207
 In the Brazilian Legal System, a contract with the public administration, in the case of permits, can be 
regarded as a “precarious” contract, which means the possibility of one party – usually the public party, 
unilaterally terminate the contract at any time, without the requirement of indemnification to the other part. 
The article 40 says that both situations, precariousness and unilateral termination can be clauses of the 
contract and be at the invitation to bid as well. 
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implementation of the 
208
bidding procedure that will precede the 
209
concession that will 
replace
210
, time that shall not be less than 24 (twenty four) months. 
3rd Paragraph - The concessions referred to in 2
nd
 Paragraph of this Article, including 
those without contract that formalizes it or with clause providing for its extension, shall 
have a maximum validity until 31 December 2010, provided that, until the 30 June 2009, 
have been fulfilled, cumulatively, the following conditions: 
I – Broader and most retroactive possible survey of the physical elements, components of 
the reversible infrastructure assets and financial, accounting and business data concerning 
the provision of services, in a required dimension and enough to perform the calculation 
of any indemnity related to investments still not repaid by arising revenues from the 
concession, subject to legal and contractual provisions regulating the service or 
applicable to it in twenty (20) years prior to the publication of this Law; 
II – implementation of an agreement between the grantor Power and the concessionaire 
about the criteria and form of compensation for any remaining credits for investments not 
yet amortized or depreciated, calculated from the surveys referred to in 1
st
 subsection of 
this paragraph and audited by specialized institution chosen by agreement between the 
parties, and 
III - publication in the official press of a formal act of the grantor authority, authorizing 
the provision of precarious services for a period of six (6) months, renewable until 31 
December 2008, upon proof of compliance with the provisions of sections I and II of this 
paragraph. 
4th Paragraph – If the agreement referred to in subsection II, 3rd paragraph of this Article 
fails, the calculation of compensation for investments shall be made based on the criteria 
set out in the instrument of concession signed before or, in omission thereof, by assessing 
its economic value or asset revaluation, depreciation and amortization of fixed assets 
defined by tax and corporate laws, performed by independent auditing company selected 
by mutual agreement of the parties. 
5th Paragraph - In the case of the 4th Paragraph of this Article, the payment of any 
compensation shall be performed by collateral security, through four (4) equal, 
successive and annual installments, of the part still not amortized of investments and 
other indemnification related to the provision of services, conducted with own equity of 
the concessionaire or its controller, or originated from funding operations, or obtained 
through the issue of shares, debentures and other securities, with the first installment paid 
until the last day of the financial year in which occurs reversal. 
6th Paragraph - If there is agreement, the indemnity mentioned at the 5th Paragraph of 
this Article shall be paid by revenues of new contract that will govern the provision of 
service. 
Article 44. The concessionaires who have public works that are delayed, at the date of 
publication of this Law, shall submit to the grantor Power, within one hundred and eighty 
days, an effective plan of completion
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Single paragraph. If the concessionaire fails to submit the plan referred to in this Article 
or if this plan does not provide effective conditions for completion of the public work, the 
grantor Power may declare terminated the concession concerning this public work. 
Article 45. In the cases of the Articles 43 and 44 of this Act, the grantor Power shall 
indemnify the public works and services performed, only in the case and with the 
resources of a rebidding procedure. 
Single paragraph. The bidding procedure of the head of this Article shall mandatorily 
take into account, for evaluation purposes, the stage of the public works stalled or 
delayed, to allow the use of the judgment criteria set out in subsection III of Article 15 of 
this Law. 
Article 46. This Law shall enter into force on the date of its publication. 
Article 47. The opposite provisions are revoked.  
Brasília, 13 February 1995; 174th of Independence and 107th of the Republic. 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
Nelson Jobim 
This does not replace the text published in the official newspaper of 14 February 1995 
and republished in the official newspaper of 28 September 1998 
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GENERAL LAW OF CONCESSIONS - ORIGINAL IN PORTUGUESE 
 
Lei número 8.987 de 13 de fevereiro de 1995.  
Dispõe sobre o regime de concessão e permissão da prestação de serviços públicos 
previsto no art. 175 da Constituição Federal, e dá outras providências. 
O PRESIDENTE DA REPÚBLICA Faço saber que o Congresso Nacional decreta e eu 
sanciono a seguinte Lei: 
Capítulo I 
DAS DISPOSIÇÕES PRELIMINARES 
Art. 1
o
 As concessões de serviços públicos e de obras públicas e as permissões de 
serviços públicos reger-se-ão pelos termos do art. 175 da Constituição Federal, por esta 
Lei, pelas normas legais pertinentes e pelas cláusulas dos indispensáveis contratos. 
Parágrafo único. A União, os Estados, o Distrito Federal e os Municípios promoverão a 
revisão e as adaptações necessárias de sua legislação às prescrições desta Lei, buscando 
atender as peculiaridades das diversas modalidades dos seus serviços. 
Art. 2
o
 Para os fins do disposto nesta Lei, considera-se: 
I - poder concedente: a União, o Estado, o Distrito Federal ou o Município, em cuja 
competência se encontre o serviço público, precedido ou não da execução de obra 
pública, objeto de concessão ou permissão; 
II - concessão de serviço público: a delegação de sua prestação, feita pelo poder 
concedente, mediante licitação, na modalidade de concorrência, à pessoa jurídica ou 
consórcio de empresas que demonstre capacidade para seu desempenho, por sua conta e 
risco e por prazo determinado; 
III - concessão de serviço público precedida da execução de obra pública: a construção, 
total ou parcial, conservação, reforma, ampliação ou melhoramento de quaisquer obras de 
interesse público, delegada pelo poder concedente, mediante licitação, na modalidade de 
concorrência, à pessoa jurídica ou consórcio de empresas que demonstre capacidade para 
a sua realização, por sua conta e risco, de forma que o investimento da concessionária 
seja remunerado e amortizado mediante a exploração do serviço ou da obra por prazo 
determinado; 
IV - permissão de serviço público: a delegação, a título precário, mediante licitação, da 
prestação de serviços públicos, feita pelo poder concedente à pessoa física ou jurídica que 
demonstre capacidade para seu desempenho, por sua conta e risco. 
Art. 3
o
 As concessões e permissões sujeitar-se-ão à fiscalização pelo poder concedente 
responsável pela delegação, com a cooperação dos usuários. 
Art. 4
o
 A concessão de serviço público, precedida ou não da execução de obra pública, 
será formalizada mediante contrato, que deverá observar os termos desta Lei, das normas 
pertinentes e do edital de licitação. 
Art. 5
o
 O poder concedente publicará, previamente ao edital de licitação, ato justificando 
a conveniência da outorga de concessão ou permissão, caracterizando seu objeto, área e 
prazo. 
Capítulo II 
DO SERVIÇO ADEQUADO 
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Art. 6
o
 Toda concessão ou permissão pressupõe a prestação de serviço adequado ao pleno 
atendimento dos usuários, conforme estabelecido nesta Lei, nas normas pertinentes e no 
respectivo contrato. 
§ 1
o
 Serviço adequado é o que satisfaz as condições de regularidade, continuidade, 
eficiência, segurança, atualidade, generalidade, cortesia na sua prestação e modicidade 
das tarifas. 
§ 2
o
 A atualidade compreende a modernidade das técnicas, do equipamento e das 
instalações e a sua conservação, bem como a melhoria e expansão do serviço. 
§ 3
o
 Não se caracteriza como descontinuidade do serviço a sua interrupção em situação 
de emergência ou após prévio aviso, quando: 
I - motivada por razões de ordem técnica ou de segurança das instalações; e, 
II - por inadimplemento do usuário, considerado o interesse da coletividade. 
Capítulo III 
DOS DIREITOS E OBRIGAÇÕES DOS USUÁRIOS 
Art. 7º. Sem prejuízo do disposto na Lei n
o
 8.078, de 11 de setembro de 1990, são direitos 
e obrigações dos usuários: 
I - receber serviço adequado; 
II - receber do poder concedente e da concessionária informações para a defesa de 
interesses individuais ou     coletivos; 
III - obter e utilizar o serviço, com liberdade de escolha entre vários prestadores de 
serviços, quando for o caso, observadas as normas do poder concedente.   
IV - levar ao conhecimento do poder público e da concessionária as irregularidades de 
que tenham conhecimento, referentes ao serviço prestado; 
V - comunicar às autoridades competentes os atos ilícitos praticados pela concessionária 
na prestação do serviço; 
VI - contribuir para a permanência das boas condições dos bens públicos através dos 
quais lhes são prestados os serviços. 
Art. 7º-A. As concessionárias de serviços públicos, de direito público e privado, nos 
Estados e no Distrito Federal, são obrigadas a oferecer ao consumidor e ao usuário, 
dentro do mês de vencimento, o mínimo de seis datas opcionais para escolherem os dias 
de vencimento de seus débitos.     
Parágrafo único. (VETADO) (Incluído pela Lei nº 9.791, de 1999) 
Capítulo IV 
DA POLÍTICA TARIFÁRIA 
Art. 8
o
 (VETADO) 
Art. 9
o
 A tarifa do serviço público concedido será fixada pelo preço da proposta 
vencedora da licitação e preservada pelas regras de revisão previstas nesta Lei, no edital e 
no contrato. 
§ 1
o
 A tarifa não será subordinada à legislação específica anterior e somente nos casos 
expressamente previstos em lei, sua cobrança poderá ser condicionada à existência de 
serviço público alternativo e gratuito para o usuário.   
§ 2
o
 Os contratos poderão prever mecanismos de revisão das tarifas, a fim de manter-se o 
equilíbrio econômico-financeiro. 
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§ 3
o
 Ressalvados os impostos sobre a renda, a criação, alteração ou extinção de quaisquer 
tributos ou encargos legais, após a apresentação da proposta, quando comprovado seu 
impacto, implicará a revisão da tarifa, para mais ou para menos, conforme o caso. 
§ 4
o
 Em havendo alteração unilateral do contrato que afete o seu inicial equilíbrio 
econômico-financeiro, o poder concedente deverá restabelecê-lo, concomitantemente à 
alteração. 
Art. 10. Sempre que forem atendidas as condições do contrato, considera-se mantido seu 
equilíbrio econômico-financeiro. 
Art. 11. No atendimento às peculiaridades de cada serviço público, poderá o poder 
concedente prever, em favor da concessionária, no edital de licitação, a possibilidade de 
outras fontes provenientes de receitas alternativas, complementares, acessórias ou de 
projetos associados, com ou sem exclusividade, com vistas a favorecer a modicidade das 
tarifas, observado o disposto no art. 17 desta Lei. 
Parágrafo único. As fontes de receita previstas neste artigo serão obrigatoriamente 
consideradas para a aferição do inicial equilíbrio econômico-financeiro do contrato. 
Art. 12. (VETADO) 
Art. 13. As tarifas poderão ser diferenciadas em função das características técnicas e dos 
custos específicos provenientes do atendimento aos distintos segmentos de usuários. 
Capítulo V 
DA LICITAÇÃO 
Art. 14. Toda concessão de serviço público, precedida ou não da execução de obra 
pública, será objeto de prévia licitação, nos termos da legislação própria e com 
observância dos princípios da legalidade, moralidade, publicidade, igualdade, do 
julgamento por critérios objetivos e da vinculação ao instrumento convocatório. 
Art. 15. No julgamento da licitação será considerado um dos seguintes critérios:  
I - o menor valor da tarifa do serviço público a ser prestado;  
II - a maior oferta, nos casos de pagamento ao poder concedente pela outorga da 
concessão;  
III - a combinação, dois a dois, dos critérios referidos nos incisos I, II e VII;  
IV - melhor proposta técnica, com preço fixado no edital;  
V - melhor proposta em razão da combinação dos critérios de menor valor da tarifa do 
serviço público a ser prestado com o de melhor técnica; (Incluído pela Lei nº 9.648, de 
1998) 
VI - melhor proposta em razão da combinação dos critérios de maior oferta pela outorga 
da concessão com o de melhor técnica; ou (Incluído pela Lei nº 9.648, de 1998) 
VII - melhor oferta de pagamento pela outorga após qualificação de propostas 
técnicas. (Incluído pela Lei nº 9.648, de 1998) 
§ 1
o
 A aplicação do critério previsto no inciso III só será admitida quando previamente 
estabelecida no edital de licitação, inclusive com regras e fórmulas precisas para 
avaliação econômico-financeira.  
§ 2
o
 Para fins de aplicação do disposto nos incisos IV, V, VI e VII, o edital de licitação 
conterá parâmetros e exigências para formulação de propostas técnicas.  
§ 3
o
 O poder concedente recusará propostas manifestamente inexequíveis ou 
financeiramente incompatíveis com os objetivos da licitação. 
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§ 4
o
 Em igualdade de condições, será dada preferência à proposta apresentada por 
empresa brasileira.  
Art. 16. A outorga de concessão ou permissão não terá caráter de exclusividade, salvo no 
caso de inviabilidade técnica ou econômica justificada no ato a que se refere o art. 
5
o
 desta Lei. 
Art. 17. Considerar-se-á desclassificada a proposta que, para sua viabilização, necessite 
de vantagens ou subsídios que não estejam previamente autorizados em lei e à disposição 
de todos os concorrentes. 
§ 1
o
 Considerar-se-á, também, desclassificada a proposta de entidade estatal alheia à 
esfera político-administrativa do poder concedente que, para sua viabilização, necessite 
de vantagens ou subsídios do poder público controlador da referida 
entidade. (Renumerado do parágrafo único pela Lei nº 9.648, de 1998) 
§ 2
o
 Inclui-se nas vantagens ou subsídios de que trata este artigo, qualquer tipo de 
tratamento tributário diferenciado, ainda que em conseqüência da natureza jurídica do 
licitante, que comprometa a isonomia fiscal que deve prevalecer entre todos os 
concorrentes. (Incluído pela Lei nº 9.648, de 1998) 
Art. 18. O edital de licitação será elaborado pelo poder concedente, observados, no que 
couber, os critérios e as normas gerais da legislação própria sobre licitações e contratos e 
conterá, especialmente: 
I - o objeto, metas e prazo da concessão; 
II - a descrição das condições necessárias à prestação adequada do serviço; 
III - os prazos para recebimento das propostas, julgamento da licitação e assinatura do 
contrato; 
IV - prazo, local e horário em que serão fornecidos, aos interessados, os dados, estudos e 
projetos necessários à elaboração dos orçamentos e apresentação das propostas; 
V - os critérios e a relação dos documentos exigidos para a aferição da capacidade 
técnica, da idoneidade financeira e da regularidade jurídica e fiscal; 
VI - as possíveis fontes de receitas alternativas, complementares ou acessórias, bem como 
as provenientes de projetos associados; 
VII - os direitos e obrigações do poder concedente e da concessionária em relação a 
alterações e expansões a serem realizadas no futuro, para garantir a continuidade da 
prestação do serviço; 
VIII - os critérios de reajuste e revisão da tarifa; 
IX - os critérios, indicadores, fórmulas e parâmetros a serem utilizados no julgamento 
técnico e econômico-financeiro da proposta; 
X - a indicação dos bens reversíveis; 
XI - as características dos bens reversíveis e as condições em que estes serão postos à 
disposição, nos casos em que houver sido extinta a concessão anterior; 
XII - a expressa indicação do responsável pelo ônus das desapropriações necessárias à 
execução do serviço ou da obra pública, ou para a instituição de servidão administrativa; 
XIII - as condições de liderança da empresa responsável, na hipótese em que for 
permitida a participação de empresas em consórcio; 
XIV - nos casos de concessão, a minuta do respectivo contrato, que conterá as cláusulas 
essenciais referidas no art. 23 desta Lei, quando aplicáveis; 
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XV - nos casos de concessão de serviços públicos precedida da execução de obra pública, 
os dados relativos à obra, dentre os quais os elementos do projeto básico que permitam 
sua plena caracterização, bem assim as garantias exigidas para essa parte específica do 
contrato, adequadas a cada caso e limitadas ao valor da obra;  
XVI - nos casos de permissão, os termos do contrato de adesão a ser firmado. 
Art. 18-A. O edital poderá prever a inversão da ordem das fases de habilitação e 
julgamento, hipótese em que:  
I - encerrada a fase de classificação das propostas ou o oferecimento de lances, será 
aberto o invólucro com os documentos de habilitação do licitante mais bem classificado, 
para verificação do atendimento das condições fixadas no edital;  
II - verificado o atendimento das exigências do edital, o licitante será declarado 
vencedor;  
III - inabilitado o licitante melhor classificado, serão analisados os documentos 
habilitatórios do licitante com a proposta classificada em segundo lugar, e assim 
sucessivamente, até que um licitante classificado atenda às condições fixadas no edital;  
IV - proclamado o resultado final do certame, o objeto será adjudicado ao vencedor nas 
condições técnicas e econômicas por ele ofertadas. 
Art. 19. Quando permitida, na licitação, a participação de empresas em consórcio, 
observar-se-ão as seguintes normas: 
I - comprovação de compromisso, público ou particular, de constituição de consórcio, 
subscrito pelas     consorciadas; 
II - indicação da empresa responsável pelo consórcio; 
III - apresentação dos documentos exigidos nos incisos V e XIII do artigo anterior, por 
parte de cada consorciada; 
IV - impedimento de participação de empresas consorciadas na mesma licitação, por 
intermédio de mais de um consórcio ou isoladamente. 
§ 1
o
 O licitante vencedor fica obrigado a promover, antes da celebração do contrato, a 
constituição e registro do consórcio, nos termos do compromisso referido no inciso I 
deste artigo. 
§ 2
o
 A empresa líder do consórcio é a responsável perante o poder concedente pelo 
cumprimento do contrato de concessão, sem prejuízo da responsabilidade solidária das 
demais consorciadas. 
Art. 20. É facultado ao poder concedente, desde que previsto no edital, no interesse do 
serviço a ser concedido, determinar que o licitante vencedor, no caso de consórcio, se 
constitua em empresa antes da celebração do contrato. 
Art. 21. Os estudos, investigações, levantamentos, projetos, obras e despesas ou 
investimentos já efetuados, vinculados à concessão, de utilidade para a licitação, 
realizados pelo poder concedente ou com a sua autorização, estarão à disposição dos 
interessados, devendo o vencedor da licitação ressarcir os dispêndios correspondentes, 
especificados no edital. 
Art. 22. É assegurada a qualquer pessoa a obtenção de certidão sobre atos, contratos, 
decisões ou pareceres relativos à licitação ou às próprias concessões. 
Capítulo VI 
DO CONTRATO DE CONCESSÃO 
Art. 23. São cláusulas essenciais do contrato de concessão as relativas: 
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I - ao objeto, à área e ao prazo da concessão; 
II - ao modo, forma e condições de prestação do serviço; 
III - aos critérios, indicadores, fórmulas e parâmetros definidores da qualidade do serviço; 
IV - ao preço do serviço e aos critérios e procedimentos para o reajuste e a revisão das 
tarifas; 
V - aos direitos, garantias e obrigações do poder concedente e da concessionária, 
inclusive os relacionados às previsíveis necessidades de futura alteração e expansão do 
serviço e conseqüente modernização, aperfeiçoamento e ampliação dos equipamentos e 
das instalações; 
VI - aos direitos e deveres dos usuários para obtenção e utilização do serviço; 
VII - à forma de fiscalização das instalações, dos equipamentos, dos métodos e práticas 
de execução do serviço, bem como a indicação dos órgãos competentes para exercê-la; 
VIII - às penalidades contratuais e administrativas a que se sujeita a concessionária e sua 
forma de aplicação; 
IX - aos casos de extinção da concessão; 
X - aos bens reversíveis; 
XI - aos critérios para o cálculo e a forma de pagamento das indenizações devidas à 
concessionária, quando for o caso; 
XII - às condições para prorrogação do contrato; 
XIII - à obrigatoriedade, forma e periodicidade da prestação de contas da concessionária 
ao poder concedente; 
XIV - à exigência da publicação de demonstrações financeiras periódicas da 
concessionária; e 
XV - ao foro e ao modo amigável de solução das divergências contratuais. 
Parágrafo único. Os contratos relativos à concessão de serviço público precedido da 
execução de obra pública deverão, adicionalmente: 
I - estipular os cronogramas físico-financeiros de execução das obras vinculadas à 
concessão; e 
II - exigir garantia do fiel cumprimento, pela concessionária, das obrigações relativas às 
obras vinculadas à concessão. 
Art. 23-A. O contrato de concessão poderá prever o emprego de mecanismos privados 
para resolução de disputas decorrentes ou relacionadas ao contrato, inclusive a 
arbitragem, a ser realizada no Brasil e em língua portuguesa, nos termos da Lei n
o
 9.307, 
de 23 de setembro de 1996.  
Art. 24. (VETADO) 
Art. 25. Incumbe à concessionária a execução do serviço concedido, cabendo-lhe 
responder por todos os prejuízos causados ao poder concedente, aos usuários ou a 
terceiros, sem que a fiscalização exercida pelo órgão competente exclua ou atenue essa 
responsabilidade. 
§ 1
o
 Sem prejuízo da responsabilidade a que se refere este artigo, a concessionária poderá 
contratar com terceiros o desenvolvimento de atividades inerentes, acessórias ou 
complementares ao serviço concedido, bem como a implementação de projetos 
associados. 
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§ 2
o
 Os contratos celebrados entre a concessionária e os terceiros a que se refere o 
parágrafo anterior reger-se-ão pelo direito privado, não se estabelecendo qualquer relação 
jurídica entre os terceiros e o poder concedente. 
§ 3
o
 A execução das atividades contratadas com terceiros pressupõe o cumprimento das 
normas regulamentares da modalidade do serviço concedido. 
Art. 26. É admitida a subconcessão, nos termos previstos no contrato de concessão, desde 
que expressamente autorizada pelo poder concedente. 
§ 1
o
 A outorga de subconcessão será sempre precedida de concorrência. 
§ 2
o
 O subconcessionário se sub-rogará todos os direitos e obrigações da subconcedente 
dentro dos limites da subconcessão. 
Art. 27. A transferência de concessão ou do controle societário da concessionária sem 
prévia anuência do poder concedente implicará a caducidade da concessão. 
§ 1
o
 Para fins de obtenção da anuência de que trata o caput deste artigo, o pretendente 
deverá:   
I - atender às exigências de capacidade técnica, idoneidade financeira e regularidade 
jurídica e fiscal necessárias à assunção do serviço; e 
II - comprometer-se a cumprir todas as cláusulas do contrato em vigor. 
§ 2
o
 Nas condições estabelecidas no contrato de concessão, o poder concedente autorizará 
a assunção do controle da concessionária por seus financiadores para promover sua 
reestruturação financeira e assegurar a continuidade da prestação dos serviços.  
§ 3
o
 Na hipótese prevista no § 2
o
 deste artigo, o poder concedente exigirá dos 
financiadores que atendam às exigências de regularidade jurídica e fiscal, podendo alterar 
ou dispensar os demais requisitos previstos no § 1
o
, inciso I deste artigo.  
§ 4
o
 A assunção do controle autorizada na forma do § 2
o
 deste artigo não alterará as 
obrigações da concessionária e de seus controladores ante ao poder concedente.  
Art. 28. Nos contratos de financiamento, as concessionárias poderão oferecer em garantia 
os direitos emergentes da concessão, até o limite que não comprometa a 
operacionalização e a continuidade da prestação do serviço. 
Art. 28-A. Para garantir contratos de mútuo de longo prazo, destinados a investimentos 
relacionados a contratos de concessão, em qualquer de suas modalidades, as 
concessionárias poderão ceder ao mutuante, em caráter fiduciário, parcela de seus 
créditos operacionais futuros, observadas as seguintes condições:  
I - o contrato de cessão dos créditos deverá ser registrado em Cartório de Títulos e 
Documentos para ter eficácia perante terceiros; 
II - sem prejuízo do disposto no inciso I do caput deste artigo, a cessão do crédito não 
terá eficácia em relação ao Poder Público concedente senão quando for este formalmente 
notificado;  
III - os créditos futuros cedidos nos termos deste artigo serão constituídos sob a 
titularidade do mutuante, independentemente de qualquer formalidade adicional;  
IV - o mutuante poderá indicar instituição financeira para efetuar a cobrança e receber os 
pagamentos dos créditos cedidos ou permitir que a concessionária o faça, na qualidade de 
representante e depositária;  
V - na hipótese de ter sido indicada instituição financeira, conforme previsto no inciso IV 
do caput deste artigo, fica a concessionária obrigada a apresentar a essa os créditos para 
cobrança;  
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VI - os pagamentos dos créditos cedidos deverão ser depositados pela concessionária ou 
pela instituição encarregada da cobrança em conta corrente bancária vinculada ao 
contrato de mútuo;  
VII - a instituição financeira depositária deverá transferir os valores recebidos ao 
mutuante à medida que as obrigações do contrato de mútuo tornarem-se exigíveis; e  
VIII - o contrato de cessão disporá sobre a devolução à concessionária dos recursos 
excedentes, sendo vedada a retenção do saldo após o adimplemento integral do contrato.  
Parágrafo único. Para os fins deste artigo, serão considerados contratos de longo prazo 
aqueles cujas obrigações tenham prazo médio de vencimento superior a 5 (cinco) anos.  
Capítulo VII 
DOS ENCARGOS DO PODER CONCEDENTE 
Art. 29. Incumbe ao poder concedente: 
I - regulamentar o serviço concedido e fiscalizar permanentemente a sua prestação; 
II - aplicar as penalidades regulamentares e contratuais; 
III - intervir na prestação do serviço, nos casos e condições previstos em lei; 
IV - extinguir a concessão, nos casos previstos nesta Lei e na forma prevista no contrato; 
V - homologar reajustes e proceder à revisão das tarifas na forma desta Lei, das normas 
pertinentes e do contrato; 
VI - cumprir e fazer cumprir as disposições regulamentares do serviço e as cláusulas 
contratuais da concessão; 
VII - zelar pela boa qualidade do serviço, receber, apurar e solucionar queixas e 
reclamações dos usuários, que serão cientificados, em até trinta dias, das providências 
tomadas; 
VIII - declarar de utilidade pública os bens necessários à execução do serviço ou obra 
pública, promovendo as desapropriações, diretamente ou mediante outorga de poderes à 
concessionária, caso em que será desta a responsabilidade pelas indenizações cabíveis; 
IX - declarar de necessidade ou utilidade pública, para fins de instituição de servidão 
administrativa, os bens necessários à execução de serviço ou obra pública, promovendo-a 
diretamente ou mediante outorga de poderes à concessionária, caso em que será desta a 
responsabilidade pelas indenizações cabíveis; 
X - estimular o aumento da qualidade, produtividade, preservação do meio-ambiente e 
conservação; 
XI - incentivar a competitividade; e 
XII - estimular a formação de associações de usuários para defesa de interesses relativos 
ao serviço. 
Art. 30. No exercício da fiscalização, o poder concedente terá acesso aos dados relativos 
à administração, contabilidade, recursos técnicos, econômicos e financeiros da 
concessionária. 
Parágrafo único. A fiscalização do serviço será feita por intermédio de órgão técnico do 
poder concedente ou por entidade com ele conveniada, e, periodicamente, conforme 
previsto em norma regulamentar, por comissão composta de representantes do poder 
concedente, da concessionária e dos usuários. 
Capítulo VIII 
DOS ENCARGOS DA CONCESSIONÁRIA 
Art. 31. Incumbe à concessionária: 
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I - prestar serviço adequado, na forma prevista nesta Lei, nas normas técnicas aplicáveis e 
no contrato; 
II - manter em dia o inventário e o registro dos bens vinculados à concessão; 
III - prestar contas da gestão do serviço ao poder concedente e aos usuários, nos termos 
definidos no contrato; 
IV - cumprir e fazer cumprir as normas do serviço e as cláusulas contratuais da 
concessão; 
V - permitir aos encarregados da fiscalização livre acesso, em qualquer época, às obras, 
aos equipamentos e às instalações integrantes do serviço, bem como a seus registros 
contábeis; 
VI - promover as desapropriações e constituir servidões autorizadas pelo poder 
concedente, conforme previsto no edital e no contrato; 
VII - zelar pela integridade dos bens vinculados à prestação do serviço, bem como 
segurá-los adequadamente; e 
VIII - captar, aplicar e gerir os recursos financeiros necessários à prestação do serviço. 
Parágrafo único. As contratações, inclusive de mão-de-obra, feitas pela concessionária 
serão regidas pelas disposições de direito privado e pela legislação trabalhista, não se 
estabelecendo qualquer relação entre os terceiros contratados pela concessionária e o 
poder concedente. 
Capítulo IX 
DA INTERVENÇÃO 
Art. 32. O poder concedente poderá intervir na concessão, com o fim de assegurar a 
adequação na prestação do serviço, bem como o fiel cumprimento das normas 
contratuais, regulamentares e legais pertinentes. 
Parágrafo único. A intervenção far-se-á por decreto do poder concedente, que conterá a 
designação do interventor, o prazo da intervenção e os objetivos e limites da medida. 
Art. 33. Declarada a intervenção, o poder concedente deverá, no prazo de trinta dias, 
instaurar procedimento administrativo para comprovar as causas determinantes da 
medida e apurar responsabilidades, assegurado o direito de ampla defesa. 
§ 1
o
 Se ficar comprovado que a intervenção não observou os pressupostos legais e 
regulamentares será declarada sua nulidade, devendo o serviço ser imediatamente 
devolvido à concessionária, sem prejuízo de seu direito à indenização. 
§ 2
o
 O procedimento administrativo a que se refere o caput deste artigo deverá ser 
concluído no prazo de até cento e oitenta dias, sob pena de considerar-se inválida a 
intervenção. 
Art. 34. Cessada a intervenção, se não for extinta a concessão, a administração do serviço 
será devolvida à concessionária, precedida de prestação de contas pelo interventor, que 
responderá pelos atos praticados durante a sua gestão. 
Capítulo X 
DA EXTINÇÃO DA CONCESSÃO 
Art. 35. Extingue-se a concessão por: 
I - advento do termo contratual; 
II - encampação; 
III - caducidade; 
IV - rescisão; 
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V - anulação; e 
VI - falência ou extinção da empresa concessionária e falecimento ou incapacidade do 
titular, no caso de empresa individual. 
§ 1
o
 Extinta a concessão, retornam ao poder concedente todos os bens reversíveis, 
direitos e privilégios transferidos ao concessionário conforme previsto no edital e 
estabelecido no contrato. 
§ 2
o
 Extinta a concessão, haverá a imediata assunção do serviço pelo poder concedente, 
procedendo-se aos levantamentos, avaliações e liquidações necessários. 
§ 3
o
 A assunção do serviço autoriza a ocupação das instalações e a utilização, pelo poder 
concedente, de todos os bens reversíveis. 
§ 4
o
 Nos casos previstos nos incisos I e II deste artigo, o poder concedente, antecipando-
se à extinção da concessão, procederá aos levantamentos e avaliações necessários à 
determinação dos montantes da indenização que será devida à concessionária, na forma 
dos arts. 36 e 37 desta Lei. 
Art. 36. A reversão no advento do termo contratual far-se-á com a indenização das 
parcelas dos investimentos vinculados a bens reversíveis, ainda não amortizados ou 
depreciados, que tenham sido realizados com o objetivo de garantir a continuidade e 
atualidade do serviço concedido. 
Art. 37. Considera-se encampação a retomada do serviço pelo poder concedente durante 
o prazo da concessão, por motivo de interesse público, mediante lei autorizativa 
específica e após prévio pagamento da indenização, na forma do artigo anterior. 
Art. 38. A inexecução total ou parcial do contrato acarretará, a critério do poder 
concedente, a declaração de caducidade da concessão ou a aplicação das sanções 
contratuais, respeitadas as disposições deste artigo, do art. 27, e as normas 
convencionadas entre as partes. 
§ 1
o
 A caducidade da concessão poderá ser declarada pelo poder concedente quando: 
I - o serviço estiver sendo prestado de forma inadequada ou deficiente, tendo por base as 
normas, critérios, indicadores e parâmetros definidores da qualidade do serviço; 
II - a concessionária descumprir cláusulas contratuais ou disposições legais ou 
regulamentares concernentes à concessão; 
III - a concessionária paralisar o serviço ou concorrer para tanto, ressalvadas as hipóteses 
decorrentes de caso fortuito ou força maior; 
IV - a concessionária perder as condições econômicas, técnicas ou operacionais para 
manter a adequada prestação do serviço concedido; 
V - a concessionária não cumprir as penalidades impostas por infrações, nos devidos 
prazos; 
VI - a concessionária não atender a intimação do poder concedente no sentido de 
regularizar a prestação do serviço; e 
VII - a concessionária não atender a intimação do poder concedente para, em 180 (cento e 
oitenta) dias, apresentar a documentação relativa a regularidade fiscal, no curso da 
concessão, na forma do art. 29 da Lei nº 8.666, de 21 de junho de 1993.  (Redação dada 
pela Lei nº 12.767, de 2012) 
§ 2
o
 A declaração da caducidade da concessão deverá ser precedida da verificação da 
inadimplência da concessionária em processo administrativo, assegurado o direito de 
ampla defesa. 
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§ 3
o
 Não será instaurado processo administrativo de inadimplência antes de comunicados 
à concessionária, detalhadamente, os descumprimentos contratuais referidos no § 1º deste 
artigo, dando-lhe um prazo para corrigir as falhas e transgressões apontadas e para o 
enquadramento, nos termos contratuais. 
§ 4
o
 Instaurado o processo administrativo e comprovada a inadimplência, a caducidade 
será declarada por decreto do poder concedente, independentemente de indenização 
prévia, calculada no decurso do processo. 
§ 5
o
 A indenização de que trata o parágrafo anterior, será devida na forma do art. 36 desta 
Lei e do contrato, descontado o valor das multas contratuais e dos danos causados pela 
concessionária. 
§ 6
o
 Declarada a caducidade, não resultará para o poder concedente qualquer espécie de 
responsabilidade em relação aos encargos, ônus, obrigações ou compromissos com 
terceiros ou com empregados da concessionária. 
Art. 39. O contrato de concessão poderá ser rescindido por iniciativa da concessionária, 
no caso de descumprimento das normas contratuais pelo poder concedente, mediante 
ação judicial especialmente intentada para esse fim. 
Parágrafo único. Na hipótese prevista no caput deste artigo, os serviços prestados pela 
concessionária não poderão ser interrompidos ou paralisados, até a decisão judicial 
transitada em julgado. 
Capítulo XI 
DAS PERMISSÕES 
Art. 40. A permissão de serviço público será formalizada mediante contrato de adesão, 
que observará os termos desta Lei, das demais normas pertinentes e do edital de licitação, 
inclusive quanto à precariedade e à revogabilidade unilateral do contrato pelo poder 
concedente. 
Parágrafo único. Aplica-se às permissões o disposto nesta Lei. 
Capítulo XII 
DISPOSIÇÕES FINAIS E TRANSITÓRIAS 
Art. 41. O disposto nesta Lei não se aplica à concessão, permissão e autorização para o 
serviço de radiodifusão sonora e de sons e imagens. 
Art. 42. As concessões de serviço público outorgadas anteriormente à entrada em vigor 
desta Lei consideram-se válidas pelo prazo fixado no contrato ou no ato de outorga, 
observado o disposto no art. 43 desta Lei. (Vide Lei nº 9.074, de 1995) 
§ 1
o
  Vencido o prazo mencionado no contrato ou ato de outorga, o serviço poderá ser 
prestado por órgão ou entidade do poder concedente, ou delegado a terceiros, mediante 
novo contrato.  
§ 2
o
 As concessões em caráter precário, as que estiverem com prazo vencido e as que 
estiverem em vigor por prazo indeterminado, inclusive por força de legislação anterior, 
permanecerão válidas pelo prazo necessário à realização dos levantamentos e avaliações 
indispensáveis à organização das licitações que precederão a outorga das concessões que 
as substituirão, prazo esse que não será inferior a 24 (vinte e quatro) meses. 
§ 3º  As concessões a que se refere o § 2
o
 deste artigo, inclusive as que não possuam 
instrumento que as formalize ou que possuam cláusula que preveja prorrogação, terão 
validade máxima até o dia 31 de dezembro de 2010, desde que, até o dia 30 de junho de 
2009, tenham sido cumpridas, cumulativamente, as seguintes condições:  
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I - levantamento mais amplo e retroativo possível dos elementos físicos constituintes da 
infra-estrutura de bens reversíveis e dos dados financeiros, contábeis e comerciais 
relativos à prestação dos serviços, em dimensão necessária e suficiente para a realização 
do cálculo de eventual indenização relativa aos investimentos ainda não amortizados 
pelas receitas emergentes da concessão, observadas as disposições legais e contratuais 
que regulavam a prestação do serviço ou a ela aplicáveis nos 20 (vinte) anos anteriores ao 
da publicação desta Lei;  
II - celebração de acordo entre o poder concedente e o concessionário sobre os critérios e 
a forma de indenização de eventuais créditos remanescentes de investimentos ainda não 
amortizados ou depreciados, apurados a partir dos levantamentos referidos no inciso I 
deste parágrafo e auditados por instituição especializada escolhida de comum acordo 
pelas partes; e   
III - publicação na imprensa oficial de ato formal de autoridade do poder concedente, 
autorizando a prestação precária dos serviços por prazo de até 6 (seis) meses, renovável 
até 31 de dezembro de 2008, mediante comprovação do cumprimento do disposto nos 
incisos I e II deste parágrafo.    
§ 4
o
  Não ocorrendo o acordo previsto no inciso II do § 3
o
 deste artigo, o cálculo da 
indenização de investimentos será feito com base nos critérios previstos no instrumento 
de concessão antes celebrado ou, na omissão deste, por avaliação de seu valor econômico 
ou reavaliação patrimonial, depreciação e amortização de ativos imobilizados definidos 
pelas legislações fiscal e das sociedades por ações, efetuada por empresa de auditoria 
independente escolhida de comum acordo pelas partes.   
§ 5
o
  No caso do § 4
o
 deste artigo, o pagamento de eventual indenização será realizado, 
mediante garantia real, por meio de 4 (quatro) parcelas anuais, iguais e sucessivas, da 
parte ainda não amortizada de investimentos e de outras indenizações relacionadas à 
prestação dos serviços, realizados com capital próprio do concessionário ou de seu 
controlador, ou originários de operações de financiamento, ou obtidos mediante emissão 
de ações, debêntures e outros títulos mobiliários, com a primeira parcela paga até o 
último dia útil do exercício financeiro em que ocorrer a reversão.   
§ 6
o
  Ocorrendo acordo, poderá a indenização de que trata o § 5
o
 deste artigo ser paga 
mediante receitas de novo contrato que venha a disciplinar a prestação do serviço.   
Art. 43. Ficam extintas todas as concessões de serviços públicos outorgadas sem licitação 
na vigência da Constituição de 1988.(Vide Lei nº 9.074, de 1995) 
Parágrafo único. Ficam também extintas todas as concessões outorgadas sem licitação 
anteriormente à Constituição de 1988, cujas obras ou serviços não tenham sido iniciados 
ou que se encontrem paralisados quando da entrada em vigor desta Lei. 
Art. 44. As concessionárias que tiverem obras que se encontrem atrasadas, na data da 
publicação desta Lei, apresentarão ao poder concedente, dentro de cento e oitenta dias, 
plano efetivo de conclusão das obras.(Vide Lei nº 9.074, de 1995) 
Parágrafo único. Caso a concessionária não apresente o plano a que se refere este artigo 
ou se este plano não oferecer condições efetivas para o término da obra, o poder 
concedente poderá declarar extinta a concessão, relativa a essa obra. 
Art. 45. Nas hipóteses de que tratam os arts. 43 e 44 desta Lei, o poder concedente 
indenizará as obras e serviços realizados somente no caso e com os recursos da nova 
licitação. 
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Parágrafo único. A licitação de que trata o caput deste artigo deverá, obrigatoriamente, 
levar em conta, para fins de avaliação, o estágio das obras paralisadas ou atrasadas, de 
modo a permitir a utilização do critério de julgamento estabelecido no inciso III do art. 15 
desta Lei. 
Art. 46. Esta Lei entra em vigor na data de sua publicação. 
Art. 47. Revogam-se as disposições em contrário. 
Brasília, 13 de fevereiro de 1995; 174
o
 da Independência e 107
o
 da República. 
FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO 
Nelson Jobim 
Este texto não substitui o publicado no DOU de 14.2.1995 e republicado no DOU de 
28.9.1998 
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